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Abstract

I engage environmental scholarship by focusing on internal human displacement – people whose
lives are adversely affected by natural disasters associated with climate change, and, do not cross
an international border. Human displacement is increasing as rising global temperatures cause
natural disasters such as storms and floods to become larger and more severe. Moreover,
displacement is an understudied intervening condition that I show links climate change to conflict.
I follow the trend of disaggregating conflict by taking advantage of new event-based
datasets to explore multiple conflict types. I also use a dataset that is dedicated to human
displacement, rather than a proxy that is focused on natural disasters, to enhances my project’s
conceptual validity. I then thrice apply statistical and spatial analytic methods to evaluate data with
global coverage during 2008-2016. For each application, I use varied units of analysis to provide
the necessary detail for investigating questions oriented to temporality and spatiality.
Statistical analyses of data with global coverage found anti-government conflict and protest
are the two conflict types that significantly increase following disaster-induced displacement. The
relationship between disaster-induced displacement and conflict is significantly curvilinear with
country regime type, producing the expected inverted-U shape from mixed regimes having the
highest conflict incidence, in comparison to autocracies and democracies. The incidence of antigovernment conflict and protest show two peaks around 3 and 10 months after disaster-induced
displacement (in northern hemispheric countries). Finally, a case study of Bangladesh and its 64
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subnational administrative units found that disaster-induced displacement and conflict do not
spatially overlap, a finding that suggests migration away from disaster epicenters.
My research design and methods show how disaggregation of concepts and units of
analysis can reveal empirical patterns that would otherwise be undetectable. Moreover, I
demonstrate that spatiality must be accounted for in statistical modeling. Finally, my findings have
policy implications that range from affirmation of the contested assertion that climate change and
conflict are related, to the possibility of determining when and where relief and reconstruction
efforts can be focused to mitigate the suffering of displaced persons, thereby addressing the
conditions that elevate the probability of increased conflict.
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Chapter One
Introduction

[I]t’s not a coincidence that immediately prior to the civil war in Syria, the country
experienced its worst drought on record. As many as 1.5 million people migrated from
Syria’s farms to its cities, intensifying the political unrest that was just beginning to roil
and boil in the region. Again, I am not suggesting that climate change was the primary
reason for the crisis in Syria…[b]ut the drought that devastated communities across the
country exacerbated instability on the ground and made a bad situation worse.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
November 10, 2015

Do natural environmental factors influence social-political conflict and violence? And if so, how
is this relationship likely to be affected by climate change? Questions such as these have been
addressed as early as the eighteenth-century by Thomas Malthus (1798) who claimed that human
population size would eventually exceed food production capacity, resulting in starvation and
conflict followed by renewed population-food equilibrium. Similar arguments positing a natural
environment-conflict relationship continually manifested throughout the twentieth-century
(Ehrlich 1968; Homer-Dixon 1999; Kaplan 1994; Klare 2002). More recently, the combination of
drought, high atmospheric temperatures, and wildfire that diminished much of Russia’s 2010
wheat output and led to increased global bread prices, have been suggested as factors that
contributed to the Arab Spring uprisings (Norwood 2012; Simmons 2013). The assertion that the
natural environment can contribute to human conflict is therefore not a new idea and is gaining
salience because of the projected effects of climate change. Exemplifying this development is the
1

U.S. Department of Defense’s strategy that asserted “[a]mong the future trends that will impact
our national security is climate change…[which] will intensify the challenges of global instability,
hunger, poverty, and conflict” (U.S. Department of Defense 2014, 2).1
Environmental conflict scholarship focuses on how natural environmental factors interact
with and contribute to social-political conflict and violence (Diehl 1998; Ross 2004a, 2004b;
Wilner 2006). A subset of environmental conflict focuses on how the effects of climate change
might causally influence conflict. Climate change has naturally occurred throughout the Earth’s
history but anthropogenic climate change, meaning changes that are brought by human activities,
is occurring at unprecedented rates (Stocker et al. 2013a). Increased temperatures are, on average,
worsening climate extremes, which can include rainfall volume, and particular to storm events,
windspeed and spatial extent. Another finding that lends to the importance of climate change is
that its trajectory is largely determined and is now a matter of degree. The United Nations’
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports that “[m]ost aspects of climate change will
persist for many centuries even if emissions of CO2 (carbon dioxide) are stopped” (Stocker et al.
2013b, 25–27).
The physical aspects of climate change have social implications. Not all of these impacts
entail gloom and doom and some actually occasion social benefit. Increased atmospheric
temperature will reduce energy requirements and expenditure for heating, and increased levels of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere might promote photosynthesis, leading to boosted agricultural
yield in some circumstances (Porter et al. 2014, 493). The preponderance of climate changes
however, are undermining the conditions that constitute human security: the ability to maintain a

1

The substance of this assessment has endured within official U.S. defense strategizing despite general
skepticism from President Donald Trump’s administration towards climate change science (115th Congress
2017).

2

livelihood, hindering culture and identity, displacement from one’s home, and the capacity of
states to promote these aspects of security (Adger et al. 2014, 758). Social impacts of climate
change are not uniformly distributed. One reason is that climate hazards must combine with
exposure of human populations or infrastructure for adverse impact to occur (Field et al. 2014b,
5). Moreover, populations with high vulnerability, meaning low capacity to prepare for and
rebound from climate extreme events, are experiencing the brunt of climate change effects.
Heretofore climate-conflict scholarship has produced few generalizable and robust
findings (Tollefsen and Buhaug 2015, 15–16)(Field et al. 2014a; Meierding 2013; Salehyan 2008;
Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug 2011). Research design features likely contribute to the
inconsistent findings. Most of the early climate-conflict studies statistically examined climate
change proxies (e.g., atmospheric temperature, rainfall amounts and variations, and severe storms)
with highly aggregated conflict types, namely civil war. In addition, the conventional unit of
analysis has been the country-year, which is probably too imprecise to capture the sub-national
spatial concentrations of climate change hazards and social vulnerability (Busby et al. 2013;
Busby, Smith, and Krishnan 2014), and the temporal variation that, based on theoretical work and
one empirical study, occurs during a period of time that is considerably briefer than a year
(Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015). The combination of these factors constitutes a research
design that is problematically suited to detecting the statistical significance that would derive from
and signal the actuality of a climate change-conflict relationship.

Project goals
Three fundamental questions motivate this project. The first asks, does climate change influence
social-political conflict? I approach this question by focusing on internal human displacement,
3

meaning people whose lives are adversely affected by natural disasters associated with climate
change, and, remain in their country of origin. Human displacement is important because the
number of displaced persons is increasing as rising global temperatures are causing natural
disasters such as storms and floods to become larger and more severe. Moreover, in contrast to
studying purely physical manifestations of climate change (e.g. atmospheric temperature or
rainfall), displacement is an understudied intervening condition.
The second question that drives this project asks, if evidence is found to support such a
relationship, what are the association’s characteristics? I want to know what types of conflict are
influenced by disaster-induced placement, e.g. violent anti-government opposition, repression by
the government, protest by citizens? Does conflict incidence increase or decrease? When, after a
natural disaster event occurs, does conflict incidence vary? Immediately, one month, two months,
more? How do natural disasters spatially relate to conflict? Do they overlap, wherein natural
disasters and conflict events concentrate in the same locale, or are they spatially separate?
Findings in response to these questions inform the project’s third motivating question: what
are the policy implications? In a basic sense, is there evidence of a displacement-conflict
relationship that warrants further consideration by policymakers and researchers? The relationship
is theoretically plausible but may be empirically unfounded. But if the relationship is supported by
systematically evaluated evidence, policy implications could entail a temporal window(s) of
opportunity to provide disaster relief, so as to have the best chance of influencing conflict
incidence. Similarly, findings could guide government officials and transnational relief
organizations regarding the location of their effort and resources.

4

Findings and Contributions
This project makes several contributions to environmental conflict scholarship in the course of
answering these questions. I follow the trend of theoretically and empirically disaggregating
conflict. Instead of studying conflict in the highly aggregated form of civil war, I take advantage
of prior theoretical work and advances in data and statistical software to explore multiple conflict
types: anti-government conflict, non-governmental conflict, repression, and protest, and what I
term unrest for aggressive and/or destructive behavior by individuals that is unassociated with a
social or political organization. My contributions are not limited to the outcome of interest, a
dataset for human displacement that has yet to appear in social science research is used. Using a
dataset that is dedicated to human displacement, rather than a proxy that is focused on natural
disasters more broadly, enhances my project’s conceptual validity. Further taking advantage of
new datasets, after conducting statistical analyses that follow the convention of using country-year
as the unit of analysis, I then temporally and spatially format the data at alternative units of analysis
for subsequent analyses that generate findings with substantively greater detail.
These research design features lead to several notable findings. Country-year statistical
analyses of data with global coverage found anti-government conflict and protest are the two
conflict types that significantly increase following disaster-induced displacement. The relationship
between disaster-induced displacement and conflict is significantly curvilinear with country
regime type, producing the expected inverted-U shape from mixed regimes having the highest
conflict incidence, in comparison to the lower incidence of autocracies and democracies. The
incidence of anti-government conflict and protest show two peaks around 3 and 10 months after
disaster-induced displacement (in northern hemispheric countries), which reconciles sociology's
disaster scholarship with work in contentious politics. Finally, a case study of Bangladesh and its
5

64 subnational administrative units enabled application of spatial analytic methods that yielded
suggestive findings that disaster-induced displacement and conflict do not spatially overlap.
My findings contribute to environmental conflict scholarship by demonstrating that
internal human displacement because of climate change-related natural disasters influence the
incidence of conflict and unrest. Insights from this dissertation are not limited to environmental
scholarship. I apply research design features and methods that show how disaggregation of
concepts and units of analysis can reveal empirical patterns that would otherwise be undetectable.
Conflict studies more generally will benefit from adoption and similar application of these
methodological choices. Finally, findings from this dissertation have policy implications that range
from affirmation of the contested assertion that climate change and conflict are related, to the
possibility of determining when and where relief and reconstruction efforts can be focused to
mitigate the suffering of displaced persons, thereby addressing the conditions that elevate the
probability of conflict.

Dissertation Outline
The content and arguments of this dissertation proceed as follows. Chapter two establishes
theoretical grounds for why climate change, manifest as disaster-induced human displacement,
might influence social-political conflict. Doing so requires drawing on the natural sciences for a
primer on the physical aspects of climate change. This sets the context for highlighting research
on the social consequences of climate change, in particular, how the convergence of climate
hazards and human vulnerability from social, political, and economic conditions result in spatial
concentrations of the adverse effects. I then draw on multiple academic disciplines–geography,
political science, psychology, sociology–for theoretical insights regarding the intervening social
6

conditions that mediate climate change and conflict. It is important to note here that theoretical
expectations are not limited to a positive relationship where increased human displacement is
followed by increased conflict. A considerable amount of research, especially from disaster
scholarship in sociology, suggests that a climate-conflict relationship will be negative, meaning
that increased human displacement might entail decreased conflict because of heightened
cooperation and communal solidarity following natural disasters.
Chapter four introduces the data and assesses the relationship between disaster-induced
displacement and conflict by using conventional statistical analyses. Relatively new event-based
data allows me to craft variables for multiple conflict types. Country-year is used as the unit of
analysis because it is a convention of climate-conflict studies that use statistical methods.
Following this tack and using data with global coverage provided an initial analysis of the project’s
first question. Cooperation theory was initially favored by the preponderance of results that
included international aid in the modeling. However, when international aid was omitted to
increase the number of more recent observations, the results provided considerable support for
conflict theory. Anti-government conflict in particular showed robustness as it was significant and
positive through varied specifications, both in this analysis and earlier modeling that included
international aid. Another notable finding is that regime type performed as expected, presenting
the curvilinear inverted-U distribution. Anocratic countries, those with regimes that present
democratic and autocratic features, experienced the most conflict incidence. This accords with
theoretical expectation that mixed regimes, in comparison to autocracies, may not possess the
ability or resolve to suppress conflict directed towards government entities or among nongovernmental actors. Alternatively, in comparison to democracies, autocracies may foster conflict
through less effective governance, in terms of preparation and response to natural disasters, as well
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as peaceful conflict resolution. Also related to regime type, the results favored the expectation of
that democracies, because of their tolerance for public demonstrations, do experience increased
protest incidence following climate change-related disaster-induced displacement.
Chapter five engages temporally oriented questions about the relationship between climate
change-related human displacement and conflict. Specifically, when will conflict and unrest
incidence significantly vary following disaster-induced displacement events? Using the countrymonth as the unit of analysis, in combination with descriptive statistics and regression analyses,
enables evaluation of temporally-oriented hypotheses with greater detail. Anti-government
conflict protest most closely accorded with the expectation that conflict will peak during the period
2-3 months following displacement activity. This is consistent with findings from both sociological
disaster scholarship and contentious political theory; the former finding that cooperation
characterizes communities immediately following natural disasters, and the latter’s expectation
that time will be required for political actors to take advantage of post-disaster conditions. An
unanticipated finding was that anti-government conflict showed a second increase during the ninth
and tenth months following displacement. Similarly, protest showed significant increases during
the 0-4 month-lead periods, which is surprising because of the expectation that time would be
required for grievances to develop following disaster-induced displacement. To further check the
validity and robustness of these findings, dummy variables for calendar months confirmed that
northern hemispheric countries experienced increased anti-government conflict and protest
subsequent to the region’s seasonal crest of disaster-related displacement during August.
Chapter six engages spatially oriented questions about the relationship between climate
change-related human displacement and conflict. To establish this relationship, a case study was
necessary because the natural disaster data required manual geocoding to enable spatial analyses.
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Bangladesh was selected because it is a most-likely case to exhibit a climate-conflict relationship:
it has high exposure to disaster hazards, and its social, political, and economic conditions lend to
its vulnerability, meaning that its governance and capacity to prepare for and respond to major
storms is relatively low. The paramount finding was that natural disasters presented significant
spatial autocorrelation. This is important because it calls for models that can accommodate the
spatiality of natural disasters, which violate the independence assumption of conventional
statistics. Preliminary analyses of spatially oriented hypotheses were administered through
statistics that indicate significant local spatial dependence. Non-governmental conflict was the
only conflict type with a high-incidence district that overlapped with a high-disaster district. This
result suggests domestic out-migration of disaster-induced Internally Displaced persons (IDPs),
meaning that people relocate to other sub-national districts to get away from the epicenter of a
natural disaster(s). Resource-based theories were also supported by finding that a majority of subnational districts with significantly high conflict incidence included a major city. Interestingly
though, the results were more nuanced for Bangladesh’s country capital, Dhaka. Consistent with
expectation, anti-government conflict showed significantly high incidence in the Dhaka district,
but no other conflict type showed high incidence in the district, which is especially curious for
repression and protest, which would expectedly show similarly high incidence as the state’s forces
would presumably counter insurgents and protestors. Finally, chapter seven concludes this project
by reviewing the findings so that policy implications and suggestions for further research can be
discussed.
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Chapter Two
The Natural and Social Science
of
Climate Change and Conflict

Human security will be progressively threatened as the climate changes.
Opening statement by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change in its assessment of the implications of climate change for humanity (Adger
et al. 2014, 757).

How could the natural environment influence social-political conflict? What evidence has been
found to support such a relationship? And what implications derive from climate change being one
of the most impactful issues that will be faced for generations? I respond to these questions by first
surveying environmental conflict scholarship, the line of research that is dedicated to better
understanding how natural environmental factors influence social-political conflict. I show how
early findings provided support for an environmental conflict relationship, whereby the natural
environment acts as an additive influence by aggravating other well documented conditions that
give rise to conflict. Such findings prompt attention towards climate change because the
preponderance of its effects is expected to amplify conflict antecedents. I elaborate these
relationships by tracing the physical-natural aspects of climate change and how they yield political,
social, and economic impacts.
10

All of this serves as a foundation for the subfield of environmental conflict research that is
dedicated to studying the relationships between climate change and conflict. I focus on three
characteristics of climate-conflict scholarship: (1) an increased focus on the intervening conditions
that may link climate change to conflict; (2) theorization and measurement of conflict types other
than civil war; and (3) analysis of spatial dimensions that do not uniformly adhere to country-level
territory. Finally, I introduce the concept of human displacement because it is an understudied
intervening condition that may link climate change to conflict. I detail how human displacement
is worsening because of climate change, thereby setting up the subsequent chapter that theorizes
how climate change-related human displacement might influence social-political conflict.

Environmental Conflict and the Foundation of Climate-Conflict Research
Environmental conflict is a social scientific field of study that developed in the 1990s with the
pioneering work of Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) and Nils Petter Gleditsch (1998), who shortly
after the Cold War’s end sought to broaden security theory beyond its previous focus on nationstates (Diehl 1998; Levy 1995). Environmental conflict focuses on how natural environmental
factors interact with social-political conflict and violence (Diehl 1998; Ross 2004a, 2004b; Wilner
2006). Despite its post-Cold War origin, the assertion that environmental factors causally influence
social-political conflict and violence has long been suggested (Ehrlich 1968; Kaplan 1994;
Malthus 1798; Quarantelli and Dynes 1976).
The terms conflict and unrest are fundamental to this project. Conflict and unrest:
describe events where regular patterns of dispute resolution fail or social orders change.
These events may or may not be violent in nature, they may involve individuals or groups
of individuals, they may be organized or disorganized, and they may be personally,
politically or otherwise motivated (Hsiang and Burke 2014, 41).
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Table 2.1: Dimensions of Conflict and Unrest
Goal(s) Deliberation

Number of Actors

Degree of Coordination

Degree of Violence

Emotional /

Rational /

Single

Multiple

Spontaneous

Non-

Cathartic

Goal

Person

Person

Organized

Violent

Violent

Oriented
Conflict
Unrest

u
u

u

u

u

u

u

u

u

u

u
u

Source: Author’s own work.

This definition is sufficiently broad to encompass the range of conceptualizations within
environmental conflict scholarship. It also conveys the four characteristics that constitute and
distinguish the two concepts, Table 2.1. Goal deliberation refers to whether or not an action has
some form of a desired outcome that is sought by a rational actor or is the result of psychological
processes seeking emotional outlet or catharsis. Rioting to, in part, communicate grievance
exemplifies conflict because of its strategic or goal oriented deliberation (Tilly and Tarrow 2007).
In contrast, becoming irritable because of relatively hot and uncomfortable weather increases the
likelihood of unrest, meaning aggressive and/or destructive behaviors with catharsis being the
primary purpose (Anderson and DeLisi 2011). Studies have found that higher atmospheric
temperatures correlate with increased unrest such as professional baseball pitchers throwing
pitches that hit batters (Larrick et al. 2011; Reifman, Larrick, and Fein 1991), horn-honking by
drivers (Kenrick and MacFarlane 1986), domestic violence (Auliciems and DiBartolo 1995), and
use of force by police officers during training (Vrij, Van Der Steen, and Koppelaar 1994).
Number of actors refers to the number of analytically relevant human individuals. An event
could result from a single person or multiple, ranging from a small group of two or more to a large
12

faction. Degree of coordination refers to the degree of planning that precedes an event. An event
can be spontaneous or result from aforethought calculation. Unrest is characterized by spontaneity,
whereas conflict tends to be the outcome of planning, but may also occur suddenly in response to
opportune circumstance.
Finally, degree of violence refers to the use of physical force to inflict property damage
and/or bodily injury or death (Demmers 2012). Attentiveness to violence is important because of
research that shows non-violent conflict campaigns engender greater success rates than those that
are predominantly violent (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Conflict can therefore be non-violent
or violent, whereas I am conceptualizing unrest as always violent.
Scarcity of natural resources has been the theoretical foundation linking natural
environmental factors to all types of conflict. Scarcity theories are often termed Malthusian in
reference to Thomas Malthus’ eighteenth-century claim that human populations would eventually
exceed the carrying capacity of the natural environment, resulting in civilizational chaos until
balance was restored (Gleditsch 1998; Hartman 2001; Malthus 1798; Urdal 2005). Later scarcity
theorists argued that the probability for conflict increases when supplies of basic resources that are
necessary for subsistence (e.g. water, food, arable land) combine with market distortions, ethnic
division, human displacement, and weakened institutions (Homer-Dixon 1999; Klare 2002).
Scarcity is thought to make conflict more likely because those most affected may be more
susceptible to joining civil war campaigns in hopes of sharing in the forceful acquisition of basic
resources. Alternatively, scarcity might create or worsen extant inter-group tensions as groups
compete for resources to meet their members’ needs. A presumption regarding scarcity-conflict
relationships is that they will most likely occur where adaptation capabilities and access to resource
alternatives are low (Barnett and Adger 2007; Busby et al. 2013; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012).
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Scarcity theories were the presumptive starting point for early environmental conflict
scholarship. They provided a foundation for research that tended to be case studies and exemplified
the “plausibility probe” research design, whereby “preliminary studies on relatively untested
theories and hypotheses [are undertaken] to determine whether more intensive and laborious
testing is warranted” (George and Bennett 2005, 75). These studies succeeded in providing
empirical support for the plausibility of scarcity theories (Homer-Dixon 1999; Howard and
Homer-Dixon 1996; S. W. Lee 1997).
Scarcity theories also prompted criticisms that fostered theoretical refinement. A
prominent and frequent critique of Malthusian-scarcity theories is that they are deterministic
because of inadequate consideration for mediating political, institutional, and economic conditions
(Dauvergne 2005; Gleditsch 1998; O’Loughlin, Linke, and Witmer 2014; Peluso and Watts 2001;
Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Urdal 2005). Another challenge to scarcity came from
abundance theory, which asserts that resource plenitude is more likely to cause conflict.
Abundance theory claims that most people afflicted with severe scarcity are less prone to conflict
because of preoccupation with the survival of themselves and immediate family members.
Resource abundance by contrast, presents an incentive for theft or participation in conflicts
because of the possibility of partaking in the spoils (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Salehyan and
Hendrix 2014). In addition, resources may not only incentivize initiation of conflict, but may also
be used to fund and maintain conflict campaigns (Ross 2004a, 2004b). Abundance can also
contribute to conflict by creating tactically opportune circumstances (Demmers 2012; Keen 1998).
For example, Adano et al. (2012) showed that inter-tribal conflict in Kenya increased during
periods of ample rainfall, in part, because cattle-thieves could more easily conceal stolen livestock
within thicker foliage and were able to hydrate the ill-gotten cattle when absconding.
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Case studies that were based on scarcity theory also received severe methodological
criticisms. These criticisms reflected the quantitative-qualitative debates of political science
(McKeown 2004; Rudolph 2005). Environmental conflict case studies were criticized for
producing non-generalizable results because of research designs that did not enable precise
hypothesis testing, and relied on cases that were selected on the dependent variable (Binningsbø,
de Soysa, and Gleditsch 2007; Gleditsch 1998). Such reproaches accurately highlight the
limitations of case studies for assessing external validity, but typically fail to acknowledge the
tentative and circumscribed conclusions from the early case studies and their welcoming of “more
sophisticated hypotheses, and that these hypotheses should be tested using a broader range of
methodologies, including cross-national statistical analysis” (Homer-Dixon 1999, 182). Most
environmental conflict studies during the last decade use large-n statistical methods that reflect
this research line’s emphasis on generalizable findings (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013; Selby
2014).
These features and critiques of environmental conflict scholarship have informed the subset
line of research that focuses on the relationship between climate change and conflict. Climateconflict scholarship has grown during recent years as the effects of climate change have become
clearer. The next section provides an overview of findings and projections from the natural
sciences about climate change. This primer will then survey how the physical impacts of climate
change affect social phenomena. Doing so is necessary because the immediate social impacts of
climate change constitute the intervening conditions that may link climate change to conflict.

Climate Change – Assessments and Projections from Natural Science
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Climate change has naturally occurred throughout the Earth’s history but anthropogenic climate
change, meaning changes brought by human activities, is occurring at unprecedented rates
(Stocker et al. 2013a).2 Greenhouse gases (GHG), primarily carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous
oxide are emitted into the atmosphere as byproducts from energy and cement production,
agriculture, transportation, and deforestation. As their name suggests, GHGs prevent the sun’s
energy from radiating back to space thereby leading to global warming. In terms of planetary
averages, atmospheric, land and ocean temperatures have been increasing since 1880 (Stocker et
al. 2013b, 3), with climate change since 1950 primarily being the result of human activities
(Bindoff et al. 2013, 869).
The overall increase of global temperatures is leading to slow onset conditions that alter
the Earth’s ecosystems over years and decades. Daytime temperatures entail warmer days with
fewer cooler nights, and a recent study found that atmospheric temperatures that were unusually
hot during the summers of 1951-1980, were typical for summers during 2005-2015 (Field et al.
2012, 8; Popovich and Pearce 2017). In addition, global sea-levels have been rising, in part because
of melting glaciers and polar ice deposits, but primarily as a result of thermal expansion whereby
increased ocean temperature leads to a corresponding increase in the volume of water (Church et
al. 2013, 1139).

2

I rely heavily on reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to support this
section’s claims about climate change. The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological
Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to regularly generate Assessment Reports
regarding findings and projections about climate change from natural and social science research. IPCC
reports are arguably the most vetted and comprehensive body of information for enabling policymakers’
address of climate change. The IPCC states that its fifth and most recent Assessment Report resulted from
the effort of over 830 authors and editors from 85 different countries (IPCC 2017).
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Increased temperatures are, on average, also worsening climate extremes. Climate extremes
are “the occurrence of a value of a weather or climate3 variable above (or below) a threshold value
near the upper (or lower) ends (‘tails’) of the range of observed values of the variable” (Field et al.
2012, 30). In other words, using the bell-shape of the normal distribution, extremes are represented
in the tails, both above the mean in the 90th percentile or greater, or below the mean in the 10th
percentile or less. Climate extremes are context dependent despite use of the bell curve as a
standardized quantitative measure. They depend on the event type (e.g. atmospheric temperature,
precipitation, wind) and its frequency, timing, duration, severity, and spatial extent. For example,
a daily-high temperature of 94oF (34oC) during July is unremarkable for Houston, Texas, whereas
comparable temperatures in England and Wales during July 2016 were considered an extreme heat
wave that saw a small but statistically significant increase in human deaths (Current Results 2017;
Siddique 2016).
IPCC observations of heretofore changes to climate extreme events, and projections for the
21st century, present multiple dimensions of variation. Variations include frequency, duration,
intensity, regularity, spatial location and the degree of confidence that can be attributed to
observations and projections. The decades-long trend of rising atmospheric temperature is
“virtually certain” to continue on a global scale with warmer days becoming more frequent and
intense, which will also generate more frequent, intense, and longer lasting heat waves (Field et
al. 2012, 119, 133–41). Extreme rainfall events, which can be either deluge or drought, have also

3

Weather and climate are distinguished by temporal range, at “the simplest level the weather is what is
happening to the atmosphere at any given time. Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the ‘average
weather,’ or more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant
quantities over a period of time.” (Cubasch et al. 2013, 123–26; Field et al. 2012, 40). Thirty years is
commonly used by the World Meteorological Organization to average weather measurements to describe
climate (Cubasch et al. 2013, 126).
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been worsening. Most regions have experienced a statistically significant increase in the frequency
of heavy rainfall events and total rainfall therein, both of which are expected to persist into the 21st
century, especially over mid-latitude land masses and tropical regions (Field et al. 2012, 12, 149;
Stocker et al. 2013a, 5). Conversely, droughts have become longer and more intense in southern
Europe and western Africa, whereas regions in North America and northwestern Australia have
seen a decline in their frequency, intensity, of duration (Field et al. 2012, 112). However, the IPCC
projects with medium confidence that drought intensity and duration will worsen during the 21st
century, expanding beyond southern Europe and the Mediterranean region to include central
Europe, central North America, Central America, and southern Africa (Field et al. 2012, 119).
Climate extremes have implications for compound events that combine weather
manifestations (Field et al. 2012, 118). A compound event refers to one of the following situations:
(1) two or more extreme events occur simultaneously or consecutively, (2) a combination of
extreme events with shared defining conditions that magnify both events’ impact, or (3) discrete
events that are not extremes per se, but constitute an extreme event when combined. Flooding well
exemplifies all three possibilities for a compound event. The quick succession of Hurricanes
Harvey and Irma, and their toll on the U.S. emergency and reconstruction capacity, demonstrate
the first possibility for a compound event. For the second possibility, storm surge from cyclones4
will eventually combine with higher sea level, and the combination of these two categorically
distinct phenomena will amplify the severity of flooding. Lastly, the third possibility for a
compound event can manifest when two non-extreme rainfall events occur in short succession
wherein the first downpour saturates the soil. Rainfall from the subsequent storm that cannot be

4

The term for tropical cyclones depends on where the event occurs. They are known as hurricanes in the
Atlantic Ocean and northeastern Pacific, typhoons in the northwestern Pacific Ocean, and cyclones in the
south Pacific and Indian oceans.
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absorbed into the waterlogged soil or drained by a locale’s watershed system can then lead to
flooding.5
Another finding that lends to the importance of climate change is that its general trajectory
is immutable. The IPCC reports that “[m]ost aspects of climate change will persist for many
centuries even if emissions of CO2 (carbon dioxide) are stopped” (Stocker et al. 2013b, 25–27).
The Earth’s natural systems are capable of removing the surge of anthropogenic GHGs but will
require “a few hundred thousand years” to return to pre-industrial levels (Ciais et al. 2013, 472–
73). Geoengineering technologies are available to mitigate the effects of GHGs and help remediate
the planet but the degree to which such technologies can offset anthropogenic climate change is
unclear (Stocker et al. 2013b).6 The IPCC reports that it “is virtually certain that increases in the
frequency and magnitude of warm daily temperature extremes and decreases in cold extremes will
occur through the 21st century at the global scale…[and it] is very likely that the length, frequency,
and/or intensity of warm spells or heat waves will increase over most land areas” (Field et al. 2012,
112).

The Immediate Social Impacts of Climate Change
The physical aspects of climate change have social implications. Not all of these impacts entail
gloom and doom and some actually occasion social benefit. Climate change will reduce energy
requirements and expenditure for heating. Global warming has also opened Arctic maritime routes

5

Elaboration of the IPCC’s assessments and projections is provided in Table A.1 in the appendix.
Current assessments of geoengineering capabilities agree that such technology will not provide a silver
bullet to address climate change. Notwithstanding the present uncertainty about the extent to which
geoengineering will aid climate change mitigation, these technologies will not affect rising ocean
acidification, which is one of Earth’s natural processes for processing GHGs (Stocker et al. 2013b).
6
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that were previously only seasonally navigable, often only with the aid of specialized icebreaking
vessels (Chow 2017; Goldman 2017). Increased levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere might
promote photosynthesis that leads to crop increases (Porter et al. 2014, 493). In addition, effective
countermeasures are already available for many of climate change’s health detriments, e.g.
provision of clean water and sanitation, vaccinations and disaster preparation. The preponderance
of climate changes however, is undermining the conditions that constitute human security: the
ability to maintain a livelihood, hindering culture and identity, displacement from one’s home, and
the capacity of states to promote these aspects of security (Adger et al. 2014, 758).
Climate change will adversely influence economic livelihood through a variety of
processes. While the cost of heating will decrease for many regions, this positive externality will
be more than offset by greater energy demand for cooling (Arent et al. 2014, 662, 672). Multiple
types of agricultural output will decline because of climate extremes such as high temperature and
insufficient rainfall, as well as from pathogens that are expected to spread with warmer
temperatures (Adger et al. 2014, 803). One study cited by the IPCC estimates that global labor
productivity will decrease during the hottest months to 60% in 2100, and in the context of severe
climate change with less mitigation of GHG emissions, possibly less than 40% in 2200 (K. R.
Smith et al. 2014, 736). Especially severe examples of undermined livelihood are Alexandria and
Port Said in Egypt, two cities that are densely populated and impoverished low elevation coastal
zones, where they are already challenged with worsening floods and are increasingly at risk of
submersion (Adger et al. 2014, 803). The combination of floods and sea-level rise inflict saltwater
intrusion and risk erosion not only of the two cities’ assets, but for the surrounding Nile delta
region that provides one-third of Egypt’s agricultural production and half of its industrial
productivity (Eldeberky and Hünicke 2015). Insurance coverage is one form of adaptation to
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climate change, by enabling those affected to recoup losses and rebuild (Albuja et al. 2015; Busby
et al. 2013; P. P. Wong et al. 2014). The future affordability and sustainability of insurance
coverage is questionable though, because premiums are expected to rise as coverage diminishes
and costs rise from more frequent and severe extreme events (Arent et al. 2014, 687).
Food security is another social dimension that is projected to experience net negative
outcomes because of climate change. Food security is commonly disaggregated into four requisite
conditions: (1) availability, or ample supply through production or trade; (2) access, meaning the
ability to purchase or produce one’s own food; (3) utilization is the ability to meet one’s
physiological needs through diet, and that one’s nutrients are not lost (e.g. because of illness related
to inadequate sanitation); and (4), stability in terms of consistent access, regardless of season or
price (Simmons 2013, 9). Most findings and projections about food availability are troubling.
Wheat and maize production have already experienced decreases in several regions, and for
terrestrial food production (i.e. land-based rather aquatic) in general, negative effects are more
common than positive ones (Porter et al. 2014, 491, 494). Some cereal and oilseed (e.g. soybeans,
peanuts, cotton) will have lower yields with exposure to temperatures above 86oF (30oC) and stress
from water shortage (Porter et al. 2014, 497). Stocks of fish and invertebrate species in some
tropical fisheries will diminish from coral bleaching (Porter et al. 2014, 493). And although some
areas within tropical and temperate regions are expected to have increased average agricultural
yields through 2029, decreased output will likely become more common and severe for the
remainder of the 21st century (Field et al. 2014a, 65, 504–5).
The utilization criterion of food security is also in jeopardy. Vector-borne infection will
worsen because of increased temperatures that promote the growth, survival, and transmission of
pathogens (K. R. Smith et al. 2014, 726). E. coli and cholera can result from consumption of
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contaminated food or water, with symptoms (vomiting and diarrhea) that impair food utilization.
In addition, as the recent hurricane damage in Houston and Florida demonstrate, flood waters from
storm surges pose a toxic threat from sewage and chemicals within the water (MacKenzie 2017;
Strochlic 2016).
Access to food regardless of season or price is another pathway by which food security is
anticipated to suffer because of climate change. Beginning in approximately 2005, food prices
spiked following climate extreme events, and the IPCC asserts that food prices are “very likely”
to increase by 2050 because of temperature and rainfall factors, with projected price increases
ranging from 3-84% (Porter et al. 2014, 494, 512).
Social impacts of climate change also pertain to aspects of public health that are outside
the analytical scope of food security. The mere presence of climate-altering pollutants was
estimated to have been responsible for approximately 7% of global disease during the year 2010
(K. R. Smith et al. 2014, 728). The IPCC additionally projects with “very high confidence” that
heat waves and fires will heighten risk of injury, disease, diminished occupational productivity
and death (Mora et al. 2018; K. R. Smith et al. 2014, 713). In fact, some parts of the world already
exceed the international standard for safe working conditions during their hottest months (K. R.
Smith et al. 2014, 713, 720). In a dry-bulb environment that has minimal humidity, the human
body can most effectively maintain a healthy core temperature range through perspiration. Physical
labor in a locale with a high wet-bulb temperature, a type of heat index that takes atmospheric
temperature and humidity into account, can exceed the human body’s capacity for
thermoregulation.7 Hyperthermia risks heat exhaustion’s physical and cognitive impairment in

7

Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT) measures humidity, wind speed, sun angle and cloud cover. It’s a
guide for the degree of heat stress that can be expected from physical activity in direct sunlight. The WGBT
is referenced for prescribing safe physical activity and labor by organizations such as the International
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mild cases, and in more dire instances, the possibility of heat stroke with its attendant organ
damage and/or death. Findings from one recent study even indicate that parts of the Arabian Gulf
and Southwest Asia might become uninhabitable when rising temperature combines with the
region’s low elevation and coastal humidity (Pal and Eltahir 2015).
Social impacts of climate change are not uniformly distributed. One reason is that climate
hazards must combine with exposure of human populations or infrastructure for adverse impact to
occur (Field et al. 2014b, 5). Hazard refers to the probability for the occurrence of physical events
such as floods and heat waves that could harm human life and assets, and exposure denotes the
presence of human beings or assets. The Afar region in East Africa, for instance, has some of the
hottest year-round climate on Earth, and its northeastern desert has no permanent human
settlements because of the harsh climate (Pal and Eltahir 2015). The potential for negative climate
change impact is therefore quite low; high WBGT poses little threat in northeastern Afar because
of its minimal exposure to persons and infrastructure. In contrast, less severe WBGT conditions
pose greater hazard in the context of Europe because of exposure to denser human population.
Vulnerability, another important concept in climate change research and policy making, helps to
demonstrate the complex and contingent relationships of these conditions. Vulnerability refers to
social conditions that mitigate or exacerbate impacts through interaction with hazard and exposure.
Europe is projected to experience more intense and frequent heat waves, but despite having less
intense heat waves than the Afar region, European hazard will be greater because of its exposure
to denser human population. In comparison with Europe, Southwest Asia will likely experience
worse impact following heat waves, in part because of greater intensity, but primarily because of

Labour Organization, the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and American College of
Sports Medicine. The more common Heat Index, in contrast, is limited to temperature and humidity and is
calculated for shady conditions.
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greater vulnerability. Europe’s vulnerability to high WBGT will be less than many parts of
Southwest Asia because of the availability of air conditioning, clean water for hydration, and
medical attention that is more readily available when hyperthermia occurs.
Differential social impacts of climate will be especially harmful to persons who are already
marginalized. By marginalized, I mean groups of people who are burdened with greater
vulnerability consequent to historic or ongoing political, economic, or cultural disempowerment.
Prominent examples include racial and ethnic groups, females, the impoverished, disabled, or
elderly. The theories of threat multiplication or catastrophic convergence assert that climate change
will aggravate the political, economic, and cultural conditions that give rise to poverty and socialpolitical conflict (Adger et al. 2014, 802; Parenti 2011, 7–9; U.S. Department of Defense 2014).
Climate-related hazards, ranging from subtle changes to extreme events, will influence the lives
of poor people “directly through impacts on livelihoods, such as losses in crop yields, destroyed
homes, food insecurity, and loss of sense of place, and indirectly through increased food prices”
(Adger et al. 2014, 796). The IPCC portends with “high confidence” that undernutrition and
derivative maladies will rise and concentrate in impoverished regions where food security will
decline (K. R. Smith et al. 2014, 730–31). Vulnerability considerations are not confined to the
proverbial global South. The fact that more than 80% of the deaths associated with Europe’s 2003
extreme heat wave were persons 75 years of age or older, highlights the global relevance of
vulnerability (K. R. Smith et al. 2014, 721). In short, “[c]limate-related hazards exacerbate other
stressors, often with negative outcomes for livelihoods, especially for people living in poverty”
(Adger et al. 2014, 796).
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Climate-conflict research
The social implications of climate change – disrupted economic activity, food insecurity,
heightened exposure to environmental hazards – correspond to risk factors for civil war and
conflict. Climate change has consequently received increased attention from environmental
conflict scholars. In this section, I briefly review climate-conflict scholarship, highlighting three
features for this line of research: (1) an increased focus on the intervening conditions that may link
climate change to conflict; (2) theorization and measurement of conflict types other than civil war;
and (3) analysis of spatial dimensions that do not uniformly adhere to country-level territory.
Climate change effects that have been empirically assessed include atmospheric
temperature increases (Buhaug 2010; Burke et al. 2009; Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 2011; Theisen
2012), rainfall amount and variation (Buhaug 2010; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Koubi et al. 2012;
Salehyan and Hendrix 2014), and natural disasters brought about by increased frequency and
severity of storms and floods (Brancati 2007; Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman 2015; Nardulli,
Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015; Nel and Righarts 2008; Slettebak 2012). These studies rely on historic
data of natural environmental phenomena as proxies for the effects of climate change.
Climate-conflict scholarship initially focused on civil war as the primary type of conflict
(Buhaug 2010; Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 2011; Nel and Righarts 2008; Raleigh and Urdal 2007).
One reason for this emphasis is theoretical – climate change has been characterized as a “threat
multiplier” (Field et al. 2014a, 1109; U.S. Department of Defense 2014), a source of natural
environmental pressures that aggravate factors that have already been found to contribute to civil
war, such as weak states that lack capacity to meet the needs of their citizens (Hendrix 2008; Kahl
2006), ethnic diversity (Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman 2015; Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug
2011), low or diminished economic performance (Bergholt and Lujala 2012; Maystadt, Ecker, and
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Findings from climate-conflict research are difficult to generalize because of results that
are contradictory or have yet to be corroborated by subsequent studies (Busby et al. 2013, 139–40;
Meierding 2013; Salehyan 2008; Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). For example, of ten
studies that examined if short-term decreases of rainfall amount contribute to increased civil war,
three studies found increased incidence of conflict, five found no relationship, and two found
decreased incidence (Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 617). Similarly discrepant results have
been found for atmospheric warming, water scarcity, natural disasters, and land degradation (Selby
2014; Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). One meta-study found “strong support for a causal
association between climatological changes and conflict across a range of geographies, a range of
different time periods, a range of spatial scales and across climatic events of different duration”
(Hsiang and Burke 2014, 42). However, Buhaug et al. (2014, 394) undermine the finding by noting
that the “the meta-analysis…considers just one climate indicator from each study, in many cases
the one that indicated the strongest effect, although many of the original studies actually explore
multiple alternative and complementary climate measures that sometimes produce contrasting
results.”
Researchers have responded to the heretofore absence of robust findings with theoretical
refinement for the possibility of a more contingent climate-conflict relationship and use of methods
with recently developed datasets for testing newly derived hypotheses. Earlier research designs
typically examined correlations between climate change proxies and civil war (Buhaug 2010;
Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 2011; Nel and Righarts 2008; Raleigh and Urdal 2007). A problem with
these research designs is that they do not enable testing of hypotheses with sufficient precision to
identify critical intervening and causal processes. Closer study of economic conditions exemplifies
this trend towards better understanding of intervening factors and processes. Low economic

27

performance and high reliance on primary commodity exports, for instance, have been found to
increase the probability for civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Two
studies that assessed the importance of country-level economic levels – GDP per capita and real
GDP per capita growth rate – did not find support for macroeconomics as an intervening factor
linking climate to conflict (Bergholt and Lujala 2012; Koubi et al. 2012).8 However, in response
to projections that climate change will imperil food security, Hendrix and Haggard (2015) found
increased incidence of urban riots and protests in African and Asian countries with democratic or
mixed national regimes, when policies were not implemented to mitigate increased domestic food
prices. These findings highlight the contingency of a possible climate-conflict relationship. While
findings from civil war and conflict research are suggestive, the validity of their relevance to
climate change needs theoretical elaboration and empirical assessment.
The contentious politics framework of social movements research has influenced how
climate-conflict scholars theorize intervening conditions (Hendrix and Haggard 2015; Nardulli,
Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015; Jürgen Scheffran et al. 2012). Contentious politics theorization and
epistemology tries to identify the “mechanisms” that similarly operate within complex events and
conceptually distinct phenomena such as revolutions, civil wars, and social movements (McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Similar to my definition of goal deliberation as
one of the four dimensions of conflict, contentious politics refers to instances when the political
objective of one actor impinges upon the interests of another actor. This approach asserts that

8

Both studies used a two-stage research design to test the hypotheses that climate change proxies would
result in an overall decline in a country’s economic performance, and secondly, that relatively low economic
performance would be followed by increased civil war incidence. One study found that climate change
proxies (floods and severe storms) decreased countries’ economic performance as expected, but that the
decreased economic performance did not significantly relate with civil war onset (Bergholt and Lujala
2012). The other study found that precipitation and atmospheric temperatures did not significantly relate
with declined economic performance (Koubi et al. 2012).

28

repertoires of contention, the actions that actors undertake to promulgate and advance their
interests, range from acts of non-violent protest by individual persons to bloody revolution (Tilly
2004; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). A commonality among the lone protestor and collective actions
such as social movements and civil war is conflict, i.e., actions characterized by strategic goal
deliberation, meaning self-aware pursuit of a goal that impinges on someone else’s interests.
In addition to greater attention to intervening conditions, the contentious politics approach
contributed to a broadened conceptualization of conflict, one that is interested in conflict types
other than civil war. Prior to 2012, most climate-conflict studies relied on Uppsala/PRIO’s Armed
Conflict Dataset (ACD) that requires three criteria for an event to be considered an armed conflict
(i.e. civil war): (1) at least one of the combatants must be a state; (2) in addition to a state, the
conflict must involve an “organized opposition…with a stated incompatibility…involving
consciously conducted and planned political campaigns rather than spontaneous violence”; and (3)
at least 25 battle-deaths during a year (UCDP and PRIO 2014, 2). These requirements exclude
conflict types that are theoretically expected to increase because of climate change. For instance,
the criterion that one of the parties in conflict must be a state excludes conflicts that only involve
non-state actors.
Another problem results from the organized actor criterion that assumes organizational
composition and overlooks impediments to collective action (Olson 1965; Tilly 1978). While some
conflict events – demonstrations and protests – are planned by organized actors, organization and
planning are not necessary conditions. A superlative example is Mohammed Bouazizi, the
Tunisian street vendor whose sudden protest by self-immolation has been described as the catalyst
for the Arab Spring, a spontaneous conflict event without organizational backing (Day 2011;
Watson and Karadsheh 2011). Requiring planning and organization therefore excludes
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extemporaneous yet relevant events, which is why the goal deliberation dimension of conflict is a
continuum of spontaneity to aforethought. Finally, the ACD’s third 25 battle-death per annum
threshold omits events of conflict and unrest that are either not violent or do not meet the casualty
threshold. Recent studies recognize the need to examine conflict types other than civil war by
examining demonstrations and political attacks by non-state actors (Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh
2015), riots (Hendrix and Haggard 2015), and combinations thereof (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012).
Spatial analysis is the third development intended to better assess the contingency of a climateconflict relationship. It refers to methods for data that are geocoded, or correspond to a specific
location on the Earth’s surface.9 Climate change effects vary spatially; for instance, low-elevation
coastal areas will suffer most from rising sea-level, whereas large areas in the northern latitudes
are projected to experience the highest increases of atmospheric temperature (Stocker et al. 2013b).
Figure 2.2 illustrates an aggregation of Africa’s climate-related hazards and shows, for example,
the Democratic Republic of Congo has regions ranging from lowest to highest hazard exposure.
Moreover, other factors that have been theorized as making a climate-conflict link more likely—
population density, low levels of governance effectiveness, accountability, education and wealth—
also vary sub-nationally. Figure 2.3 illustrates a composite map of the climate, demographic, and
political factors that have been theorized as making a climate-conflict relationship more probable.

9

Geocoding data is accomplished through varied techniques. For example, the Global Precipitation
Climatology Project geocodes rainfall data using a combination of remote-sensing and rain gauges (Hendrix
and Salehyan 2012). Interpolation techniques are used for areas where direct measurements do not occur,
by relying on the surrounding measurements for approximations (Chang 2012). Geocoded social data such
as conflict events, can often be achieved by cross-referencing locational information about events with
gazetteers (indexes that provide latitude and longitude coordinates for locations). An alternative is the
Global Administrative Areas database that provides geocoded information based on political borders
beginning with nation-states down to sub-national administrative units (Raleigh and Dowd 2015).
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What becomes visually apparent is that the conditions that constitute vulnerability are spatially
concentrated.
Spatial considerations related to theoretically pertinent variables also make country-level statistical
analysis problematic for climate-conflict research. The problem results from the so-called first law
of geography, that “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than
distant things” (Tobler 1970, 236). This geographic premise undermines the independence
assumption of non-spatial statistical models, whereby each observation is supposed to be
uninfluenced by other observations. Inadequately modeled spatial dependence increases the
possibility of making inaccurate inferences regarding the variables’ relationships (Anselin and Rey
1991; Cressie 1993; Darmofal 2015; D. W. S. Wong and Lee 2005).
Geographic Information System (GIS) enabled methods offer much promise in response to the
sub-national spatial dimensions of climate-conflict research (Busby et al. 2013; Fjelde and von
Uexkull 2012; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Stephenne, Burnley, and Ehrlich 2009). GIS is being used
to map and overlay theoretically pertinent spatial data. Busby et al. (2013) used this capability to
create the maps in Figures 2.2-3 to visually assess concentrations of climate-conflict risk factors
in Africa. Their finding that climate-conflict risks are indeed spatially concentrated merits further
study. Furthermore, the maps support theoretical suggestions of threat multiplication or
catastrophic convergence, because climate change hazards also overlap areas where conflict risk
factors are concentrated. Following studies that identified “hot spots” or locational concentrations
of criminal activity (Ansari and Kale 2014; Chainey and Ratcliffe 2005; Gupta, Rajitha, and Mittal
2012), GIS can similarly take advantage of newly geocoded data to determine if conflict manifests
hot spots. More sophisticated applications of GIS methods have also been undertaken. Raleigh and
Urdal (2007) use of GIS statistical techniques found that water scarcity (but not land degradation
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when we incorporate measures of resilience and governance, whereas parts of
Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan appear far more vulnerable, given
their low levels of resilience and poor governance (see online maps appendix).

Composite
vulnerability
anadd
indicator
based
on the
climate-related
hazard
(or less) vulnerable
wheniswe
indicators
from
ªnal two baskets:
houseexposure,
population
density,
household
and
community
resilience,
and
hold and community resilience and governance and political violence.
Based
governance
and historic
violence.
Source:coastline
Busby etappears
al. (2013,
161).
on this difference
map, the
Mediterranean
far less
vulnerable

ªnal composite map, we can show which places on the continent become more

Figure
2.3
sure and population. By subtracting a map of the ªrst two baskets from the

Figure 6.

correlates with civil war when combined with high population density, poverty, and unstable
national regimes. A subsequent study found similar results when applying GIS statistical
techniques to drought and an operationalization of armed conflict that did not require that a state
be one of the combatants (Maystadt, Ecker, and Mabiso 2013).
Having reviewed environmental conflict scholarship, and research that focusses on climate
change more specifically, I can now address this project’s focus on human displacement because
of climate change, as a possible intervening condition that might link climate change to conflict.
As an understudied intervening condition that will be exacerbated by climate change, scholarship
needs to better understand how human displacement influences social-political conflict.

Human Displacement: Conceptualizations and Climate Change Implications

Climate change is projected to increase human displacement (Bilak et al. 2016; Field et al. 2014a;
Koser 2011; Oliver-Smith 2011; Warner et al. 2010). Human displacement refers to coercive
dislocation from the material and social conditions that constitute one’s home. The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines displaced persons as “people or groups of
individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular
as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised (sic)
violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters” (UNHCR 2015, emphasis
added). Migration by contrast, suggests greater agency by those who are moving and tends to be
“something we do, not something that is done to us” (McDowell and Morrell 2010, 13–14). In
actuality, reasons for relocation often combine coercion and agency or fluctuate between the two
over time. For example, although adverse economic conditions and political persecution influence
displacement by “pushing” people to move, people exercise agency and vary in terms of when to
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relocate, their choice of destination, and the route thereto (Koser 2011; McDowell and Morrell
2010; Piguet, Pécoud, and Guchteneire 2011a) . Coercion and agency therefore form two poles of
a useful conceptual continuum but do not constitute an empirical dichotomy.
Crossing an international border creates an important distinction for displacement. A
displaced person who crosses an international border becomes a refugee and subject to the legal
provisions of the UN’s 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and subsequent 1967
Protocol, both of which oblige signatory countries to cooperate with the UNHCR (UN General
Assembly 1951, 1967). A displaced person who does not cross an international border is
considered an IDP, which is a descriptive not a legal term and therefore does not have the legal
standing held by refugees. The UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement sought to
promulgate awareness and recommended practices for the international community but remains a
non-binding document (OCHA 2004). The Guiding Principles state that:
internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or
obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result
of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence,
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed
an internationally recognized State border (OCHA 2004, 1).10
Definitions tend to agree about the types of events that cause displacement. Displacement can
result from armed conflict, violations of human rights, and human-made or natural disasters.
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), since 2003 there has been an
average of 5.2 million new IDPs each year globally because of violent conflict (Bilak et al. 2016,

10

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was signed during December 2018 by 163
countries and calls for greater international effort to address refugees and “migrants” (i.e. internally
displaced persons). Derivative outcomes are particularly unclear because this compact is voluntary and nonbinding (United Nations 2018).
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9). The rate of conflict-induced displacement began to rise in 2011 and was concentrated in Middle
Eastern and North African countries because of the Arab Spring. For example, 8.6 million people
suffered conflict-induced displacement throughout 28 countries during 2015, but more than half
of these displacements (4.8 million) occurred in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen (Bilak et al. 2016, 8).
Furthermore, the rate of conflict-induced displacement began decreasing in 2015.
Displacement because of natural disasters impacts far more people. The two leading
organizations that are dedicated to this topic – the IDMC and the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) – use a four-category typology of disasters: geophysical
(earthquakes, volcanic events), meteorological (storms, extreme atmospheric temperatures),
hydrological (flooding, landslides), and climatological (drought, wildfires) (Bennett et al. 2017,
9).11 The IDMC estimates that 24.2 million people throughout 125 countries suffered disasterinduced displacement during 2016 (K. Bennett et al. 2017, 9). Disasters, in comparison to conflict,
caused three times more newly displaced persons during 2016. This is consistent with the pattern
displayed by Figure 2.4, during the years 2008-2016 when the annual average number of new
conflict-induced displacement was 6.5 million, whereas the annual average for new disasterinduced displacements was 25.3 million.
Floods and storms are the disaster types that inflict the greatest number of IDPs. The IDMC
estimates that floods and storms accounted for 99% of the new disaster-induced displacement

11

This disaster typology was developed by CRED and adopted by the IDMC. The typology has additional
disaster types such as technological (e.g. industrial or large-scale transportation accidents) and animal
accidents. Biological disasters (e.g. epidemic, insect infestation) are omitted from this analysis because,
although they are projected to worsen because of climate change, I am unaware of any theoretical work on
human displacement because of biological disaster events. Including biological disasters without
developing a theoretical basis would take this project outside of the literature’s analytical scope.
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Figure 2.4 Number of new internally displaced persons, 125 countries.

during 2008-2015, whereas CRED estimates 70% for the years 2005-2014 (Bilak et al. 2016, 21;
Guha-Sapir 2016).12 Findings from empirical studies have begun specifying conditions whereby
climate change will likely lead to human displacement and migration. Extreme weather events that
result in natural disasters are the clearest link between climate change and human displacement.
While the annual incidence of natural disasters varies considerably, the trend for weatherrelated disasters—climate extremes—consists of increasing frequency and intensity (Field et al.
2014a, 767). Rapid onset natural disasters are largely floods from heavy rainfall or compound

12

CRED estimates that 35.4 million people worldwide were affected by drought, i.e. “people requiring
immediate assistance during a period of emergency,” which would constitute 20% of the persons who were
displaced by disasters during 2005-2014 (CRED 2016; Guha-Sapir 2016). The IDMC does not yet report
comparable data because it has yet to develop an operationalization for drought’s slow onset and indirect
causality (Bilak et al. 2016, 50–54; IDMC 2016, 74) .
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events such as cyclones, which tend to inflict damage primarily from high wind speed and flooding
from storm surge rather than rainfall. The incidence of category 4 and 5 cyclones, for instance, has
doubled since 1970 (McDowell and Morrell 2010, 170). Extreme weather events cause
displacement through damaged or destroyed housing and economic disruption, and is projected to
increase (Field et al. 2012, 65, 2014a, 767). Research findings confirm that the physical and social
impacts of natural disasters positively correlate with displacement (Koubi et al. 2013; Reuveny
and Moore 2009). For example, in Pakistan, six months after the floods that it experienced in 2010,
88% of households that were surveyed reported lost income up to 50% (Porter et al. 2014, 503).
Human displacement, in terms of the incidence of displacement events, and the number of IDPs
and refugees, is expected to increase because natural disasters are projected to become more severe
and frequent with climate change (Field et al. 2014a; Stocker et al. 2013b).
Displacement is also expected to worsen because of slow onset events. The threat of
extinction faced by low elevation small island states because of sea level rise is perhaps the most
striking example (UN-OHRLLS 2015). In addition, people in Low Elevation Coastal Zones
(LECZ), generally considered to be no more than 10 meters above sea-level, are at risk because of
rising sea-level and land-erosion from floods and storms (Field et al. 2014a, 366). Estimates for
the number of people who will be affected by sea-level rise and land erosion vary wildly, ranging
from 71 million by the year 2100 to 600 million by 2300 (Albuja et al. 2015, 15; Field et al. 2014a,
364, 382; Oliver-Smith 2011, 165). Generating these estimates is a highly speculative task because
of variables such as the rate of GHG emissions and local adaptation measures that could
significantly reduce the number of displaced persons. Conversely, Oliver-Smith notes that the
current projections might underestimate the number of affected persons because of the consistent
population increase in LECZs because of in-migration. Despite the wide ranging estimates, the
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Figure 2.5 Average Number of Disaster-Induced Displacement by Region, 2008-2014. Source: Albuja et al. (2015,
30).

claim that human displacement will occur because of climate change can be made with “high
confidence” (Field et al. 2014a, 778).
Notwithstanding the global occurrence of disaster-induced displacement, displacement
manifests spatial and social concentrations. Asia experienced the largest percentage (82%) of the
average yearly disaster-induced displacement during 2008-2014, Figure 2.5. In absolute terms this
amounts to a yearly average of 21.5 million persons experiencing disaster-induced IDPs, which is
approximately 0.5% of Asia’s population (World Population Bureau 2012). Applying this
percentage to North America’s 2012 population distribution for relative scale would mean that on
average, Jamaica’s entire 2.7 million people, or, the combined populations of Antigua and
Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Martinique, St. Vincent and the Grenadines
would be displaced annually (ibid). Alternatively, applying the percentage of 0.5% to the United
States’ 2010 population would mean that the entire populations of Delaware and Vermont would
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be displaced (U.S. Census 2016; World Population Bureau 2012). The concentration of disasterinduced IDPs in Asia is not limited to absolute numbers. The percentage of Asia’s population that
become new IDPs because of a natural disaster exceeds Africa (0.1%), all of Americas (0.2%) and
Europe (0.01%) (Albuja et al. 2015, 30; World Population Bureau 2012).
Spatial concentrations can be further disaggregated from region to country-level, down to
sub-national scope. China and India, for instance, experienced the highest absolute numbers of
displacement in comparison to other Asian countries (Albuja et al. 2015, 32). Furthermore, natural
disasters were spatially concentrated within both countries; China’s southern provinces
experienced the brunt of flooding from monsoons, whereas India’s eastern border suffered from
tropical storms and floods.
Disaster-induced displacement also results in differential and concentrated human impact.
The degree of human suffering and disruption that results from a natural disaster is not merely an
outcome of exposure to its physical hazards. Social, political, and economic conditions underlay
the concept of vulnerability (Busby et al. 2013; Field et al. 2014a). As illustrated by previously by
Figure 2.3, two entities, whether countries or sub-national administrative units, can experience
near identical exposure to a storm or flood with one fairing relatively well while the other suffers
more widespread and/or acute impact. Government and community leaders can act proactively to
adapt to increased hazards thereby mitigating vulnerability and decreasing the degree of persons
and property that are harmed when a disaster occurs. Alternatively, an entity’s vulnerability could
be relatively less because of greater resilience, which is the capacity “to cope with a hazardous
event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their [i.e. the
entity’s] essential function, identity, and structure” (Field et al. 2014a, 5). Preparation and response
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Figure 3.6: Displacement by World Bank regions and income groups, 2008 to 2014
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displacement’s concentration in Asia and middle to lower income countries. Developing countries
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Global Estimates 2015

present the highest vulnerability and suffer the most impact when disasters occur because of low
capacity for adaptation and resilience (Field et al. 2014a; Govind and Verchick 2016; Warner et
al. 2010). Moreover, displacement entails increased homelessness, unemployment, food
insecurity, social-psychological marginalization, exposure to infectious pathogens because of
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unsanitary conditions, all of which can further hinder countries that are already struggling with
these challenges (Albuja et al. 2015; Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman 2015; Koser 2011;
Quarantelli and Dynes 1976).
Displacement has notable temporal variation in terms of how the displacing event occurs
(Albuja et al. 2015; McDowell and Morrell 2010; Piguet, Pécoud, and Guchteneire 2011). The
causes of displacement can occur suddenly or as slow and gradual processes. The 2011 earthquakeinduced tsunami that struck Japan and damaged the Fukushima nuclear power plant, or weatherrelated disasters such as floods and storms that displaced 17.5 million people during 2014,
represent displacement events with relatively sudden causes (Albuja et al. 2015, 20). Displacement
can also result from protracted circumstances that occur over years. Desertification for instance, is
the process by which arable land degrades into a condition that its agricultural productivity is either
significantly diminished or eliminated. Factors such as drought, deforestation, and unsustainable
agricultural practices interact to produce desertification over a relatively extended temporal span
(Chasek, Downie, and Brown 2014, 215–19).13 Similarly, the threat of extinction faced by small
island states because of sea-level rise exemplifies relatively gradual human displacement (OliverSmith 2011). A challenge with studying slow onset displacement is that it does not present a
discrete and readily identifiable event that punctuates a beginning.
Territoriality and spatial dimensions are indeed important features of displacement but are
arguably subordinate to the life experiences that occur in a geographic area. This concept is known
as place attachment and refers to an emotional connection to the social and physical characteristics

13

I acknowledge that additional factors (e.g. colonial legacies, neo-liberal economic prescriptions, domestic
political institutions) often influence deforestation and unsustainable agricultural practices. These
considerations will be elaborated shortly when discussing challenges environmental conflict scholarship.
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of an area (Bernardo and Palma-Oliveira 2013; Hidalgo and Hernández 2001). McDowell and
Morrell well articulate the point that:
…displacement is understood as being alienated from physical, social and cultural
resources essential to maintain a life and livelihood of choice which may be the fate of
people who remain in the same location…and is not necessarily linked to relocation (2010,
5).
One can therefore be displaced while experiencing no significant geographic dislocation. In fact,
most displaced persons elect to stay in close spatial proximity to their homes, or to return as soon
as possible when displacement entails spatial distance (Albuja et al. 2015; Field et al. 2014a, 767).
The Syrian civil war highlights these spatial tendencies with an estimated 4.8 million refugees who
have fled the country while 6.6 million remain as IDPs (Rummery 2016). Additional support for
the life experience primacy is drawn from displacement not being exclusive to long-term citizens
or residents, but can also afflict routinely migratory or nomadic individuals. The “homes or places
of habitual residence” clause from the UNHCR and Guiding Principles definitions is meant to
include transitory individuals. Thus, while spatial dimensions are important to displacement they
must be contextualized with, and distinguished from, the life experiences that are being impeded.

Conclusion

This chapter surveyed findings from environmental conflict scholarship. Findings from this line
of research support the suggestion that natural environmental conditions can influence socialpolitical conflict. Natural environmental factors affect intervening social, political, and economic
conditions that elevate the probability of conflict. Moreover, these findings lend gravity to climate
change, because the physical-natural aspects of climate change are projected to worsen conflict
social-political risk factors. One such intervening condition is human displacement from sudden-
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onset natural disasters. Climate change is worsening disaster-induced displacement in terms of
frequency and extremity of disaster events. In the next chapter, I detail theoretical grounds for how
disaster-induced conflict may influence conflict.
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Chapter Three
Human Displacement and the Climate-Conflict Nexus

It is a modernist superstition that allows us to keep shrinking from the idea that, when
people see others as a problem, they also think that killing them is a possible solution. This
often has less to do with aggressiveness than with purposive thinking.
Harald Welzer, Climate Wars: Why People will be Killed in the Twenty-First
Century (2012, 23).

[T]his perceived tendency for the depravity of mankind to emerge during disasters is not
supported by the evidence. The community of individuals does not breakdown. The norms
which we tend to follow during normal time hold during the emergency time. In fact, during
emergency time the “best within us” is usually exhibited,…[t]he sociological literature on
disaster documents that individuals tend to become altruistic during time of disaster.
Henry W. Fischer, Response to Disaster: Fact Versus Fiction & Its Perpetuation:
The Sociology of Disaster (1998, 18).

Multiple pathways have been suggested for how persons displaced by climate change might lead
to conflict. This chapter draws on findings from sociological scholarship of post-disaster
conditions (Fischer 1998; Quarantelli and Dynes 1976; Ruitenberg and Ruitenberg 2004; Zahran
et al. 2009), as well as environmental conflict studies that are dedicated to questions of how natural
disasters influence social-political outcomes (Egorova and Hendrix 2014; Nel and Righarts 2008;
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Omelicheva 2011). Natural disasters14 are severe disruptions of a community’s normal activities
that result from the combination of a physical hazard, exposure to human beings and assets, and
vulnerability (Field et al. 2012, 5). Furthermore, natural disasters are the disaggregated events for
one of the many trends that constitute climate change.
Climate-conflict research that focuses on human displacement has two analytical
prominences that warrant highlighting. First, it uses multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the
psychological and emotional factors of individual human beings to international conditions. The
preponderance of theoretical work occurs at the level that encompasses country-level and subnational conditions, such as regime type and domestic group interactions. A second feature is that
most of this work is dedicated to conflict rather than unrest. An emphasis upon conflict makes
sense on empirical grounds because, as will be presented in the next chapter, conflict events are
more common than unrest (Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015, 324). Moreover, the numerical
predominance of conflict is unsurprising and consistent with the soon to be elaborated theoretical
expectation that conflict will be more frequent than unrest. Third, a displacement-conflict
relationship may entail decreased conflict incidence. Multiple theoretical propositions, that I

14

There are important critiques regarding natural disasters as a concept. Within displacement literature,
the question has been raised as to whether or not a natural disaster has sufficient intentionality to fulfill the
coercion criterion of displacement (McDowell and Morrell 2010, 30). For example, in contrast to conflictinduced displacement that entails one group attacking or expelling another, natural disasters often appear
to have no anthropogenic impetus. A different objection focusses on the attribution of natural to disasters.
This position argues that the qualification of natural overlooks the political ecology, or social-political
conditions such as development planning or lack thereof, as well as economic and political disparities that
create vulnerabilities to natural events (Govind and Verchick 2016, 492; Peluso and Watts 2001; Robbins
2012; Walch 2014, 41). This reasoning lends to the suggestion that social disasters may be a more accurate
term (Robbins 2012, 33; Welzer 2012, 25). I acknowledge both criticisms for raising substantive points
regarding intentionality and the social dimensions of disasters but use the term natural disaster because I
believe that it adequately communicates the concept and is distinct from strictly anthropogenic disaster
types (e.g. industrial accidents).

45

collectively refer to as cooperation theory, anticipate reduced or complete cessation of conflict
following disaster-induced displacement.
In this chapter, theoretical grounds for a displacement-conflict relationship are elaborated
by first establishing how conditions at the level of individual human being may lead to increased
instances of unrest. Country-level factors such as regime type, demographic conditions, and
domestic group interactions are then addressed to detail how these variables might contribute to
increased conflict. The level of analysis then broadens to cover international, geographic, and
temporal conditions. Finally, cooperation theories are surveyed to garner insights for how disasterinduced displacement might lend to diminished conflict incidence. All of this serves to provide
theoretical bases for deriving hypotheses that can be tested in the subsequent empirical chapters.

Individual Level: Disaster Distress and the Heat Hypothesis
Conditions at the level of individual human beings are one way that displaced persons might relate
to unrest. Unrest is anticipated at the individual level of analysis because in contrast to conflict,
the individual level emphasizes emotional impetus and behaviors with minimal forethought and
coordination, as the causal mechanisms.15 Fear and uncertainty are widely experienced emotions
by those who survive a natural disaster. Survivors experience higher rates of sleeplessness, anxiety,
depression, loss of place, and suicide following extreme weather events (Olsson et al. 2014, 805;

15

By causal mechanism, I mean the “physical, social, psychological processes through which agents with
causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or
matter to other entities. In so doing, the causal agent changes the affected entity’s characteristics, capacities,
or propensities” [emphasis added] (George and Bennett 2005, 137). I want to underscore this definition’s
probabilistic ontology, rather than the determinism that is problematically suggested by the term causal
mechanism.
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Whitmore-Williams et al. 2017).16 The cognition and emotional tolerance of persons displaced by
a disaster(s) is often diminished by these physical and emotional symptoms, and is especially acute
for vulnerable populations whose baseline living conditions were precarious prior to displacement.
Post-disaster emotional distress could therefore contribute to higher rates of unrest, manifest as
outbursts of aggression such as fights or assaults. Studies of intimate partner relationships suggest
that the incidence of psychological abuse increases for male and female disaster survivors, but
significant increases of physical abuse were limited to female disaster survivors (Rezaeian 2013;
Schumacher et al. 2010).
Unrest is also unorganized and will therefore be short-term in most cases because it does
not have the organizational backing to recruit supporters and maintain a campaign (Nardulli,
Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Spontaneous protests are another possible
observable outcome because of disaster-induced displacement. Displaced persons may become
intolerant with the pace of recovery, which may include genuine or merely perceived shortcomings
by government officials (Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman 2015). One study found that following
a disastrous flood or storm, there was a significant increase in the number of protests that were
unaffiliated with an organized initiator (Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015). While this study
used a proxy for disaster-induced displacement and its finding was not robust to both of the two
sources that were used for disaster data, it provides qualified support for the disaster-unrest causal
process. I want to additionally emphasize that these are probabilistic theoretical expectations
regarding small but potentially statistically significant portions of a community’s members. Most
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Increased substance abuse would also seem to be a common post-disaster coping behavior but findings
from spatially concentrated studies suggest the contrary. Increased substance abuse was not found among
flood survivors in the St. Louis area (North et al. 2004) but a higher rate of tobacco consumption was
detected among Australians who survived major wildfires (Parslow and Jorm 2006).
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disaster survivors manage to cope and recover in ways that are not socially harmful (Fischer 1998;
Heide 2004).
Support for the disaster-emotion proposition is garnered from work on the so-called heat
hypothesis. Warmer temperatures are associated with irritability, aggression, and tendency to
exaggerate hostility and threats presented by others (Anderson and DeLisi 2011; Hsiang, Burke,
and Miguel 2013). Higher atmospheric temperatures correlate with increased unrest such as
professional baseball pitchers throwing pitches that hit batters (Larrick et al. 2011; Reifman,
Larrick, and Fein 1991), horn-honking by drivers (Kenrick and MacFarlane 1986), domestic
violence (Auliciems and DiBartolo 1995), and use of force by police officers during training (Vrij,
Van Der Steen, and Koppelaar 1994). The disaster-unrest notion is actually enmeshed with the
heat hypothesis since humid and warm to hot weather conditions are necessary for the disastrous
floods and storms that most frequently cause displacement.
These theoretical reasonings about unrest combine with empirical findings regarding
immediate post-disaster conditions to provide one causal process by which disaster-induced
displacement might lead to increased unrest. Scarcity, because of its theorization at the level of
individual human being and group interactions, is next addressed as a possible intervening
condition that links displacement to conflict.

Scarcity and Demographic Conditions
Scarcity of resources has been the theoretical foundation linking natural environmental factors to
conflict and its influence has carried over to climate-conflict studies. Basic but essential resources
such as food and water are often in short supply following a disaster. Conflict could therefore be
expected among survivors who are desperate for subsistence resources. This notion is supported
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by media coverage that often claims or depicts looting in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.
Looting following 2005’s Hurricane Katrina is one of the more vivid examples, and appears to be
reaffirmed by similar reports following 2017’s Hurricane Irma, that armed marauders in St. Martin
were seeking food and water while others sought luxury goods (Ahmed and Semple 2017;
Barringer and Longman 2005; Butler 2017; Martin 2005). However, looting following a disaster
is generally considered to be “exceedingly rare” by disaster scholarship and when it does occur,
it’s typically carried out by few individuals and exhibits norm adherence, e.g. avoiding private
residences and refraining from physical force (Fischer 1998, 21; Quarantelli 2008, 882–84;
Ruitenberg and Ruitenberg 2004, 103). Furthermore, coverage of looting is often based on secondhand reports and sensationalized representation with racist undertones (Constable 2008).
Having established that looting in the immediate aftermath of a disaster does not warrant
further attention, I can address alternative versions of scarcity theory that may link displacement
to conflict. Relative deprivation theory builds on the premise that scarcity by itself is an insufficient
condition for conflict and unrest. Dearth becomes potent when one’s sense of expectation and
entitlement are unsatisfied based on comparison with other individuals or groups (Gurr 1970), or
inter-temporal comparison with oneself (Sayles 1984). Absolute scarcity may actually be less
important than “a judgment that one or one’s ingroup is disadvantaged compared to a relevant
referent, and that this judgment invokes feelings of anger, resentment, and entitlement” (H. Smith
and Pettigrew 2015, 2). This reasoning suggests that IDPs could be conflict-prone because of lost
economic activity, food insecurity, and disrupted place attachment are closely associated with
displacement (Albuja et al. 2015; Bilak et al. 2016; Buhaug, Gleditsch, and Theisen 2010). The
IPCC also notes that natural disasters often hinder or destroy development projects, which is
another possible source of disappointed expectation (Field et al. 2014a, 179).
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Scarcity-related conflict could result from the actions of IDPs, or as actions directed
towards them. For the former possibility, IDP’s might protest inadequate relief and recovery aid.
Referring back to the concept of vulnerability, a society’s marginalized groups will likely be
overrepresented proportions of IDPs. The added hardship of disaster-induced displacement may
create a tipping point for IDPs to protest their conditions. Alternatively, IDPs could be the target
of grievances. IDPs who are dislocated to another area or subnational administrative unit within
their country may create competition with members of the host community over economic
opportunities (Nordås and Gleditsch 2007). In this scenario, social cleavages will likely be an
important factor. The possibility of conflict between IDPs and host communities could be lessened
if the two groups share salient social associations. Conversely, social cleavage could heighten the
chance of conflict by diminishing the generosity and compassion that a host community shows to
its fellow citizens who are displaced.
Demographic pressures may also contribute to a scarcity-driven connection between
displacement and conflict. Population growth could heighten scarcity if the availability of
resources does not rise commensurately. Scarcity may be further amplified if population growth
interacts with cultural shifts towards increased material consumption (Dauvergne 2010; Rickards,
Wiseman, and Kashima 2014). Conflict studies have consequently included population measures
in statistical models and reached mixed findings. Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that population
size positively and significantly related to civil war onset when using a global dataset, whereas
Raleigh (2015) found that population growth had inconsistent results, in terms of positive and
negative coefficients, for conflict within African cities. Similarly discrepant results have been
found by climate-conflict studies. Ghimire et al.'s (2015) global study found that population
density insignificantly relates to flood displacement and civil war incidence. However, Theisen et
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al. (2011) found that population size yielded significant and positive results when included in their
modeling of the relationship between drought indicators and civil war onset.
Youth bulges, meaning a population that has a large percentage of persons aged 15-24, is
another potentially volatile demographic feature. Persons in this age cohort typically comprise
frontline combatants, and are especially susceptible to recruitment when faced with low
opportunity costs when employment and alternative possibilities are minimal. In addition, persons
in this age cohort are most likely to commit the types of violent crimes—homicide and assault—
that event-based datasets count as incidents of conflict and unrest (FBI 2003). Like the varied
findings regarding population growth and density, studies that include youth bulge measures have
produced inconsistent findings. Nel and Righarts (2008) found support for the hypothesis that
youth bulges intensify post-disaster conflict incidence, whereas results from Ghimire et al.'s (2015)
were insignificant. A particularly curious finding was reached by Salehyan and Hendrix (2014)
who found that both population growth and youth bulges, significantly but negatively related with
drought and conflict.

Contentious Politics
Contentious politics is a framework that that considers country-level conditions such as scarcity
and demographic pressures but emphasizes interactions among domestic groups and
characteristics that are associated with regime type.17 Arising from social movements research,
contentious politics has helped climate-conflict scholars’ theorization of social-political

17

Contentious politics also engages level of analyses that address individual human actors, especially when
discussing framing, and phenomena related to international politics (e.g. globalization and
internationalization), but the preponderance of attention is dedicated to domestic-level subject matter.
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intervening conditions (Hendrix and Haggard 2015; Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015; Jürgen
Scheffran et al. 2012). Like relative deprivation theory, contentious politics recognizes that
grievances are to some degree universal, rendering them insufficient conditions for conflict
because “there is no one-to-one relationship between the extent of people’s grievances and their
capacity and willingness to advance their claims” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2009, 268). For
conflict to occur, grievances and/or competing interests must combine with additional social and
political conditions. An ontological premise is that contentious politics–such as social movements,
protests, and civil wars–is comprised of mechanisms that similarly operate within these
theoretically distinct but often related and overlapping processes. This assumption leads to the
epistemological approach of trying to identify the combination and sequence of mechanisms that
generate more complex phenomena (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007).
What are these mechanisms, and how might they connect disaster-induced displacement to
conflict? Mechanisms relating to the manipulation of social boundaries are commonly found in
environmental conflict studies. Attribution of similarity, for instance, is when one group asserts
commonality with another group(s), where the commonality did not previously exist. A
mechanism of opposite effect is boundary formation where an “us-them distinction” is created by
one actor through attribution to two or more other groups (Tarrow and Tilly 2007, 215). Existing
boundaries can also be manipulated via the mechanism of boundary activation, whereby the
salience of an existing social distinction is amplified. Construction and manipulation of social
divisions are requisite to contentious collective action, but most contentious episodes eventually
conclude. A mechanism that can lead to a contentious episode’s termination is boundary
deactivation, the lessening of salience that is attributed to a social division.
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A few examples will demonstrate how boundary related mechanisms link displacement to
conflict. Ash and Obrodovich (2017) find support for attribution of similarity and boundary
activation in the lead up to the Syrian civil war. Their analysis of the relationship between Syria’s
drought-induced displacement and anti-government protest found greater protest incidence in
provinces that experienced an in-flow of IDPs. Both the drought-induced IDPs and the majority
social cleavage in the receiving provinces were Sunni Muslims, meaning that they share a history
of discrimination by the Syrian national government that is dominated by adherents to the Alawite
variant of Shia Islam. A scarcity-based orientation would anticipate conflict between the receiving
population and IDPs over available economic opportunities and burdened public resources.
Conflict increased with the number of IDPs, but in the form of anti-government protests rather
than between non-governmental groups. The influx of IDPs appears to have emboldened the
resident Sunnis by increasing their group’s size, and consistent with boundary activation, the
drought-related hardships added to the Sunnis’ collective grievances.
In a different case, boundary activation was exemplified by Kenyan President Daniel arap
Moi, who used it to preserve his autocratic rule when demographic and environmental pressures
were engendering popular grievance and opposition that threatened his regime (Kahl 2006, Ch. 4).
Moi applied boundary activation by stoking inter-ethnic divisions to impede reform efforts,
penalize opponents, and consolidate his party’s power. Lastly, conflict mitigation through
boundary deactivation is also a possibility for disaster-induced displacement. Disasters can lower
social cleavages and promote solidarity by posing a clear and present danger to a community
(Fischer 1998; Quarantelli and Dynes 1976, 142). This tendency may carry over or subsequently
develop in the recovery stage because disaster-related hardships are publicly visible and often
widely shared (Quarantelli and Dynes 1976, 143–44; Zahran et al. 2009).
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Domestic political institutions are another host of factors that figure prominently in
contentious politics. Political regimes structure relations among government officials, nongovernmental political actors, and other states. Importantly to this project, political regimes
interact with disaster-induced displacement to pattern conflict types and incidence. The degree of
democratic features and state capacity are emphasized by the literature as determinants of a
regime’s structure. Democracy entails broad, equal rights among persons who are subject to a
state’s authority, and the ability to influence government officials and policy through contained
contentious political action (Dahl 1971; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). Although the
demarcation can be unclear at times, contentious politics distinguishes contained contention, that
which remains within “established institutional routines,” from transgressive contention that
violates legal and/or normative standards (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 60).
The degree of democracy influences conflict through several pathways. Electoral
accountability incentivizes state officials to work towards lessening vulnerability, thereby
mitigating the impact of displacement events. Democratic countries tend to be associated with
environmentally beneficial policies in comparison to autocracies and anocracies (i.e. countries that
present democratic and autocratic features) (Li and Reuveny 2006; H. Ward 2008). Moreover, subnational political units within a democracy that are in closer spatial proximity to environmental
hazards tend to implement more adaptive measures (Boyer 2013). Electoral accountability also
influences conflict once a displacement event occurs. Democratic countries tend to do better in
terms of good governance measures, a pattern that applies to post-disaster relief and recovery
efforts (Wood and Wright 2015). In addition, the broad political participation of democracy helps
manage and contain inter-group conflict within institutional parameters. And adherence to rule of
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law corresponds with lower political violence following floods and storms (Nardulli, Peyton, and
Bajjalieh 2015).
State capacity is another important mediating condition. Capacity refers to the ability to do
something, “the extent to which governmental action affects the character and distribution of
population, activity, and resources within the government’s territory” (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 57).
Capacity enables a state to implement adaptive measures that lessen human vulnerabilities to
natural disasters, and respond to disasters when they occur. Regime instability is a mechanism that
promotes contentious politics, and often accompanies displacement events. A natural disaster can
create or intensify regime instability by undermining state capacity. Natural disasters can impact
large numbers of citizens, leaving them displaced and in need of support to meet basic needs, to a
degree that exceeds state capacity. Impacts can also be enduring when infrastructure is widely
damaged and hinders resumption of economic activity, in what in many cases are already
economically precarious conditions. These circumstances are opportune for contentious activity.
Protests may occur to convey popular grievance with a government-led disaster response that is
perceived as lacking in timeliness or efficacy. Protests related to a landslide-induced flood in
Pakistan exemplifies this scenario (Albuja et al. 2015, 66). The IDPs protested the government’s
management of the initial disaster and subsequent recovery, which resulted in deadly skirmishes
with police, followed by more protests and arrests.
A state that is weakened by natural disaster(s) might also see an increase in organized and
sustained conflict types. As in the case of Syria’s drought-induced displacement, government
opponents can become emboldened by diminished state capacity. In addition, IDPs may become
more susceptible to recruitment by groups that are engaged in a campaign of contentious activity.
Contentious politics posits that violent actions tend to be more costly in terms of risk and resources,
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and therefore necessitate an organized actor to recruit, direct, and sustain supporters (Tilly and
Tarrow 2007, Ch. 7). This proposition is supported by the empirical finding of more violent
conflict events following disaster-scale floods and storms by actors who are affiliated with an
organized group (Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015).
Another process by which diminished state capacity and regime instability can promote
conflict is by creating a domestic-level security dilemma (Kahl 2006). A state that is unable to
maintain order can encourage anti-government opposition and contention between nongovernmental groups. Weakened and desperate states, as in the case of a natural disaster,
sometimes stoke contention by favoring allies with disproportionate distributions of aid or land
redistribution (Silva 2009; Uson 2017). The situation can spiral when the absence of a neutral and
predominant state incentivizes combatants to enlarge their weapons and resource caches. This
process may help to explain the finding that anocratic and transitional regimes are most prone to
conflict onset following a natural disaster (Omelicheva 2011). Finally, low state capacity and
regime instability, or the perception thereof by political officials and social leaders, can lend to
elite panic, which entails misperceiving disaster survivors as unruly mobs that necessitate
cordoning and unwarranted application of martial law (Clarke and Chess 2008; Solnit 2009).18
Regime type and state capacity also influence conflict type. Minimal threat of repressive
tactics by government officials has two implications for contentious politics. First, contentious
political activity is more likely to be contained within a regime’s permitted repertoire of actions.
Second, as a result, protest is expected to be more frequent in democratic countries where such

18

Panic flight, meaning tempestuous and chaotic evacuation and/or distancing from an immediate threat,
is a recurrently popular misperception. Sociological disaster research has dispelled this notion (Fischer
1998; Quarantelli 2008).
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manifestations of contentious politics are tolerated and part of the repertoire of actions that is
available for actors to select from (Hendrix and Haggard 2015; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2009;
Tilly 2004). In contrast, protest will be minimal in autocratic countries where the cost of
contentious political engagement, especially if in opposition to government, will be greater
because of repressive tactics. Expectations regarding protest incidence in anocratic regimes are
divergent and empirically under-examined. In comparison to democracies, protest incidence might
be higher in anocracies when the state is less effective at dampening the impact of disasters through
adaptive measures and responding to disasters. However, protest incidence might be lower because
anocracies are less tolerant of dissent and more inclined to apply repressive tactics. Natural
disasters significantly relate to increased state repression, but this relationship is lessened for
countries with higher levels of democracy (Wood and Wright 2015).
Further evidence of the importance that regime type and capacity have for conflict type is
the inverted-U distribution where conflict levels are relatively low for autocracies, crest for
anocracies, and lower for democracies (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001). Not only has
evidence for the inverted-U distribution also been found in the context of environmental conflict,
the relationship was found for violent rather than non-violent conflict, thereby lending support to
the expectation that elevated conflict incidence in democracies will tend to be less violent and
repressive (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012).19
While contentious politics has guided climate-conflict scholarship’s theorization of the
social-political conditions that mediate displacement-inducing natural disasters, mixed evidence
has been found to support the importance of natural environmental factors. A notable critique of
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Ghimire et al. (2015) also found that flood displacement negatively related with conflict in democracies,
but their findings were statistically insignificant.
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environmental conflict research is that it may give excess attention to the natural environment and
thereby distract attention from more influential factors such as regime type, wealth and resource
distribution, economic opportunity (Peluso and Watts 2001; Selby 2014). Nardulli et al.'s (2015)
study of the relationship that floods and storms have with political attacks and protests support this
critique. Their disaster-impact variables accounted for little of the conflicts’ variance, whereas
political process conditions such as state repression had much more leverage. In contrast,
Omelicheva's (2011) analysis of natural disasters and conflict onset used two different tests
(Wald’s test and Akaike information criterion) to assess statistical models with only socialpolitical variables, and models that included measurements of disaster impact. Disaster impact
variables produced multiple statistically significant results and improved model fit. These
inconsistent findings highlight the need for further study to better assess the relationship between
displacement and conflict.

International Conditions
Pulling back the level of analysis from domestic regime type and group interactions, international
conditions likely influence the climate-conflict relationship. Aid from other countries could be
vital to filling resource shortages following a disaster. If distributed equitably and efficiently, aid
could help meet the needs of IDPs thereby mollifying hardships and grievances, and lessening
their attraction to anti-government forces. One study of post-disaster international aid, using
democratic regime status as proxy for equitable and efficient aid management, found support for
the expectation that democracies tend to use aid effectively, which helps to explain the same
study’s finding that democracies experience lower post-disaster conflict incidence (Wood and
Wright 2015).

58

International aid can also exacerbate conditions that either elevate risk for the onset of new
conflict and unrest, or promote ongoing conflicts. Post-disaster aid that would seemingly be an
unqualified benefit to IDPs, can, similar to the so-called resource curse, counterintuitively generate
social-political strife and conflict. Silva's (2009) case study of Sri Lanka following the 2004
tsunami that expanded from a Sumatran earthquake and damaged countries throughout the Indian
Ocean, details how aid can promote contentious politics. The Sri Lankan government was engaged
in ongoing armed conflict with the secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Despite the
extant conflict, inter-ethnic cooperation occurred immediately following the disaster, but was
figuratively washed away by what Silva termed the "‘third wave,’…the first two waves being
tsunami waves and the third and most devastating of all being the wave of tsunami aid that ended
abruptly” (2009, 61). Rebuilding efforts by transnational non-governmental organizations were
underfunded and left incomplete. In addition, indigenous rebuilding efforts were undermined by
international aid that crowded out domestic groups. Compassion and aid from unaffected parts of
Sri Lanka declined in part because of resentment for the aid and attention. Furthermore, the Sri
Lankan government aggravated the situation by directing aid to government supporters who were
unaffected by the tsunami waves. All of this encouraged inter-ethnic competition for aid, and
resentment between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
The contentious political processes detailed by Silva’s case study are not confined to Sri
Lanka. Aid can aggravate can aggravate domestic conflict when it is directed to IDPs rather than
receiving host communities (Barron, Kaiser, and Pradhan 2009, 702). In a global cross-country
study, Wood and Wright (2015) found that international aid corresponds with increased state
repression, and attributed this finding to governments countering anti-government and inter-group
tensions, similar to what was observed by Silva in Sri Lanka.

59

Proximity to other countries and shared borders are another international dimension that
has been examined as a possible influence upon domestic conflict. International borders might
provide non-governmental combatants with sanctuary for respite and resupply, or by providing
foreign recruits who may have a social-boundary affinity for one of the combatant groups. Fearon
and Laitin (2003) explored this possibility in the civil war literature and found that international
border contiguity has a positive, but statistically insignificant relationship with conflict. In a direct
test of disaster-conflict hypotheses, Omelicheva (2011) found statistically significant support for
the “bad neighborhood” proposition, that having multiple bordering countries with ongoing armed
conflict, increases the risk of conflict following a natural disaster.

Geographic Conditions
Geographically oriented theorization of the climate-conflict relationship is not confined to
international borders, but has also been directed towards domestic conditions. A country’s
geographical features can have relevant implications. The amount of territory that a country
possesses affects a state’s capacity to project power and control; more territory requires greater
capacity to control. Territorial type can also challenge state capacity, mountains are typically
rugged terrain that hinder state power projection by providing safe haven for opposition.
Mountainous countries have been found to experience significantly higher probability for civil war
onset in general (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tollefsen and Buhaug 2015), as well as by environmental
conflict research that found rugged terrain increases the risk of a disaster-conflict relationship
(Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman 2015; Slettebak 2012).
The geographic turn in climate-conflict research is important to examination of the
suggested displacement link for climate change and conflict. Sub-national spatial analyses are
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being undertaken because “using the country as the unit of analysis can mask major variations in
climatic conditions and conflict locations” (Yeeles 2015, 159). As Figure 2.3 showed,
vulnerabilities comprised of natural environmental hazards, population density that is exposed to
hazards, and lower levels of social-economic resilience, present spatial concentrations. Spatial
analyses differ from the preceding geographic discussion, with the former addressing terrain
features such as shared borders and percentage of mountainous terrain that are measured at the
country-level and offer no further specificity regarding location. Spatial analysis takes geographic
topics a step further through geocoding, such that each datum corresponds to a specific location
on the Earth’s surface. Geocoded data enables use of methods that are designed to analyze subnational spatial variation of theoretically relevant phenomena.
Overlap is a basic question being asked by spatially oriented research. Do displacement
and conflict events occur in the same area, or is there spatial distance between the two phenomena?
Spatial overlap seems plausible, if not likely, because the hardships and social disruptions of
displacement would seemingly give rise to conflict in close spatial proximity. However, studies
that have examined the question of overlap consistently contradict this expectation. One analysis
used a 500-mile radius to assess the spatial relationship between disasters (floods and storms) and
conflict (political violence and protests), and found that conflict increased both inside and outside
of the 500-mile zone, but the increase was greater for the more distant zone (Nardulli, Peyton, and
Bajjalieh 2015, 323). Post-disaster cooperation theories can account for the lower conflict
incidence in the areas closer a disaster site. IDPs who are closest to a disaster suffer the most, their
focus on survival and shared hardship may lessen the potency of social-political conditions that
promote conflict.
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Out-migration may account for greater conflict incidence in locations that are spatially
distant from a disaster’s epicenter. Mentioned earlier, anti-government protests in Syria were not
concentrated in the country’s drought-afflicted regions, instead, they occurred in different parts of
the country where the IDPs likely relocated (Ash and Obrodovich 2017). Classifying the migration
pattern of Syria’s drought-related IDPs as out-migration should be treated with heightened
tentativeness. The relocation of Syrian IDPs was measured via the proxy of variation in light
emissions from satellite-recorded data. Yet, explaining spatial separation between displacement
events and conflict is supported by case study research. One study found a 28% increase of
homicides in Houston, Texas, during 2006, which was coincident to the arrival of IDPs from
Hurricane Katrina (Reuveny 2008, 7). A similar result was identified in parts of India where
refugees from Bangladesh migrated to after being displaced following the hardships of drought
and population pressure (Anderson and DeLisi 2011; Reuveny 2008). These findings strongly
suggest that if a displacement-conflict exists, they will not spatially overlap.
Country capitals are another aspect of spatially-oriented research. Dependent on the
conflict type, capital cities can be a focal point. Anti-government conflict that seeks to replace a
regime or sitting government, concentrates in the capital for the practical reason of capturing the
seat of power, as well as for the symbolic value associated with control of a capital (Buhaug and
Gates 2002; Witmer et al. 2017). Theoretical work has been dedicated to country capitals, but I
suggest that this can also be applied to sub-national capital cities. Capital cities of provinces states
can also be where conflict is focused. Similar to the United States’ island hopping military strategy
during World War II, that advanced its forces westward towards imperial Japan, anti-government
conflict may also concentrate in provincial capital cities as part of a campaign that is working
towards a country capital.
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Temporality – The When of Climate and Conflict
Lastly, temporality is an especially understudied dimension of a displacement-conflict
relationship. When a displacement-inducing disaster occurs, how much time will elapse before
conflict and/or unrest manifests? The amount of time between a displacement event and outcome
will likely be influenced by the outcome type. Unrest will require time for the hardships of
displacement to generate the frustrations and short-temperedness that give rise to outbursts.
Conflict would seemingly require more time than unrest. One reason is that time will be required
for the hardships of displacement to generate the grievances that increase IDPs’ receptivity to
strategic and organized conflict. Similarly, extant groups that intend to take advantage of a
displacement event, would likely require time to identify an opportunity consequent to a disaster,
as well as time for the planning and execution to seize the moment.
Little theorization and empirical work have been dedicated to temporality. This probably
results from most climate-conflict studies using the country-year as the unit of analysis for
statistical studies. While scholars acknowledged that time would be required for climate change
events to be mediated by social-political conditions, they were limited to yearly lags of explanatory
variables, which is probably a research design with inadequate precision for assessing temporality
that occurs with shorter and varied timespans. Nardulli et al. (2015) made an important step
towards answering questions of temporality by assessing the incidence of protest and political
violence following 45 randomly selected disastrous floods and storms in 23 different countries, at
30, 60, 90, and 120-day intervals from the disasters’ occurrence. Their study produced two notable
findings regarding temporality: (1) conflict tended to significantly increases during the 60 and 90day intervals after a disaster event; and (2) protest incidence spiked and declined more quickly
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than political violence. While the mechanism is unclear (e.g. cooperation theory, preoccupation
with survival, or time being required for grievances to develop), the results indicate that time must
elapse before conflict levels increase. Moreover, the rise and decrease of conflict incidence were
observed within a three-month timespan, thus supporting the expectation that lags with countryyears as the units of analysis is an excessively blunt measure for detecting the temporal dimensions
of a displacement-conflict relationship.

Alternative Expectations of Cooperation
A variety of theoretical orientations posit that conflict is unlikely to result from climate change
and disaster-induced displacement. Cooperation theories from sociology and disaster research are
the primary exemplar of such expectation. Disasters can create or enhance solidarity, leading to
cooperation among IDPs (Quarantelli 2008; Zahran et al. 2009). Displacement from natural
disasters entails widespread hardship that can be a “democratization of social life…facilitated by
the fact that danger, loss, and suffering become a public phenomenon” (Quarantelli and Dynes
1976, 143). While poor or absent planning can worsen disaster impacts, similar to climate change
in general because of its complexity and relatively long time-horizons, disasters are often
perceived as exogenous events that are devoid of blame. Also, the boundary mechanisms of
contentious politics theory are not entirely divisive and conflictual. Previously separate and
conflicting groups can reduce hostilities through boundary deactivation, whereby attributions of
similarity lessen previous social boundaries.
Empirical research has found support for cooperation theories. As mentioned earlier,
looting in post-disaster contexts is rare and when it occurs, looters often adhere to norms of nonviolence and refrain from pillaging residences. A county-level analysis of Florida’s post-disaster
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crime rates found lower incidence of property and general violent crimes, e.g. assaults, murder,
rape, and robberies (Zahran et al. 2009, 45).20 In a study of 23 different countries, political violence
significantly decreased when higher proportions of a country’s persons were affected by disastrous
storms and floods (Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015, 329). IDPs are disempowered because
they tend to disproportionately represent a society’s politically and economically marginalized,
and case studies suggest that they work to integrate rather than challenge circumstances (Raleigh,
Jordan, and Salehyan 2008, 35, 37). More broadly, the absence of robust findings to support a
climate-conflict relationship may indicate that such a relationship does not generally exist.
Other theories suggest that disaster-induced displacement and conflict are related in the
sense of conflict abatement. Disasters can provide “windows of opportunity” for cessation of
ongoing conflict (Egorova and Hendrix 2014). The fighting capacity of combatant organizations
may be debilitated as personnel are sapped by death, injury, or desertion; and the materials for
fighting can become scarce because of disrupted supply lines. Contending organizations may need
to undergo internal reconfiguration, from which pro-peace advocates may rise in prominence.
The aforementioned 2004 earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean highlights how
intervening political conditions led to divergent results for the anti-government conflicts that were
occurring in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In contrast to Sri Lanka, where disaster aid aggravated
contentious politics, the tsunami’s devastation created conditions that led to resolution of
Indonesia’s decades-long secessionist Free Aceh Movement (McDowell and Morrell 2010, 149–
50; Omelicheva 2011, 442) . Foremost, international aid was not politicized. Indonesia maintained
separate bureaucracies for peace talks and aid distribution, that managed their respective domains

20

However, domestic-related violent crimes significantly increased, suggesting that post-disaster social
cohesiveness does not apply to the most intimate contexts.
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in without consideration of the other (Egorova and Hendrix 2014). Unlike the resentment that was
engendered by the Sri Lankan government’s distribution of aid to political allies (some of whom
were unaffected by the tsunami), Indonesia’s aid management was perceived as inclusive and
apolitical.

Conclusion
This chapter established theoretical bases for how climate change-related human displacement
may influence conflict. The displacement-conflict relationship has theoretical foundations at
various levels of analysis, spanning from the individual human being to country-level conditions
and international factors. Also important is that a displacement-conflict relationship does not
necessarily mean a positive relationship, whereby more disaster-induced displacement has
corresponding increases of conflict and unrest. Insights from cooperation theories reveal how
displacement-conflict relationship may be negative – elevated measures of disaster-induced
displacement may lead to decreased conflict.
The next chapter develops theoretically informed hypotheses, introduces the data that will
be used for testing, and conducts a first-round of testing using the conventional country-year unit
of analysis.
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Chapter Four
Introduction of Data and Country-Year Analyses

We do not believe in a single, common climate effect that connects various distinct climatic
conditions (drought, heatwave, excess rainfall, etc.) with various distinct forms of violent
conflict (urban riots, land grabbing, insurgency, etc.) at various spatiotemporal scales in a
direct and simple manner.
Halvard Buhaug and Jonas Nordkvelle (2014, 9), responding to Hsiang et al.'s
(2013, 1212) meta-analysis that concluded “[d]eviations from normal precipitation
and mild temperatures systematically increase the risk of conflict substantially.”

This chapter develops theoretically informed hypotheses for the displacement-conflict
relationship. I then introduce the datasets that are relied upon for displacement, conflict, and unrest.
I explain how these datasets add to this project’s value, their limitations, and my efforts to mitigate
them. Accomplishing this requires discussion and preliminary analysis of the data, especially from
the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), as it has yet to appear in published research.
Because the country-year is the predominant unit of analysis for climate-conflict research that uses
statistical methods, the empirical part of this project begins by using the country-year to test
hypotheses. Notwithstanding the disadvantages that accompany country-year aggregation, this
chapter’s results enable useful comparison to chapter 5’s country-month results that focus on
temporally-oriented hypotheses, and chapter 6’s analysis of subnational administrative units to test
spatially-informed hypotheses. Consistent with the quote that opens this chapter, the results do not
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show “a single, common climate effect,” instead, the results are sensitive to data source,
measurement, and the type of conflict or unrest. Support is found for conflict theory, especially for
anti-government conflict, and a curvilinear relationship with regime type, such that anocracies are
found to be most susceptible to a displacement conflict relationship.

Hypotheses
As discussed in chapter 3, theoretical expectations regarding a climate-conflict relationship via
human displacement are multiple and contradictory. Theories that are informed by environmental
conflict scholarship generate hypotheses that anticipate increased conflict and unrest incidence
following displacement events (Kahl 2006; Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Displacement
events make conflict more likely by aggravating the conditions that have been shown to increase
the probability of contentious politics and armed conflict (Albuja et al. 2015, 66; Ash and
Obrodovich 2017; Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015; Jonas Scheffran et al. 2012).
Displacement also entails suffering and stressors that elevate the risks of unrest, manifest by
outbursts and aggression by individual persons whose conduct is unassociated with an organized
group (Anderson and DeLisi 2011; Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman 2015).
In contrast, the expectations of cooperation theories from sociological work on natural
disasters raise are less specified. Applying cooperation theory to disaster-induced displacement
anticipates IDPs who experience heightened solidarity, are preoccupied with recovery, and
therefore have little time or interest for contentious political activity (Fischer 1998; Heide 2004).
An ambiguity of cooperation theories is whether post-disaster cooperation will maintain conflict
and unrest at baseline incidence or produce a decrease. Two hypotheses are derived from these
divergent theoretical expectations.
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H1.A: Disaster-induced human displacement will lead to greater conflict and unrest
incidence.
H1.B: Disaster-induced human displacement will lead to either a decrease or no change in
conflict and unrest incidence.
Country regime type raises additional hypotheses. Anocratic regimes, countries that
possess autocratic and democratic features, are expected to be especially susceptible to a
displacement-conflict relationship (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001; Hendrix and
Haggard 2015). Anocracies tend to perform less well on good governance measures. This may
result from political officials having less electoral accountability, capacity to render services to
citizens, or a combination thereof. Consequently, in comparison to democracies, anocracies
implement fewer and less effective measures to mitigate natural disasters (Wood and Wright
2015). Popular grievance will be more acute because the government’s post-disaster efforts will
be less effective and timely, and blame may be attributed to the government for not having
addressed known vulnerabilities earlier.
A higher probability of conflict also relates to anocracies being more permissive of conflict
than autocracies (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, Ch. 3). Greater permissiveness can result from liberal
legal or normative influences, meaning higher tolerance of groups that oppose the government or
regime in general. Greater levels of civil rights also provide aggrieved citizens the option to express
grievances through public protest. Permissiveness can additionally stem from low capacity to
monopolize violence and maintain order (Clarke and Chess 2008; Kahl 2006; Solnit 2009). In such
case, a domestic security dilemma can occur with conflict occurring among non-governmental
groups. Alternatively, weak anocratic states may exploit tensions among domestic groups, or use
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groups as scapegoats for what may otherwise be characterized as governance failures. These
conditions account for the inverted U-shaped distribution.
H2: Disaster-induced IDPs will lead to greater conflict incidence, especially in anocratic
countries.
Two contradictory hypotheses relate to countries with democratic regimes. Democracies,
on average, perform better than anocracies and autocracies on measures of good governance (Jahan
2016; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). This suggests that post-disaster relief efforts in
democratic countries will tend to be effective and timely. One expectation from competent and
prompt governance of post-disaster conditions is that popular grievances will be minimized. This
reasoning, when combined with cooperation theory and findings of heightened solidarity among
survivors immediately following a disaster, leads to the expectation that protest incidence in
democratic countries will decrease because of disaster-induced displacement (Wood and Wright
2015).
H3.A: Disaster-induced human displacement will decrease protest incidence in democratic
countries.
The preceding hypothesis is contradicted by implications of democracies having liberal
legal systems and norms. Democracies tolerate public and collective expressions of popular dissent
to a greater extent than other regime types. Greater tolerance creates a political opportunity
structure of relatively low costs associated with protest (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, Ch. 3).
Democracies might therefore experience greater protest incidence because of legal and cultural
permissiveness. Additionally, relative deprivation theory supports this expectation (Gurr 1970).
Citizens in democracies enjoy higher levels on development indicators, making the sudden and
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drastic change to an IDP with its attendant hardships especially distressing. These considerations
are summarized in the following hypothesis.
H3.B: Disaster-induced human displacement will increase protest incidence in democratic
countries.
International aid is another source of divergent hypotheses. Aid can ameliorate the
hardships of human displacement by making post-disaster conditions less dangerous and
uncomfortable, and hastening recovery (Wood and Wright 2015). When hardship is lessened in
severity and duration, recruitment of IDPs for campaigns of conflict is hindered by dampened
grievances and greater opportunity costs. One observable implication is that aid will prevent
elevated incidence of anti-government armed conflict. The ability of aid to reduce opposition or
grievance also generates the implications that protests and unrest will not increase. Furthermore,
the absence of increased opposition in the forms of armed conflict or protest means that state
repression will not elevate. Alternatively, aid may elevate conflict and unrest incidence. Aid that
is allocated on the basis of political affiliations rather than disaster-related need may arouse protest
or even anti-governmental armed conflict (Silva 2009; Uson 2017). Aid could also serve as
lucrative booty, leading to armed conflict among non-governmental actors. These possibilities give
rise to the following hypothesis.
H4.A: International aid will lead to either a decrease or no change the incidence of conflict
and unrest following disaster-induced displacement events.
H4.B: International aid will lead to increased incidence of conflict and unrest following
disaster-induced displacement events.
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Table 4.1 Hypotheses that relate disaster-induced displace to conflict and unrest.

Conflict / Cooperation
H1.A Disaster-induced human displacement will lead to greater conflict and unrest
incidence.
H1.B Disaster-induced human displacement will lead to either a decrease or no change
in conflict and unrest incidence.
Regime type
H2:

Disaster-induced IDPs will lead to greater conflict incidence, especially in
anocratic countries.

H3.A Disaster-induced human displacement will decrease protest incidence in
democratic countries.
H3.B Disaster-induced human displacement will increase protest incidence in
democratic countries.
International Aid
H4.A International aid will lead to either a decrease or no change the incidence
of conflict and unrest following disaster-induced displacement events.
H4.B International aid will lead to increased incidence of conflict and unrest
following disaster-induced displacement events.

Data and Variables
Dependent variables
Data for the dependent variables of conflict and unrest derive from two event-based datasets.
Event-based datasets have the advantage of enabling analysis of the displacement-conflict
relationship with considerable detail and flexibility. In contrast to studies that examined the
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relationship between climate change and civil war onset, an event-based ontology means the
conflict events that constitute a civil war (e.g. battles, deaths, seizure and occupation of territory)
are individually counted (Bergholt and Lujala 2012; Buhaug 2010; Ghimire, Ferreira, and
Dorfman 2015; Koubi et al. 2012; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Salehyan and Hendrix 2014). The
movement towards event-based data includes smaller-scale conflict types (e.g. protests and unrest)
that are consistent with theoretically informed hypotheses. In addition, this offers the benefit of
more variation of the dependent variable relative to binary operationalizations (King, Keohane,
and Verba 1994). Finally, event-based data can be combined at various spatial and temporal
formats that enable departure from the country-year unit of analysis that has been a convention of
large-n environmental conflict studies.
The Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS) is one source of data for conflict
and unrest because of its spatial and temporal coverage. Its temporal coverage spans the years 1995
through September 2016 at the time of this writing, and well covers the available temporal
coverage for the displacement data. The ICEWS also offers global spatial coverage, which is an
important advantage in comparison to other datasets that are frequently used in climate conflict
scholarship but do not cover Asia. Asian countries experience the greatest incidence and impact
of climate relevant disaster-induced displacement, making their inclusion vital to this analysis
(Albuja et al. 2015; Bilak et al. 2016). Another benefit of the ICEWS is that observations are
geocoded, meaning that each event21 has latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates that link an event
to a specific location on the Earth’s surface. Geocoded data will be necessary to this project’s
spatial analyses.

21

Event and observation are used synonymously.
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ICEWS data derive from automated coding of news reports that are published in English,
French, Portuguese and Spanish (Boschee et al. 2015). Each event has multiple variables that
allowed me to craft new variables that are theoretically appropriate. The basic variables of the
ICEWS that are pertinent to this project are:
Country: Country in which an event occurred.
Event Date: Date of an event.
CAMEO code: A typology of events that is based on the Conflict and Mediation Event
Observations (CAMEO) coding scheme.
Source-sector(s): Social-political association(s) of the actor that is the source of an event,
e.g. government, military, police, activist, civilian, business.
Target-sector(s): Social-political association(s) of the actor that is the target of an event’s
action.
Geographic coordinates: Latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates for where an event
occurred. If unknown, coordinates for the capital city of the most subnational
administrative unit are provided.
The ICEWS data were filtered using the above variables to generate five new variables for conflict
and unrest: anti-government conflict, non-governmental conflict, repression, protest, and unrest.
Composition of the variables’ is detailed in the appendix (Table A.2) and a brief definition for
each is provided here.
Anti-government conflict denotes violent and/or armed actions by a non-governmental
actor (source-sector) towards a government entity (target-sector). Examples of event types
that constitute anti-government conflict are: assassinations, ethnic cleansing, occupation of
territory, and property destruction and/or confiscation.
Non-governmental conflict means violent and/or armed actions between two nongovernmental actors. Examples of event types that constitute non-governmental conflict
are: assassinations, ethnic cleansing, occupation of territory, and property destruction
and/or confiscation.
Repression denotes action by a government entity that undermines and/or inhibits the
ability of political opponents to advance anti-government policies or sentiments. The
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source-sector is therefore a government entity and the target-sector is a non-governmental
actor. Repression can manifest as: arrest, assassination, torture, confiscation and/or
destruction of property. Repression and anti-government conflict are quite similar, with the
direction of action between the source and target sectors being the key distinction.
Protest refers to public displays of advocacy or grievance by non-governmental actors. The
target-sector can be a government entity or non-governmental actor. The target-sector is
purposefully unspecified because theoretical and empirical work indicates that government
and non-governmental actors can be the target of protest (Adano et al. 2012; Uson 2017).
Protest events entail demonstration and rallies and, can be violent or non-violent.
Unrest refers to spontaneous and uncoordinated socially harmful acts that can be violent
or non-violent. Unrest is most closely associated with the heat hypothesis, which posits
that people are more susceptible to outbursts when faced with high wet-bulb (i.e. hot and
humid) conditions and/or heightened and prolonged stress of disaster-induced
displacement. Examples of unrest include physical and/or sexual assault, killing as a result
of assault, and confiscation and/or destruction of property.
A sixth variable, conflict aggregate, was generated. It’s a composite that sums values for
the three armed conflict variables – anti-governmental, non-governmental, and repression – for
each unit of analysis. The conflict aggregate variable follows similar operationalizations by
climate-conflict scholars that combine conflict sub-types. For example, Omelicheva (2011, 447)
examined an Onset of Political Instability variable that is comprised of “ethnic war, revolutionary
war, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides." Testing hypotheses with the conflict
aggregate variable and for each of the constituent sub-types separately means that this project’s
findings may offer insight not only about a particular event type(s), but also about more
generalizable measurement considerations.
ICEWS data entail three shortcomings that need acknowledgement. First, the data may
include events that are theoretically invalid. Arrest or detainment (CAMEO code 173), for
example, is the most frequent event sub-type that is coded as repression. Contrary to expectation
that repression occurs least in democratic countries, the annual mean incidence of repression is
greatest in democratic countries (278.8), in comparison to autocratic countries (132.8) and
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anocracies (131.2). Repressive arrests will presumably be less reported in illiberal regimes and
that “news coverage may be biased toward ‘newsworthy’ countries, which tend to be large,
Western, and economically developed” (Brancati 2007, 727). This project is admittedly unable to
distinguish between an arrest that is lawful and legitimate from one that is repressive. However,
statistical analysis of country-level panel data should be able to distinguish theoretically relevant
variation in conflict incidence. Furthermore, notwithstanding the greater detail that is gained from
event-based data, this project’s research design relative to case study work, is a macroscopic
“plausibility probe” whereby “preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses
[are undertaken] to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted” (George
and Bennett 2005, 75).
A second acknowledgement about the ICEWS is that it includes approximately 12-23%
erroneous observations. The team that generates the ICEWS reported the following percentages of
accurate coding of news stories for the event types that this project’s conflict and unrest variables
were derived (Lustick et al. 2015, 4):
Assaults / Fights
Coercion
Protests
Unconventional Mass Violence

73.8%
88.1%
84.5%
83.6%

Third, duplication occurs, in that a single event might be counted more than once. The ICEWS
may report a single event redundantly because multiple media outlets reported the same event, or
when a previously reported event receives subsequent coverage as new information is acquired.
While the above issues are problematic, benefits of the ICEWS data and mitigating
measures make them worthwhile. In contrast to other large event datasets that are generated from
automatic coding (e.g. GDELT), the ICEWS possesses “near duplicate detection” capability that
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limits duplicate stories to less than 20% of the observations (Saraf and Ramakrishnan 2016;
Schrodt 2012; Wang et al. 2016, 1503). Moreover, an external party’s analysis indicated that
duplicates will not obscure increased incidence of theoretically pertinent events (M. D. Ward et al.
2013, 6). Duplicates may actually be useful by “amplify[ing] politically relevant signals” (Schrodt
2012, 553). I also took an additional step when crafting the dependent variables to heighten the
threshold for including an observation. Observations that were missing any information regarding
the country in which an event occurred, source-sector, or target-sector were dropped from this
analysis. Missing information about the source-sector was the main reason for dropping potential
events. Doing so eliminated 22.3% of available observations but left only those in which the
highest degree of confidence could be placed in their validity.
Use of a second event-based dataset for the dependent variables is the final effort for
addressing problems with ICEWS data (Butcher 2017) and serving as a robustness check (Witmer
et al. 2017). The Social Conflict in Analysis Database (SCAD) has been used in environmental
and climate conflict scholarship and will be used to compare results with the ICEWS (Hendrix and
Salehyan 2012; Ide et al. 2014; T. G. Smith 2014). The SCAD includes event types that well
correspond to all four of the non-aggregated conflict variables – anti-government conflict, nongovernmental conflict, repression, and protest – that I generated from the ICEWS. Table A.3 in
the appendix provides detail regarding my adaptation. In addition to theoretical relevance, the
SCAD is generated in large part by trained human coders who undergo inter-coder reliability
checks.
There are drawbacks associated with the SCAD data. The data’s spatial coverage is limited
to African, Caribbean, and Latin American countries. The omission of Asia is unfortunate in light
of it being the region with the highest incidence and impact of climate change relevant disaster-
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induced displacement. Temporal coverage also presents a disadvantage because it is limited to
1990-2015, meaning that a year is lost when relating it to the IDP data that spans 2008-2016.
Finally, a comparable variable for unrest is not availed by the SCAD.
Figure 4.1 presents the event incidence for variables from the ICEWS and SCAD22. Seven
of the nine variables’ incidence appear within similar ranges. The striking exceptions are the
ICEWS’s protest and repression variables, which are considerably higher and punctuated by a
sharp increase in 2011. The incidence spike likely results from the Arab Spring beginning in
December 2010, the ICEWS counting more events because it is not limited to English-only news
sources, and the SCAD’s human coding that likely depresses the number of duplicate counts.
Figure 4.2 omits the ICEWS’s protest and repression variables so that the other variables’
incidence can be viewed with more detail. The discrepancy of these datasets illustrates how using
multiple theoretically comparable variables from two different sources will help to assess the
results’ robustness. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4.2.

Independent variables

Data for human displacement also derive from two sources. The IDMC (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre) is one source that provides global coverage for years 2008-2016.
Observations are country-based events of new disaster-induced displacement. For example,

22

For this chapter, the SCAD data was filtered to omit observations/rows that indicate an event’s occurrence
in secondary locations. Doing so is recommended by the SCAD codebook to avoid redundant counting of
events in non-spatial analysis. For example, Algeria experienced a spontaneous violent riot on February 5,
1992. The riot is considered a single event that occurred in three different cities, with the epicenter in
Algiers and secondary occurrences in Constantine and Batna. For spatial analysis, the SCAD provides three
observations/rows for each of this single event’s three locations.
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Figure 4.1 Comparison of conflict datasets.

Figure 4.2 Comparison of conflict datasets – ICEWS’s protest and repression variables are omitted.
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Typhoon Haiyan occurred during November 2013 and is coded as four events with differing
estimates for the numbers of IDPs for each of the countries that it affected: China (181,000), Palau
(1,500), the Philippines (4,095,280), and Vietnam (800,000). Displacement events because of
earthquakes and volcanoes23 are omitted because of their irrelevance to climate change, thereby
limiting this analysis to extreme (atmospheric) temperature, floods, storms, wildfires, wet mass
movements (i.e. mudslides), and severe winter conditions. Disasters because of dry mass
movement (i.e. landslides) are omitted because their relationship to climate change is highly
debated in comparison to other disaster types (Field et al. 2014a; Gariano and Guzzetti 2016).
Drought is also omitted because its slow onset, often over the course of years, makes assessing its
relationship with social-political events ill-suited to this project’s research design. Moreover, there
is only one instance included in the IDMC data.
One reason for using the IDMC’s data is that human displacement is its analytical focus,
which might portend improved validity. Previous environmental conflict studies understandably
used the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ (CRED) Emergency Events
Database (EM-DAT) because of its spatial and temporal coverage that permitted large-n analyses
of hypotheses related to natural disasters and climate change (Bergholt and Lujala 2012; Nel and
Righarts 2008; Omelicheva 2011; Slettebak 2012). However, the EM-DAT does not measure
human displacement per se because of CRED’s focus on disasters. For example, Figure 4.3
illustrates that CRED and IDMC produce strikingly different counts of flood and storm events that

23

Possibly surprising to those of us who are not cross-trained climate change and geology specialists,
anthropogenic climate change is expected to increase volcanic activity. Previous recessions of glaciers have
been followed by augmented volcanic activity, which is a “well established” finding in the field of geology
(Swindles et al. 2018, 47). The lag from glacial decline to elevated volcanic activity is estimated at 600
years. Including volcanic-induced displacement as part of this project’s assessment of a climate-conflict
relationship is not yet warranted.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics (unit of analysis is country-year).
Variables

Mean
Aggregate*

ICEWS

Conflict

SCAD

IDMC
Displacement
EM-DAT

199.51

Anti3.79
government
Non3.31
governmental
Repression
192.41

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

1,081.3

0

30,202

15.12

0

211

9.83

0

123

1,073.53

0

30,034

Protest

127.80

4446.88

0

12,180

Unrest

3.69

17.72

0

500

Aggregate*

16.57

42.95

0

372

17.20

0

157

23.16

0

210

Anti5.94
government
Non7.74
governmental
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0.081

0
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0
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9.83
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* Aggregate combines anti-governmental, non-governmental, and repression.
X 1/3 indicates cube-root transformation. ln indicates natural log transformation.
N = number of observations. Number of countries: Up to 136.

81

impacted human populations. The EM-DAT’s relatively unwavering count in comparison to the
IDMC is a discrepancy that is partially attributable to differing operationalizations for when a flood
or storm is documented as a disaster or displacement event. An event is considered a disaster by
the EM-DAT when it meets one of the following four thresholds: 10 or more persons die because
of the event, 100 or more persons are affected, a state of emergency is declared, or a call for
international aid is issued (CRED 2017). The IDMC does not apply thresholds to events. The spike
of displacement events however, according to IDMC-sourced data in Figure 4.3, resulted from the
IDMC having expanded its “data collection capacity” in 2014, thereby affecting its generation and
coding of data for 2013 and thereafter (IDMC and Griggs 2017). The increased capacity enabled
the IDMC to draw upon more sources and report smaller-scale events.
Figure 4.4 further emphasized the discrepancy by showing totals for the number of persons
who were displaced or affected by floods and storms. The IDMC’s conceptualization of
displacement is informed by the UNHCR’s definition and the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement (OCHA 2004; UNHCR 2015). In contrast, the EM-DAT uses its own
conceptualizations for measuring the total number of persons who are affected, which includes
those who are injured and left homeless by an event that meets one of the aforementioned
thresholds.24
Compounding these discrepancies is the EM-DAT’s problematic coding that does not
distinguish whether a zero indicates the documented value of a variable, or a missing value because
of unavailable information (CRED 2017). One study that analyzed multiple disaster datasets

24

The EM-DAT defines affected as, “[p]eople requiring immediate assistance during a period of
emergency, i.e. requiring basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate
medical assistance…[and homeless as the number] of people whose house is destroyed or heavily damaged
and therefore need shelter after an event” (CRED 2016).
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Figure 4.3 Comparison of disaster datasets. Global sum of floods and storms, 161 countries.

Figure 4.4 Comparison of disaster datasets. Global sum of displaced / affected persons by floods
and storms, 161 countries.
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concluded that such indiscriminate coding, in combination with reporting gaps by domestic
governmental and journalist sources, generate “approximations of numbers [of] injured and
displaced [that] are likely gross underestimates of the true values” (Doocy et al. 2013, n.p.). These
circumstances result in 16% of EM-DAT observations having zeroes for the Total Affected persons
– sum of the injured, homeless, and persons requiring immediate aid – because of a climate-related
disaster during 2008-2016.
Underestimation appears to also afflict the IDMC data because 15% of its events have
missing values for the number of new IDPs during the same timeframe. In response to these
concerns, the only observations that were kept and analyzed had a disaster-type that is relevant to
climate change, and, a non-zero value for new IDPs in the case of IDMC data or Total Affected
for the EM-DAT.
Two measurements of displacement are analyzed. The first is country-level per capita
measures of new IDPs (IDMC) and total persons affected (EM-DAT). Per capita measures are
used rather than raw value because, theoretically, they better reflect the magnitude of an event.
Further, empirical evaluation has shown that per capita measurement yielded more conservative
results than raw totals; raw data that generated statistically significant findings of a climate-conflict
relationship did not maintain when replicated with per capita measures (Slettebak 2012, 168).
Both displacement measures present large right-skew because of their range, many
countries experienced no new IDPs during a year whereas, for example, Nigeria had 6.1 million
new IDPs during 2012 that equaled 4% of its population. Variables with skewed distributions can
violate the assumptions of statistical analyses and make inefficient estimators. Data
transformations are used to mitigate outliers and skewness (Stock and Watson 2007; Tufte 1974).
A commonly used transformation is the natural logarithm but it’s inappropriate for zero (and
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negative) values, rendering it ill-suited for the displacement data (Wooldridge 2016, 173). An
alternative is the cube-root transformation because it can mitigate skewness from outliers while
also managing zero values (Cox 2011). Following precedence in IR (Lebovic and Saunders 2016)
and research by geographers on tropical cyclones (Terry, Kim, and Jolivet 2013), a cube-root
transformation is applied to both per capita displacement measures.
A count of displacement events is the second measure that will be used to evaluate the
hypotheses. Including a count measurement serves as a robustness check for results obtained via
per capita measures. Furthermore, a count of displacement events has the inductive purpose of
exploring whether or not the incidence of displacement events produces different results than per
capita measures. For instance, tipping points may exist wherein communities manage to cope with
one or two displacement events, but then become especially vulnerable to being overwhelmed
when subsequent displacements events occur shortly thereafter. Omelicheva's (2011) study of the
relationship between natural disasters and conflict, and Zahran et al.'s (2009) study of natural
disasters and crime incidence, provide precedence for using a count measure (among others) of
natural disasters. A cube-root transformation was applied to both IDMC and EM-DAT event
counts because of large right-skew and the AIC25 indicated improved model fit with the
transformation.

Control variables
Additional variables are included to control for alternative explanations of a climate changeconflict relationship. Economic conditions have been shown to significantly influence conflict

25

The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used to assess this project’s statistical models. Superior fit
was established by lower AIC values (Hilbe 2011, 2014, 116–19).
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(Bergholt and Lujala 2012; Koubi et al. 2012; Maystadt, Ecker, and Mabiso 2013). Economic
levels are particularly relevant to this project because the ability to pay for measures that facilitate
adaptation is an integral factor that determines the degree of vulnerability to climate change
(Busby, Smith, and Krishnan 2014; Field et al. 2014a). One estimate is that developing countries
account for 96% of deaths that are attributed to natural disasters (McDowell and Morrell 2010,
31). However, wealth by itself is an insufficient condition for reduced vulnerability to climate
change because country wealth may be distributed with acute inequality. Infant mortality rates are
often used in conflict scholarship as a proxy for economic development and inequality, as well as
quality of governance (Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman 2015; Nel and Righarts 2008; Omelicheva
2011). The presumption is that low infant mortality rates generally reflect higher levels of
economic status, government stability and services, with lower inequality. However, I chose GDP
per capita as my control for economic development because it is also commonly used in this line
of research and when separately evaluated, model fit was better with GDP per capita than infant
mortality (Hendrix and Haggard 2015; Slettebak 2012). The GDP per capita variable was
transformed using a natural logarithm to mitigate skewness (Raleigh 2015; Slettebak 2012; Tufte
1974). Both variables were obtained from the World Bank (2017).
Polity’s indicator for regime type is included, ranging from autocracy (-10) to democracy
(+10) (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). Controlling for regime type is important because of
empirical findings based on varied theoretical expectations. Regime type has been found to present
a curvilinear–inverted-U–relationship when used as a control for the influence of natural
environmental factors on armed conflict. Natural environmental factors and armed conflict are
negatively associated for autocratic countries, but armed conflict increases for anocracies (i.e.
regimes that present autocratic and democratic characteristics) and then declines for democracies
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(Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). Democratically elected leaders are thought to be more accountable
to their citizenries and might consequently be more inclined to implement adaptive measures that
ease the hardships of climate change. While some theoretical and empirical work questions this
notion because short-term electoral benefits can outweigh natural environmental considerations
with longer time-horizons (Burnell 2012), democracy is generally associated with higher levels of
environmental performance and sustainability (Betsill and Corell 2008; Bryner 2011; Li and
Reuveny 2006).
Regime type is also important in terms of managing inter-group conflict and providing
citizens with institutionalized opportunities to articulate policy preferences and dissent.
Autocracies monopolize force and are by definition repressive of opposition, whereas democracies
are expected to have lower conflict because of better service provision and institutionalized,
peaceful, dispute resolution. Anocracies have the greatest probability for armed fighting because
of less opportunity for popular influence and accountability, in combination with lower capacity
and experience with repressing expressions of grievance or challenges to state authority. Conflict,
especially in the form of protest, leads to different and in some instances, conflicting expectations.
For instance, protest is less likely to occur in autocracies because of high levels of repression but
is anticipated in anocracies and democracies because of differing causal mechanisms. In light of
these complexities, two variables are modeled for regime type. First, Polity’s standard indicator
for regime type is included for linear relationships. Second, a transformed version of Polity that
squares its values is included because a quadratic function is suited to detection of curvilinear
relationships (Hendrix and Haggard 2015; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012).26

26

Before squaring the Polity variable, its original values were augmented by adding 11 to each observation.
Otherwise, autocracies coded as “-10” and democracies coded as “10” are valued equally after their values
are squared.
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A variable for international aid is included because of prior research that found mixed
results regarding whether aid mitigates or aggravates conflict in post-disaster contexts (AidData
2017). Similar to the displacement variables, the aid variable has high positive skewness because
31% of observations have a zero value; a cube-root transformation was consequently applied. Two
additional points are notable. In addition to post-disaster funds for emergency food and health
services, the aid variable includes pre-disaster contributions that are intended for disaster
prevention and preparedness. Keeping this type of aid in the measurement is consistent with theory
that aid mitigates conflict by reducing the hardship and duration of displacement, and the
alternative explanation that aid worsens conflict when mismanaged. Second, the aid data’s most
recent year is 2013. There are enough observations to include the aid variable in this chapter’s
country-year analysis that spans years 2008-2015/6. The aid variable unfortunately had to be
omitted from the next chapter’s country-month analyses because it had too few observations after
subsetting the data by dropping years 2008-2012, to accommodate the IDMC’s improved coding
that began in 2013.
Two variables are included to account for demographic conditions. The percentage of a
country’s annual population growth was included to control for scarcity-based arguments. Youth
bulge was included as the percentage of a country’s population that was 15-24 years of age.
Countries with youth bulges are expected to have higher rates of conflict because this cohort is
especially likely to comprise the foot soldiers of organized groups engaged in armed conflict,
protesters, and perpetrators of acts of unrest. Both variables were obtained from the World Bank
(World Bank 2017).
Lastly, no variables were included to control for a country’s recent history of conflict.
Theoretically, conflict incidence and severity are expected to influence future conflict events;
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countries with a recent history of conflict are prone to have conflict in the near future. This
relationship may result from inability to resolve underlying points of contention, availability of
weaponry and combat skills, or from inadequate institutions and norms for non-violent dispute
resolution. More pertinent to this project, conflict can hinder economic productivity and distract
state resources from projects that implement adaptations to climate changes, thereby lessening the
potential for displacement. Researchers have responded to the issue of endogenous outcomes with
instrumental variables (Ghimire, Ferreira, and Dorfman 2015, 617), lagging predictor and control
variables (Buhaug 2010, 16480; Hendrix and Haggard 2015), or including measures of duration
since a country’s last major conflict (Nel and Righarts 2008; Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug
2011). I respond to endogeneity of the dependent variable by first acknowledging its likely
presence and stipulating that, for example, older democracies and countries with lower conflict
incidence in recent years are likely to have similar incidence in the near future. Methodologically,
I opt for a parsimonious research design that controls for theoretically pertinent conditions,
declines modeling instrumental or lagged conflict variables to avoid unduly introducing bias, and
uses relatively find-grained measures of conflict and unrest as the outcomes of interest to assess if
variations in human displacement lead to patterned change (Anderson and DeLisi 2011; Hsiang
2016)

Estimation Methods
Inferential statistical methods are used to analyze the relationship of disaster-induced human
displacement and conflict. Models with ICEWS data for conflict and unrest provide global
coverage and up to 136 countries, whereas analyses that use SCAD data have a maximum of 53
countries because its coverage is limited to the Caribbean, Latin America, and Africa. Country-
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years are this empirical chapter’s unit of analysis because research designs for large-n climateconflict analyses often use yearly or country-averaged data (Buhaug 2010; Hendrix and Salehyan
2012; Landis 2012; Omelicheva 2011). I begin with country-years to establish a baseline of results
that is consistent with much of the preceding work. Subsequent chapters will analyze units of
analysis with greater temporal and spatial precision.
The dependent variable is count data, which are non-negative discrete integers (e.g. 0, 1,
2, 3, 4, 5…etc.) that cluster towards zero and low values. These properties distinguish count data
from more common continuous ratio data that can present negative values and rational numbers
(e.g. -2.74, -1.6, 0, 2, 3.98…etc.). With a population or sample size of roughly 30 cases, continuous
ratio data begin to resemble the normal distribution (i.e. bell curve) that can be analyzed with a
basic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model. Count data’s clustering at lower values
however, creates a distribution with extreme positive skewness that violates assumptions of OLS
regression and situates this data type within the family of Poisson distributions (Coxe, West, and
Aiken 2009; Hilbe 2014). OLS also has the problematic assumption that changes in the dependent
variable’s value from, for example, 10 to 11 is the same as a change from 0 to 1 (Nasvik 2014).
This assumption is inappropriate for count data because the difference between one instance of
either a natural disaster or conflict event and no such instance is more significant than, for instance,
the difference between ten and eleven instances.
Diagnostics found that all of the conflict and unrest variables are overdispersed. This is
common for count data and indicates that a variable’s variance is larger than its mean.
Overdispersion is problematic because it can decrease standard errors of the estimates, thereby
elevating the risk of a Type I error that falsely identifies a variable as a significant predictor.
Negative binomial regression has an extra parameter to account for overdispersion and was
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therefore selected to model the variables’ relationships (Hilbe 2011; Hoffmann 2016). Fixed
effects are used to achieve robust standard errors because of unmodeled heterogeneity (Hsiang
2016; Koubi et al. 2012).
Multiple post-estimation techniques were implemented to assess the models’ fit. Fit refers
to how well a model – which can be the actual statistical method or the combination of variables
being analyzed – explains the dependent variable. Assessments of fit were used in selecting control
variables. For instance, infant mortality rates and GDP per capita are the most common measures
used to control for development and economic affluence. To avoid arbitrary selection, using
assessments of fit techniques favored GPD per capita. More fundamental to this project, fit
assessments were applied with a focus on the displacement measures. An important question about
this project’s statistical results relates to measures of association, or how much value is added from
including displacement measures in the analyses (Omelicheva 2011). Log likelihood ratio tests
confirmed that models where the displacement variables were found to be significant, are superior
when compared to the same model that omits the displacement measure. These checks maintained
when evaluated with the AIC (Hilbe 2014, 116–19).
A reasonable critique regarding my estimation technique is that the high percentage of zero
values presented by the conflict and displacement measures make the negative binomial (NB)
model suboptimal for this analysis. A zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) might
therefore be a preferable alternative, as it assumes that there are two types of cases that require
differing statistical models. The first type of cases can range from zero or more but still have the
relatively low values that are characteristic of count data. A second type of cases are referred to as
“true zeroes” because they are incapable of generating a value other than zero, and it is these cases
that inflate a population or sample’s zeroes. For example, imagine that one wants to better
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understand the conditions that influence the count of medals that countries attain during a session
of the Olympic games. Representing the first case type, most countries participate in the Olympics
and leave with zero medals. Countries that do not participate in the Olympics represent the latter
case type of true zeroes because they would have no chance of winning a medal. With the
unrealistic premise that a researcher does not know which countries participated in the games, nonparticipant countries would inflate the count of zero medals won. ZINB addresses these
circumstances by applying a logistic regression to assess the probability of a country transitioning
from zero to one medal, and a NB model is subsequently used to assess the distribution of one or
more medals won among non-true zero countries.
ZINB is inappropriate to this project because of theoretical and methodological reasons.
There is no theoretical reason for a country to be true zero, i.e., truly incapable of presenting at
least one instance of conflict or unrest during a given year. A methodological reason for not using
a ZINB model is that I am unaware of statistical software that can apply it to this project’s panel
data. Discussions of ZINB consistently occur in relation to cross-sectional data (Hilbe 2011, 370–
81, 2014, 202–6; Hoffmann 2016, 149–54). In addition, likelihood ratio tests purportedly do not
favor ZINB over NB (Allison 2012). To assess this claim, I analyzed single years of cross sectional
data using NB and ZINB and found that the AIC consistently and unequivocally favored NB.27
Lastly, Stata’s countfit diagnostic feature preponderantly favored NB over ZINB.

27

I was unable to replicate the comparison with a likelihood ratio test. The Akaike Information Criterion
is an acceptable alternative and “most commonly used general fit statistic” for count models (Hilbe 2011,
68–71, 2014, 116–19).
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Results and Analysis
Addressing generalities regarding the results are warranted before evaluating individual
hypotheses. Initial results for the displacement-conflict hypotheses are inconsistent and sensitive
to model specification. Specifically, the results vary dependent on the data sources and whether or
not international aid is included in the analysis. For the non-lagged models that assess the
displacement-conflict relationship within the same country-year, using ICEWS data for conflict
and unrest so that global coverage is attained, only one of 24 results showed a significant increase
(Tables 4.3-4). The significant increase occurred when IDMC-sourced per capita displacement
was regressed on anti-government conflict (Table 4.3); the coefficient (6.335) is interpreted as a
one-unit increase of (cube-root transformed) per capita displacement has an expected incidence of
anti-government conflict being 535% more often.28 This is the largest coefficient, most results are
within the range of -2 and 2. For example, regressing identical model specification on protest yields
a coefficient of 1.44, meaning that a one-unit increase of (cube-root transformed) per capita
displacement has an expected incidence of protest being 44% more often. Coefficients less than
one denote a negative relationship, as in the case of IDMC-sourced displacement events counts on
repression (Table 4.4), the result of 0.967 means that a one-unit increase of the displacement

28

All results are exponentiated as Incidence Rate Ratios to facilitate interpretation; refer to (Hilbe 2011,
109–16, 2014, 145–47).
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Coefficients are exponentiated Incidence Rate Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. X1/3 indicates cube-root transformation.

Constant

Youth
Bulge

Pop.
Growth

Intl. Aid1/3

Polity22

Polity2

GDP pc (ln)

Ttl. Aff.
pc 1/3 t-1

Ttl. Aff.
pc 1/3

IDP pc 1/3
t-1

IDP pc 1/3

(3)
NonGov

(2)
AntiGov

(1)
Conflict
Aggregate

IDMC

Table 4.3 Negative binomial models estimating the effect of human displacement per capita on conflict and unrest†.
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***

(0.056)

0.999

(0.043)
1.132
(0.088)
1.380***
(0.114)
0.987***
(0.003)
1.000
(0.000)

1.005

(0.042)

0.991

Repress

(10)

EM-DAT

† Data for conflict and unrest derive from the ICEWS, years 2008-2016. Spatial coverage is global.
p < + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Coefficients are exponentiated Incidence Rate Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. X1/3 indicates cube-root transformation.

Observation
s

Constant

Youth
Bulge

Pop.
Growth

Intl. Aid1/3

Polity22

Polity2

GDP pc (ln)

Ttl. Aff.
ec 1/3 t-1

Ttl. Aff.
ec 1/3

IDP ec1/3
t-1

IDP ec 1/3

(1)
Conflict
Aggregate

IDMC

Table 4.4 Negative binomial models estimating the effect of human displacement event counts on conflict and unrest†.

665

3.175
(3.166)

(0.015)

0.965

*

(0.054)

1.004

(0.067)
1.210**
(0.085)
1.271**
(0.101)
0.992*
(0.003)
1.000
(0.000)

1.148*

(0.061)

1.056

Protest

(11)

557

0.117
(0.229)

(0.032)

1.047

(0.111)

1.032

(0.104)
1.443*
(0.241)
1.468*
(0.224)
0.985*
(0.006)
1.000
(0.000)

1.121

(0.118)

1.192+

Unrest

(12)

96

13.42
(37.213)
257

18.66
(60.300)
257

265.3+
(889.98)
227

(0.490)

0.993
(0.215)
1.078
(0.240)
0.999
(0.009)
1.000
(0.001)
1.171
(0.237)
0.926
(0.053)

(0.547)

(0.351)

0.475

0.368
(0.433)

Non-Gov

(3)

1.220
(0.255)
1.461+
(0.332)
0.987
(0.009)
1.000
(0.001)
1.274
(0.293)
0.859**
(0.049)

0.478

0.350

0.944
(0.153)
1.112
(0.205)
0.997
(0.007)
1.000
(0.001)
1.094
(0.179)
0.944
(0.045)

0.731
(0.913)

0.319
(0.342)

Anti-Gov

(2)

18.03
(71.010)
226

1.120
(0.283)
1.290
(0.336)
0.990
(0.010)
0.999
(0.001)
1.107
(0.300)
0.939
(0.059)

(0.617)

0.513

2.484
(3.245)

Repress

(4)

361.4*
(1000.432)
259

1.035
(0.198)
2.040***
(0.411)
0.973***
(0.007)
1.000
(0.001)
1.019
(0.210)
0.954
(0.045)

(0.466)

0.595

1.182
(1.086)

Protest

(5)

16.48
(45.212)
257

(0.183)
0.940
(0.154)
1.090
(0.202)
0.998
(0.007)
1.000
(0.001)
1.093
(0.183)
0.939
(0.044)

0.214

261.7+
(867.55)
227

(0.400)
1.215
(0.253)
1.441
(0.328)
0.988
(0.009)
1.000
(0.001)
1.264
(0.291)
0.859**
(0.048)

0.397

(0.596)

(0.272)
+

0.580

0.326

(6)
Conflict
Aggregate

18.55
(59.158)
257

(0.290)
0.999
(0.217)
1.060
(0.237)
1.000
(0.009)
1.000
(0.001)
1.173
(0.243)
0.925
(0.052)

0.329

(0.436)

0.490

EM-DAT
(7)
(8)
AntiNon-Gov
Gov

37.18
(142.764)
226

(0.116)
1.107
(0.277)
1.241
(0.322)
0.992
(0.010)
0.999
(0.001)
1.131
(0.306)
0.921
(0.056)

0.109

*

(0.811)

0.786

Repress

(9)

(0.464)
1.017
(0.198)
2.038***
(0.415)
0.973***
(0.008)
1.000
(0.001)
1.007
(0.208)
0.957
(0.044)

0.673

(0.583)

0.784

Protest

(10)

376.1*
(1054.82)
259

† Data for conflict derive from the SCAD, years 2008-2015. Spatial coverage is Caribbean, Latin American, and African countries.
p < + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Coefficients are exponentiated Incidence Rate Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. X1/3 indicates cube-root transformation.

Observations

Constant

Youth Bulge

Pop. Growth

Intl. Aid1/3

Polity22

Polity2

GDP pc (ln)

Ttl. Aff.
pc 1/3 t-1

Ttl. Aff.
pc 1/3

IDP pc 1/3
t-1

IDP pc 1/3

(1)
Conflict
Aggregate

IDMC

Table 4.5 Negative binomial models estimating human displacement per capita on conflict†.

2.504**
(0.704)
3.137***
(1.023)
0.960**
(0.012)
1.000
(0.001)
1.149
(0.320)
1.047
(0.086)
0.0270
(0.111)
232

(10.160)

(0.678)

1.190
(0.167)
1.895***
(0.285)
0.975***
(0.006)
1.000
(0.000)
0.949
(0.138)
0.897***
(0.028)
2129.9***
(4586.63)
277

3.135

8.354+

1.270

0.857
(0.401)
1.808+
(0.636)
0.984
(0.013)
0.999
(0.001)
0.313
(0.241)
0.924
(0.103)
5026.4
(40865)
174

(4.181)

9.220
(16.627)

6.424
(7.908)

Non-Gov

(3)

1.392
(0.800)

Anti-Gov

(2)

1.025
(0.149)
1.955***
(0.294)
0.974***
(0.006)
1.000
(0.000)
0.848
(0.126)
0.883***
(0.027)
21717.7***
(47445.82)
277

(0.496)

0.939

1.101
(0.617)

Repress

(4)

1.207
(0.164)
1.793***
(0.273)
0.980***
(0.006)
1.000
(0.001)
0.720*
(0.115)
0.900**
(0.032)
744.8**
(1703.043)
277

(0.628)

1.001

1.062
(0.749)

Protest

(5)

0.575
(0.577)
2.297**
(0.601)
2.866***
(0.860)
0.964**
(0.011)
1.000
(0.001)
1.050
(0.266)
1.052
(0.086)
0.0310
(0.125)
232

(0.293)
1.171
(0.158)
1.902***
(0.280)
0.975***
(0.006)
1.000
(0.000)
0.935
(0.132)
0.891***
(0.028)
3531.1***
(7450.088)
277

(0.980)

(0.341)
0.646

0.956

0.753

(6)
Conflict
Aggregate

(2.390)
0.796
(0.379)
1.892+
(0.688)
0.983
(0.014)
0.999
(0.001)
0.275
(0.217)
0.911
(0.103)
28355.6
(232441)
174

1.749

(10.008)

6.357

EM-DAT
(7)
(8)
AntiNon-Gov
Gov

(0.253)
1.006
(0.144)
1.970***
(0.290)
0.974***
(0.006)
1.000
(0.000)
0.837
(0.122)
0.878***
(0.027)
35054***
(74965)
277

0.566

(0.310)

0.706

Repress

(9)

† Data are subset from the ICEWS, years 2008-2015. Spatial coverage is Caribbean, Latin American, and African countries.
p < + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Coefficients are exponentiated Incidence Rate Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. X1/3 indicates cube-root transformation.

Observations

Constant

Youth Bulge

Pop. Growth

Intl. Aid1/3

Polity22

Polity2

GDP pc (ln)

Ttl. Aff.
pc 1/3 t-1

Ttl. Aff.
pc 1/3

IDP pc 1/3
t-1

IDP pc 1/3

(1)
Conflict
Aggregate

IDMC

Table 4.6 Negative binomial models estimating human displacement per capita on conflict†.

(0.382)
1.204
(0.164)
1.800***
(0.275)
0.980***
(0.006)
1.000
(0.001)
0.720*
(0.116)
0.895**
(0.031)
974.0**
(2204.74)
277

0.702

(0.462)

0.857

Protest

(10)

97

(0.190)

(0.142)

4.786
(13.042)
257

133.0
(436.9)
227

1.233
(0.268)
1.517+
(0.345)
0.985+
(0.009)
1.000
(0.001)
1.310
(0.314)
0.874*
(0.047)

1.093

0.991

0.963
(0.161)
1.117
(0.209)
0.997
(0.007)
1.000
(0.001)
1.096
(0.185)
0.965
(0.043)

1.202
(0.209)

1.092
(0.158)

(2)
AntiGov

9.876
(31.64)
257

1.018
(0.226)
1.108
(0.249)
0.998
(0.009)
1.000
(0.001)
1.185
(0.247)
0.940
(0.051)

(0.156)

1.004

1.003
(0.154)

(3)
NonGov

9.822
(38.117)
226

1.096
(0.285)
1.305
(0.340)
0.989
(0.010)
0.999
(0.001)
1.121
(0.314)
0.956
(0.055)

(0.194)

1.076

(0.113)
1.255
(0.261)
1.438
(0.326)
0.988
(0.009)
1.001
(0.001)
1.251
(0.292)
0.846**
(0.049)

(0.095)
1.009
(0.170)
1.107
(0.205)
0.997
(0.007)
1.000
(0.001)
1.119
(0.189)
0.939
(0.043)
10.95
(29.91)
257

1.019
(0.201)
2.053***
(0.414)
0.973***
(0.007)
1.000
(0.001)
0.989
(0.216)
0.966
(0.043)
258.7*
(723.55)
259

447.1+
(1500.1)
227

+

0.744

(0.146)

(0.138)
0.708

0.970

(7)
AntiGov

1.055

(6)
Conflict
Aggregate

**

(0.128)

1.064

1.168
(0.142)

Protest

Repress
1.266
(0.230)

(5)

(4)

14.74
(47.450)
257

(0.102)
1.054
(0.229)
1.024
(0.231)
1.001
(0.009)
1.000
(0.001)
1.169
(0.247)
0.919
(0.053)

0.721

*

(0.138)

1.008

Non-Gov

EM-DAT
(8)

21.62
(81.860)
226

(0.107)
1.159
(0.287)
1.196
(0.316)
0.993
(0.010)
0.999
(0.001)
1.165
(0.310)
0.923
(0.055)

0.665

*

(0.154)

0.993

Repress

(9)

602.3*
(1670.9)
259

(0.095)
1.007
(0.197)
2.020***
(0.407)
0.974***
(0.007)
1.000
(0.001)
0.988
(0.205)
0.952
(0.044)

0.830

(0.103)

0.888

Protest

(10)

† Data for conflict derive from the SCAD, years 2008-2015. Spatial coverage is Caribbean, Latin American, and African countries.
p < + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Coefficients are exponentiated Incidence Rate Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. X1/3 indicates cube-root transformation.

Observations

Constant

Youth Bulge

Pop. Growth

Intl. Aid1/3

Polity22

Polity2

GDP pc (ln)

Ttl. Aff.
ec 1/3 t-1

Ttl. Aff.
ec 1/3

IDP ec1/3
t-1

IDP ec 1/3

(1)
Conflict
Aggregate

IDMC

Table 4.7 Negative binomial models estimating the effect of human displacement event counts on conflict†.

98

1.211
(0.229)

(0.087)

(0.349)

1.261

0.920
(0.261)

1.004
(0.187)

1.060

Non-Gov

(3)

Anti-Gov

(2)

(0.082)

1.036

1.016
(0.080)

Repress

(4)

(0.107)

1.084

1.084
(0.106)

Protest

(5)

0.812

0.884

(0.190)

(0.065)
**

1.055

0.875+

(6)
Conflict
Aggregate

1.129

(0.312)

1.287

EM-DAT
(7)
(8)
AntiNon-Gov
Gov

0.805

**

(0.063)

0.888+

Repress

(9)

GDP pc (ln)

(0.062)
(0.157)
(0.286)
(0.058)
1.183
2.356**
0.812
1.037
1.195
1.134
2.310**
0.796
0.980
(0.165)
(0.634)
(0.383)
(0.149)
(0.163)
(0.156)
(0.614)
(0.378)
(0.142)
Polity2
1.893***
2.986***
1.845+
1.961***
1.766***
1.913***
2.819***
1.860+
1.958***
(0.289)
(0.929)
(0.668)
(0.303)
(0.270)
(0.275)
(0.850)
(0.693)
(0.282)
Polity22
0.975***
0.962**
0.983
0.974***
0.980***
0.975***
0.964**
0.983
0.974***
(0.006)
(0.011)
(0.014)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.011)
(0.014)
(0.005)
Intl. Aid1/3
1.000
1.000
0.999
1.000
1.000
1.001
1.001
0.999
1.001
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
Pop. Growth
0.942
1.043
0.324
0.858
0.711*
0.936
1.059
0.321
0.849
(0.136)
(0.268)
(0.245)
(0.125)
(0.114)
(0.131)
(0.270)
(0.237)
(0.122)
Youth Bulge
0.897***
1.049
0.887
0.886***
0.907**
0.874***
1.037
0.901
0.863***
(0.028)
(0.087)
(0.103)
(0.027)
(0.031)
(0.028)
(0.086)
(0.096)
(0.027)
***
***
**
***
Constant
2159.8
0.0343 46184.9 16617.8
530.7
12236.4
0.0456
25117.1 101938***
(4571.11) (0.141) (38962) (35730.01) (1193.261) (26027.23) (0.186) (199927) (217814)
Observations
277
232
174
277
277
277
232
174
277
† Data are subset from the ICEWS, years 2008-2015. Spatial coverage is Caribbean, Latin American, and African countries.
p < + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Coefficients are exponentiated Incidence Rate Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. X1/3 indicates cube-root transformation.

Ttl. Aff.
ec 1/3 t-1

Ttl. Aff.
ec 1/3

IDP ec 1/3
t-1

IDP ec 1/3

(1)
Conflict
Aggregate
1.023
(0.083)

IDMC

Table 4.8 Negative binomial models estimating human displacement event counts conflict†.

(0.087)
1.223
(0.169)
1.835***
(0.283)
0.979***
(0.006)
1.001
(0.001)
0.723*
(0.116)
0.890***
(0.031)
1254.7**
(2846.25)
277

0.878

(0.096)

1.001

Protest

(10)

measure has an expected incidence of repression being 3.3% less often.29
The near complete absence of significant increases favors H1.B, cooperation theory’s
expectation that conflict incidence will either decrease or not significantly increase following
displacement events. The insignificant results occur regardless of displacement being measured
per capita (Table 4.3) or as event counts (Tables 4.4). The relationship also maintains across
sources of conflict data. Upon subsetting the data temporally and spatially so that comparison can
be made with SCAD-sourced data (Tables 4.5-8), the results continue to show no significant
increases of conflict. The relationship’s directionality is another aspect that supports cooperation
theory. The coefficients are frequently negative across model specifications. Although statistically
insignificant, negative coefficients suggest that conflict incidence decreases with displacement.
However, directionality and magnitude are not entirely consistent. Models with per capita
displacement and ICEWS-sourced conflict generate larger coefficients that are more frequently
positive (Table 4.6), when compared to SCAD-sourced models (Table 4.5).

29

A trade-off from applying a cube-root transformation to measures of displacement and international aid
is that the regression results are difficult to interpret in their non-transformed scale. The cube-root
transformation eliminates the ability of results to serve as generalizable estimations in the original scale.
Consequently, interpreting results in the original scale necessitates plugging in values for a particular
country-year’s observation, rather than being able to state that the coefficient represents an average
relationship between the dependent and predictor variables (Griggs 2018). For example, regressing IDMCsourced per capita displacement, that has been cube-root transformed, on ICEWS-sourced data for
repression, with the result presented as an incidence rate ratio, produced a coefficient of 1.036 (Table 4.3).
Interpreting 1.036 in the original scale would require selecting a particulr country-year observation that has
not been transformed, say 0.0008993, which was Afghanistan’s per capita disaster-induced displacement
during 2009. This could be interpreted as a one unit increase of per capita displacement in Afghanistan
during 2009, means that the expected incidence of repression will be 3.2% more often, in comparison to
3.6% more often for the transformed coefficient. Formally expressing the process for returning the
transformed coefficient back to its original scale is provided below:
-

-

1.032 = 1.036 √'.'''())*+, - 1.036 √'.'''())*
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Additional support for cooperation theory is gained from lagging the displacement
variable. A potential problem with the non-lagged models is the assumption of temporal
simultaneity. Theoretical grounds for a displacement-conflict relationship implicitly require time.
Referring back to contentious politics theory for example, whether through boundary activation of
one group exploiting us-them distinctions with another group, or government misuse of
international aid by favoring political allies that may have been unaffected by a natural disaster, if
a displacement-conflict relationship exists, time will need to elapse between a disaster event and
variation of conflict incidence. Time is required because previous research indicates that at least
during the immediate aftermath of a disaster, IDPs are preoccupied with basic survival.
Furthermore, time is required for political opportunists to recognize and respond to post-disaster
conditions. Lagging the displacement variable by one year is the conventional method to account
for temporality. Doing so, for example, regresses a displacement event that occurred during the
year 2008 (Xt -1) with the conflict and control variables of 2009 (Xt) (Stata 2017, 661).
Lagging the displacement variables produced additional but weak support for cooperation
theory. Six of the 64 results are significant with negative coefficients, meaning that displacement
events in these instances saw a statistically significant decrease of conflict events during the
subsequent year. Examples of this result include EM-DAT per capita displacement with SCADsourced repression data (Table 4.5), and EM-DAT event counts with SCAD anti-governmental
and non-governmental conflict, repression, and the conflict aggregate (Table 4.7). The largest
decrease occurred with EM-DAT per capita displacement that produced a significant coefficient
of 0.109 in relation to SCAD-sourced repression, which can be interpreted as expected incidence
of repression that is 89.1% less often (Table 4.5). Moreover, the significant decrease of repression
was especially robust in that it maintained for EM-DAT’s event counts across conflict datasets,
101

and per capita measure for SCAD and ICEWS-sourced data. Another aspect that supports
cooperation theory is that although insignificant, 23 of the 64 lagged results generated negative
coefficients. A single exception that supports conflict theory occurred with a significant increase
of ICEWS protest in relation to EM-DAT event counts (Table 4.4). The results’ totality–two
significant increases out of 64 models, frequent negative coefficients, and robustness across
displacement and conflict data–strongly favors cooperation theory’s expectation that conflict
events will either decrease or not significantly increase in relation to displacement.
The preceding findings require an important qualification. The most recent data for
international aid is from 2013, whereas most of the other data sources span through 2016. Including
international aid data in the analyses loses nearly 40% of the observations because of its temporal
truncation. This three-year gap is potentially critical because based on IDMC data, it includes a
considerable increase of displacement event counts, and both the IDMC and EM-DAT report
increased per capita displacement during 2016. Thus, losing three years of the most recent
observations when displacement events accord with IPCC projections of becoming more severe,
and more frequent dependent on the disaster type, risks biasing the data in a manner that underestimates the displacement-conflict relationship. varied specifications, both in Tables 4.9-10
present results after omitting international aid and using ICEWS data to maximize global and
temporal coverage. The revised models provide considerable support for conflict theory (H1.A).
Of the 48 non-lagged and lagged results, eight are significant with 95% or greater confidence, and
nine more are significant at the 90% confidence level. Anti-governmental conflict takes on
robustness as it is significant and positive through this analysis and earlier modeling that included
international aid. Further supporting conflict theory is that most of the coefficients are positive.
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103

1.021

(0.020)
0.015***
(0.017)
902

(0.009)
8.320***
(5.019)
1061

(0.100)

(0.040)

0.975**

1.232*

(0.124)
1.102
(0.100)
0.998
(0.004)

(0.052)
1.127*
(0.064)
0.995*
(0.002)

0.955

***

+

1.447

(2.979)

(0.391)

1.094

4.770*

1.348

(2)
AntiGov
3.651+
(2.465)

(0.023)
1.095
(1.668)
790

1.036

(0.092)

0.935

(0.133)
1.364**
(0.132)
0.988**
(0.004)

1.090

(0.681)

0.997

(3)
NonGov
3.025
(2.131)

(0.009)
7.957***
(4.871)
1061

0.974**

(0.040)

0.955

(0.053)
1.117+
(0.064)
0.995*
(0.002)

1.105

*

(0.374)

1.282

(0.010)
1.505
(0.968)
1053

0.984

(0.040)

0.968

(0.056)
1.227***
(0.068)
0.993***
(0.002)

1.205

***

(0.748)

2.022+

1.677
(0.646)

Protest

Repress
1.536
(0.474)

(5)

(4)

(0.019)
0.0449*
(0.055)
947

1.056**

(0.068)

0.860+

(0.140)
1.261*
(0.125)
0.991*
(0.004)

1.436

***

(1.807)

3.095+

2.977+
(1.867)

Unrest

(6)

(0.752)

(0.239)

(0.009)
8.438***
(5.096)
1061

0.974**

(0.040)

0.961

(0.052)
1.129*
(0.064)
0.995*
(0.002)

1.097

(0.020)
0.0154***
(0.018)
902

1.021

(0.103)

1.258**

(0.123)
1.098
(0.100)
0.998
(0.004)

1.433

***

(1.141)

(0.230)
*

2.795

1.195

*

1.882

Anti-Gov

(8)

1.269

(7)
Conflict
Aggregate

(0.023)
0.723
(1.094)
790

1.035

(0.095)

0.962

(0.139)
1.381***
(0.134)
0.988**
(0.004)

1.143

(0.893)

2.006

(0.851)

1.954

(0.009)
8.151***
(4.991)
1061

0.973**

(0.040)

0.960

(0.053)
1.119+
(0.064)
0.995*
(0.002)

1.107

*

(0.222)

1.150

(0.232)

1.233

Repress

(10)

EM-DAT

(9)
NonGov

† Data for conflict and unrest derive from the ICEWS, years 2008-2016. Spatial coverage is global.
p < + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Coefficients are exponentiated Incidence Rate Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. X1/3 indicates cube-root transformation.

Observations

Constant

Youth
Bulge

Pop.
Growth

Polity22

Polity2

GDP pc
(ln)

Ttl. Aff.
pc 1/3 t-1

Ttl. Aff.
pc 1/3

IDP pc 1/3
t-1

IDP pc 1/3

(1)
Conflict
Aggregate
1.647
(0.506)

IDMC

Table 4.9 Negative binomial models estimating the effect of human displacement per capita on conflict and unrest†, omitting international aid.

(0.010)
1.628
(1.046)
1053

0.984

(0.040)

0.975

(0.056)
1.234***
(0.069)
0.993***
(0.002)

1.202

***

(0.349)

1.521

+

(0.243)

1.055

Protest

(11)

(0.019)
0.0472*
(0.058)
947

1.054**

(0.071)

0.878

(0.137)
1.241*
(0.123)
0.991*
(0.004)

1.418***

(0.619)

1.644

(0.720)

2.032*

Unrest

(12)

104
0.989

(0.040)

0.962

(0.055)
1.221***
(0.068)
0.993**
(0.002)

1.191

***

(0.039)

1.063***

(0.067)

0.849*

(0.140)
1.283*
(0.127)
0.990*
(0.004)

1.437

***

(0.067)

1.090

(0.090)

(0.035)

0.975**

(0.040)

0.954

(0.051)
1.136*
(0.065)
0.995*
(0.002)

1.087

1.030

(0.098)

1.217*

(0.122)
1.123
(0.102)
0.997
(0.004)

1.430

***

(0.096)

(0.037)
+

1.184

1.004

*

1.120

Anti-Gov

(8)

0.980

(7)
Conflict
Aggregate

1.043+

(0.093)

0.952

(0.141)
1.391***
(0.135)
0.988**
(0.004)

1.148

(0.092)

1.076

(0.099)

1.164+

(9)
NonGov

(0.039)

0.951

(0.053)
1.125*
(0.065)
0.995*
(0.002)

1.095

+

(0.036)

0.990

(0.034)

0.968

Repress

(10)

(0.040)

0.973

(0.056)
1.235***
(0.069)
0.992***
(0.002)

1.200

***

(0.047)

1.077

+

(0.044)

1.005

Protest

(11)

(0.010)
1.554
(1.008)
1053

0.979*

(0.040)

0.951

(0.053)
1.111+
(0.064)
0.995*
(0.002)

1.115

*

(0.032)

1.093**
1.042

1.099
(0.065)

1.086*
(0.040)

1.047
(0.030)

Unrest

Protest

Repress

(6)

(5)

(4)

(0.009)
(0.020)
(0.023)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.019)
(0.009)
(0.020)
(0.023)
(0.009)
**
***
**
**
***
***
Constant
5.815
0.009
0.989
5.466
1.359
0.0381
9.896
0.0122
0.503
10.06***
(3.534)
(0.011)
(1.520)
(3.366)
(0.874)
(0.046)
(6.086)
(0.014)
(0.788)
(6.246)
Observations
1061
902
790
1061
1053
947
1061
902
790
1061
† Data for conflict and unrest derive from the ICEWS, years 2008-2016. Spatial coverage is global.
p < + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Coefficients are exponentiated Incidence Rate Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. X1/3 indicates cube-root transformation.

1.039+

(0.092)

0.937

(0.130)
1.362**
(0.131)
0.988**
(0.004)

1.083

(0.064)

1.006

(3)
NonGov
1.072
(0.065)

0.985

1.032

(0.099)

(0.040)

0.981*

1.220*

(0.124)
1.095
(0.099)
0.998
(0.004)

(0.052)
1.122*
(0.064)
0.995*
(0.002)

0.951

***

*

1.445

(0.068)

(0.032)

1.102

1.089

1.092**

(2)
AntiGov
1.104
(0.070)

EM-DAT

0.972**

Youth
Bulge

Pop.
Growth

Polity22

Polity2

GDP pc
(ln)

Ttl. Aff.
ec 1/3 t-1

Ttl. Aff.
ec 1/3

IDP ec1/3
t-1

IDP ec 1/3

(1)
Conflict
Aggregate
1.051+
(0.030)

IDMC

Table 4.10 Negative binomial models estimating the effect of human displacement event counts on conflict and unrest†, omitting international aid.

(0.019)
0.0452*
(0.054)
947

1.059**

(0.070)

0.881

(0.139)
1.344**
(0.135)
0.988**
(0.004)

1.443***

(0.082)

1.140+

(0.093)

1.251**

Unrest

(12)

Taken as a whole, characterizing the displacement-conflict relationship, in terms of significant
increases or decreases, and how soon variations occur, necessitates considerable qualification.
The relationship of regime type and conflict will now be examined. Polity’s squared term
for regime type yielded multiple significant results. Recalling that Polity’s squared term tests for
curvilinear relationships, it is frequently significant and negative for all model specifications,
suggesting that regime type has an inverted-U relationship with conflict and unrest. This finding
is robust across displacement measures (per capita and event count) and sources (IDMC and EMDAT). Polity’s squared term is less robust to conflict source; its coefficient is consistently negative
but models with ICEWS data yield notably more significant results. This provides strong support
for H2’s expectation that conflict will be greatest in anocratic countries.
Turning to H3 and its address of protest incidence within democratic countries, the results indicate
that democracies can expect more protest in relation to climate change and displacement. The
results not only favor the expectation of H3.B that protest incidence increases in democratic
countries, but also lend further support for conflict theories more generally. To test this hypothesis,
the data were subset to democratic countries based on the Polity indicator, and, ICEWS data were
used for conflict to attain global coverage and maximize observations. Of the eight results that
included international aid, seven of the eight results are positive as expected but only one result is
significant (lagged event count using EM-DAT data), Table 4.11. When international aid is
omitted (Table 4.12), thereby adding observations from 2014-2016, six of the eight results remain
positive but the previously significant measurement of displacement becomes insignificant while
another measure becomes significant (lagged per capita using EM-DAT data). These findings
moderately support H3.B’s expectation that protest incidence will increase, rather than decrease
or remain steady, following disaster-induced displacement events in democracies.
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H4 is the final hypothesis and addresses expectations regarding international aid. The
results provide weak refutation of H4’s expectation that aid will either decrease or not significantly
increase conflict and unrest. Nearly all of the results across all model specifications and data
sources are positive, however, none present statistical significance with 95% confidence and only
two results show significance at the 90% level. Again, it’s notable that the aid data only covers
years 2008-2013 while the other variables span to 2016, excepting SCAD’s data that ends in 2015.
Including aid in the models loses up to 40% of the observations. This detail, when combined with
aid’s very small coefficient, suggests that the results are relatively imprecise and should be
therefore be treated as suggestive at best.
Turning to the control variables, logged GDP per capita generated results that are
predominantly positive for all conflict types. The results maintain across displacement measures
and data sources. Significant (and positive) findings are limited to ICEWS data, as GDP per capita
did not yield any significant results for the SCAD. These results for GDP per capita contradict
theory’s expectation that countries with greater affluence and resources will experience lower
conflict incidence because they possess more resources to prepare for and respond to disasters.
The demographic control variables do not present robust results. Population growth and
anti-government conflict have a significant and positive relationship across both displacement
measurements and data sources, but only for ICEWS data. This accords with theoretical
expectation that population growth might contribute to scarcity-oriented conflict processes or
heighten the challenge of government officials to meet the needs of displaced persons. Youth bulge
presented more numerous significant results than population growth but was fragile to data source
and displacement measure. Additionally, youth bulge was inconsistent regarding the relationship’s
directionality, presenting both positive and negative coefficients. Considered together,
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Table 4.11 Negative binomial models estimating the effect of human displacement on protest in democratic
countries†.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Protest
IDP pc 1/3
IDP pc1/3 t-1
Per Capita

1.558
(0.921)
2.216
(1.331)

Total Affected
pc 1/3

1.728
(0.632)

Ttl. Aff.
pc 1/3 t-1

1.728
(0.632)

IDP ec 1/3

1.047
(0.059)
0.996
(0.072)

IDP ec1/3 t-1
Event Counts

Total Affected
ec 1/3

1.098
(0.077)

Total Affected
ec 1/3 t-1

GDP pc (ln)
Intl. Aid1/3
Pop. Growth
Youth Bulge
Constant
Observations

1.215**
1.380***
(0.126)
1.000
(0.000)
1.149+
(0.084)
1.003
(0.020)
0.111+
(0.144)
398

1.403***
(0.128)
1.000
(0.000)
1.162*
(0.083)
1.004
(0.020)
0.0884+
(0.115)
398

1.391***
(0.129)
1.000
(0.000)
1.152*
(0.083)
1.005
(0.020)
0.0971+
(0.127)
398

(0.085)
1.393***
(0.126)
1.000
(0.000)
1.157*
(0.086)
1.007
(0.020)
0.0723*
(0.094)
398

† Data for conflict derive from the ICEWS, years 2008-2016. Global coverage.
p < + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Coefficients are exponentiated Incidence Rate Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. X1/3 indicates cuberoot transformation.
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Table 4.12 Negative binomial models estimating the effect of human displacement on protest in democratic
countries†, international aid is omitted.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Protest
IDP pc 1/3
IDP pc1/3 t-1
Per Capita

1.221
(0.584)
2.414+
(1.144)

Total Affected
pc 1/3

0.963
(0.261)

Ttl. Aff.
pc 1/3 t-1

1.733*
(0.464)

IDP ec 1/3

1.054
(0.046)
1.027
(0.046)

IDP ec1/3 t-1
Event Counts

Total Affected
ec 1/3

0.987
(0.052)

Total Affected
ec 1/3 t-1

GDP pc (ln)
Pop. Growth
Youth Bulge
Constant
Observations

1.066
1.187**
(0.074)
0.990
(0.014)
1.187**
(0.074)
0.466
(0.431)
640

1.190**
(0.075)
0.990
(0.014)
1.190**
(0.075)
0.456
(0.422)
640

1.170*
(0.074)
0.991
(0.014)
1.170*
(0.074)
0.501
(0.465)
640

(0.057)
1.181**
(0.074)
0.991
(0.014)
1.181**
(0.074)
0.464
(0.431)
640

† Data for conflict derive from the ICEWS, years 2008-2016. Global coverage.
p < + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Coefficients are exponentiated Incidence Rate Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. X1/3 indicates cuberoot transformation.
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demographic conditions in the form of population growth and youth bulge, do not appear pertinent
to a displacement-conflict relationship.

Conclusion
This chapter undertook country-year statistical analyses of the relationship that between disasterinduced human displacement and conflict and unrest. Cooperation theory was initially favored by
the preponderance of results that included international aid in the modeling. The typical result
showed that the displacement-conflict relationship was statistically insignificant, and in many
instances, generated negative coefficients that indicate decreased conflict in relation to
displacement. This assessment was robust to two different measures of displacement (per capita
and event counts), and two different sources of displacement data (IDMC and EM-DAT) and
conflict data (ICEWS and SCAD). Lagging the displacement variables further strengthened
cooperation theory, with six of the 64 results (9.3%) being significant with negative coefficients.
However, an important qualification is that when international aid was omitted to increase the
number of more recent observations, findings from the revised models provide considerable
support for conflict theory. Anti-government conflict, in particular, showed robustness as it was
significant and positive through varied specifications, both in this analysis and earlier modeling
that included international aid. Moreover, it is important to recall that operationalization of ICEWS
data to generate conflict variables is conservative. Observations that were missing any information
regarding the country in which an event occurred, source-sector, and target-sector were omitted,
which eliminated 22.3% of available observations but left only those in which the highest degree
of confidence could be placed in their validity. Taken together, the findings support conflict theory.
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Regime type performed as expected, presenting the curvilinear inverted-U distribution.
Anocratic countries experienced the most conflict incidence. This accords with theoretical
expectation that mixed regimes, in comparison to autocracies, may not possess the ability or
resolve to suppress conflict directed towards government entities or among non-governmental
actors. Alternatively, in comparison to democracies, autocracies may foster conflict through less
effective governance, in terms of preparation and response to natural disasters, as well as peaceful
conflict resolution. Also related to regime type, the results favored the expectation of H3.B that
democracies will experience increased protest incidence following climate change-related
disaster-induced displacement.
The other control variables either contradicted theoretical expectation or generated
inconsistent results. Findings related to GDP per capita and international aid were contrary to
theory’s expectation that countries with greater affluence and resources will have more capacity
to prepare for and respond to disasters, thereby lowering conflict incidence. When regressed on
ICEWS data, GDP per capita and international aid often produced significant and positive results.
A positive and significant relationship for international aid is not entirely surprising based on
previous work that showed how aid can aggravate post-disaster settings when exploited for narrow
political gain. Future analyses may benefit from squaring the value for international aid, so that
similar to regime type, a curvilinear relationship could be detected if present. Lastly, demographic
conditions did not help to account for conflict incidence. Population growth was largely
insignificant and results for youth bulge, although significant in multiple instances across conflict
datasets, the coefficients’ direction varied unreliably from positive to negative.
Three primary insights are gained from this chapter. First, as a whole, the results favors
conflict theories. Second, while the results pertaining to regime type are robust, findings regarding
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the displacement-conflict relationship are sensitive to data source and measurement. Third, and
most important, using the country-year unit of analysis, which has predominated climate-conflict
research, provides a baseline for comparison with the next two chapter’s alternative and more
detailed units of analysis. The next chapter asks questions about temporality. Using country-month
as the unit of analysis, the next chapter asks – When, after disaster-induced displacement occurs,
does conflict incidence significantly vary?
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Chapter Five
Temporally Informed Hypotheses and Analyses

Civil unrest data should [be] temporally and spatially referenced to as high a resolution as
possible. The highly localized effects of most disasters, combined with the fact that their
destabilizing effects begin to fade after several months, casts doubt on the utility of countyyear analyses.
Peter F. Nardulli, Buddy Peyton, and Joseph Bajjalieh (2015, 331) concluding their
analysis on the relationship between climate change related natural disasters and
conflict.

This chapter focusses on temporal dimensions of the relationship between climate change-related
human displacement and conflict. More precisely, once a displacement event occurs, when will
conflict present significantly patterned variation? Doing so not only contributes to climate-conflict
scholarship by focusing on disaster-induced displacement as an understudied intervening condition
that links climate change to conflict, but also has implications for conflict studies more broadly by
asking questions of temporality with considerably greater precision than the country-year.
I address this question in the following sequence. First, literature related to climate-conflict
temporality is reviewed and theoretically informed hypotheses are established. Second, the data
for internal displacement and natural disasters are analyzed to assess a basic seasonal hypothesis.
Doing so confirmed that displacement incidence predictably varies based on the seasonality for
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where a country is latitudinally located on the globe. Moreover, preliminary analysis discovered a
coding detail for the IDMC’s displacement data with critical implications for this chapter’s
analyses. Third, the data were formatted at the country-month unit of analysis and subset to
northern hemispheric countries, to which regression analyses were applied.
The results show that multiple conflict types – anti-governmental conflict, repression, and
protest – can be expected to increase during the months immediately subsequent to disasterinduced displacement events. Consistent with theoretical expectation and previous empirical
findings, the incidence of anti-government conflict and protest peaks 2-3 months after disasterinduced displacement. An additional and unexpected finding is that both conflict types experienced
a second increase around the ten-month period subsequent to climate change-related natural
disasters.

Temporality and Climate-Conflict Research
There is considerable opportunity to learn more about the temporal relationship between disasterinduced displacement and conflict. Temporal scales vary widely in research that either directly
engage climate-conflict questions or, more broadly related studies that offer relevant implications.
In the academic fields of sociology, social psychology, and geology, temporal units of analysis
range from hours (Rotton and Cohn 2000; Vrij, Van Der Steen, and Koppelaar 1994) to decades
(T. Lee 2013; Zhang et al. 2006) and centuries (D’Anjou et al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2007), with one
study using millennia to study civilizational collapse (Kuper and Kröpelin 2006). In political
science and geography, research designs for large-n climate-conflict analyses typically use yearly
or country-averaged data (Buhaug 2010; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Landis 2012). A potential
problem with aggregations at the country-year or higher is that they may obscure variegated
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temporal features such as rate of onset, termination, and duration (Buhaug et al. 2014; Nardulli,
Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015).
The temporality of climate-conflict relationships will vary based on the type of climate
event, intervening social conditions, and conflict type. Slow onset climate events, such as drought
and sea-level rise, generally do not lead to widespread internal migration (Koubi et al. 2013). This
finding is consistent with the widely held position from demography research that although
migration is a response to deal with livelihood risk, relocation is costly and disruptive, and is
therefore generally used as an adaptation of final resort (Field et al. 2014a, 767). In addition, slow
onset events are more difficult to perceive, which may lead those who are vulnerable to
misperceive the eventual outcome as less threatening. Recent international migrants from Tuvalu
for example, a small island developing state that is threatened with extinction because of sea level
rise, have not been reporting climate change as the reason for their relocation, but this could change
as the effects of climate change become less abstract (Field et al. 2014a, 770).
The protracted occurrence of slow onset events complicates climate-conflict research by
making relational attributions more difficult. Identifying a start-date for slow onset displacement
events is one difficulty. Rapid onset events by contrast, such as storms and floods, entail relatively
clear start-dates. Another characteristic of rapid onset events that facilitates climate-conflict
research is that they typically occur during a relative brief period of time. According to EM-DAT
data, average duration for climate-related displacement events is 8.84 days.30 The aftermath and
recovery period persist much longer in most cases but having an event with a temporally delimited

30

Author’s calculation using EM-DAT data.
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beginning that is relatively clear facilitates analyzing whether or not subsequent social-political
events systematically vary.
Rapid onset displacement also presents the analytical advantage of seasonality. Seasonality
refers to temporally-patterned phenomena. Unlike the relatively imprecise regularity of cyclic
phenomena (e.g. business cycles), seasonal events vary within a fixed period of time, typically a
year (Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007). Displacement seasonality grows more pronounced as a
location on the Earth’s surface moves poleward and becomes more distant from the equator.
Disaster-induced displacement for countries in the Earth’s northern hemisphere should be highest
during their summer months–June through September–when atmospheric and oceanic
temperatures are warmest and lead to more storms and floods. Conversely, southern hemispheric
countries experience the least of their displacement activity during these months, and the
distribution of displacement activity switches as the North enters its winter and the South its
summer (Meteorological Office 2018). Considered as a region, equatorial countries share
consistently hot temperatures but do not present uniform seasonality like the northern and southern
hemispheres. Dependent on a country’s particular conditions, it may have an Equatorial (i.e.
Tropical Rainforest) climate with minimal seasonal variation or, distinct wet and dry seasons for
countries with either a Monsoon or Tropical Wet-Dry/Savannah climate (Kiprop 2017; National
Geographic 2011). The point being that I may be able to leverage displacement seasonality, and
event data thereof, for a more temporally nuanced large-n analysis.
Turning to this project’s dependent variable, sociological cooperative theories argue that
conflict and unrest typically do not occur during the immediate emergency of a disaster, when
people are preoccupied with survival and responding to a clearly identifiable challenge that is faced
by a sizable portion of a community’s members (Fischer 1998; Quarantelli and Dynes 1976, 140–

115

41; Solnit 2009). Disaster scholarship however, focusses on conditions during and immediately
after a disaster’s occurrence. The conflict that this project is primarily interested in is temporally
situated during the recovery and rebuilding stage, when survivors are no longer engrossed with a
disaster’s immediate dangers and time has lapsed wherein grievances can develop and/or be
promoted and exploited.
Temporal expectations differ between conflict and unrest. The incidence of unrest will
likely occur earlier than conflict. Unrest is more of an emotionally-driven phenomenon that does
not require time for planning, which means that it can occur earlier and with greater spontaneity.
Unrest will also be short-term because of its cathartic and unplanned nature, as it does not have
the coordination and organizational backing to mount and sustain a campaign of opposition. If
source(s) of grievance persist, unrest in the form of spontaneous and uncoordinated protests for
example, may evolve into planned and directed movements when the aggrieved begin to organize
redress or are mobilized by political entrepreneurs. The duration of conflict events will therefore
occur later and persist over a longer expanse of time relative to unrest, because they result from
the efforts of actors who are attempting to achieve a goal and possess greater organizational
advantage. This reasoning leads to two hypotheses:
H1

Unrest will increase earlier than conflict.

H2

Conflict will persist longer than unrest.

Guidance from empirical research regarding the displacement-conflict’s temporal
relationship is limited. One exception is Hsiang, Meng, and Cane's (2011) study that exploited the
El Niño-Southern Oscillation’s (ENSO) cyclical occurrence to test climate-conflict hypotheses for
civil war onset. ENSO is the phenomenon of variant sea-surface temperature (SST) and air
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pressure in the equatorial Pacific Ocean, which occurs with quasi-regularity on a four-year basis
and lasts approximately eighteen months. During an El Niño period, an increase of mean SST in
the equatorial Pacific Ocean produces more severe weather events that resemble the anticipated
effects of anthropogenic climate change. Hsiang et al. found that the probability of new civil wars
throughout the Tropics doubles during El Niño years relative to La Niña years. Moreover,
formatting their data with monthly resolution supported the climate-conflict relationship by
showing that the probability for civil war onset was higher within months after ENSO events (ibid,
Figure 2.C, 439). A third hypothesis is suggested:
H3 The incidence of conflict and unrest will increase in non-equatorial countries after their
hemispheric region’s seasonal increase of disaster-induced displacement.

Another especially instructive study was conducted by Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh
(2015) who examined the relationship that floods and storms have with conflict and unrest.31 They
organized their data into country-day units of analysis with two types: benchmark periods without
a flood or storm natural disaster, and test periods of 30, 60, 90, and 120 day durations following a
disaster. Means for conflict during the benchmark and test periods were then compared for
significant differences using t-tests.32 Means for protests and political attacks tended to decrease
at the 30-day post-disaster mark, but most of the comparisons did not reach statistical significance.
Similarly, when analyzing highly disaggregated event data for violent conflict events in the North

31

Protests and political attacks by non-governmental actors constituted the dependent variables. Sub-types
of both variables were also assessed: whether or not they were affiliated with an organized initiator.
32
A multivariate regression analysis was also executed but it did not assess the variables’ temporal
relationship.
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Table 5.1 Temporally-informed hypotheses that relate disaster-induced displacement to conflict
and unrest.

H1

Unrest will increase earlier than conflict.

H2

Conflict will persist longer than unrest.

H3

The incidence of conflict and unrest will increase in non-equatorial countries after their
hemispheric region’s seasonal increase of disaster-induced displacement.

H4

Conflict incidence will peak 2-3 months following a disaster-induced displacement event.

Caucuses, O’Loughlin and Witmer (2011, 187) did not detect temporal clustering within a sixmonth window.
These findings accord with the expectation that conflict and unrest will not manifest during
the immediate post-disaster period. It is important to reiterate that the reasoning for this expectation
differs dependent on the theoretical orientation. Sociological cooperation theory posits that conflict
will probably decrease as people are preoccupied with survival and experience solidarity with other
disaster survivors, whereas a contentious political orientation will account for the absence of
increased conflict by arguing that more than 30 days will be needed for grievances to develop and
be manipulated by political actors. Lending support to contentious politics, Nardulli et al. found
that protests and political attacks exhibited significant increases at the 60 and 90-day post-disaster
periods. These spikes began decreasing at the 120-day test period, with the mean for protest
increasing more quickly than political attacks, but the decrease of protests decreased from its crest
more precipitously. A fourth and final hypothesis is derived:
H.4 Conflict incidence will peak 2-3 months following a disaster-induced displacement
event.
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Establishing the Seasonality of Disaster-Induced Displacement
Displacement for countries in the Earth’s northern hemisphere should be highest during their
summer months – June through September – and simultaneously lowest for southern hemispheric
countries. Equatorial countries will show displacement with less seasonal variation because they
will not be disaggregated by the predominant country-level climate: i.e. stable Equatorial climate
from two-season wet-dry climate types.
Countries were divided into three regions to test this preliminary hypothesis about
seasonality. The Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn were used as demarcation lines; the former is
located at 23.43o latitude north of the equator and indicates the most northern line where the sun
is directly overhead at the June solstice, whereas the Tropic of Capricorn is located at 23.43o
latitude south of the equator and indicates the most southern location where the sun is directly
overhead at the December solstice. A country’s centroid, the point-coordinate for its geographic
center, was used to assign its region. Countries with a centroid north of the Tropic of Cancer were
coded as Northern, countries with a centroid south of the Tropic of Capricorn were coded as
Southern, and countries with a centroid between the two Tropics were coded as Equatorial, Figure
5.1.
The descriptive statistics that were initially generated from this operationalization led to
two important recognitions about the data that needed address. First, the incidence of IDMCsourced displacement events was strikingly and suspiciously high for the month of January. This
finding resulted from the IDMC’s default of coding displacement events as having occurred in
January when information was unavailable regarding the month in which an event began (IDMC
and Griggs 2017). The IDMC expanded its data collection capacity in 2014, thereby enhancing its
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Figure 5.1 Classification by climate region. Map is
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:World_map_torrid.svg.

in

the

public

domain:

generation and coding of data for 2013 and thereafter. IDMC data for years 2008-2012 are
therefore omitted from this chapter’s analysis because the January-default resulted in many
displacement events having inaccurate month dates, which was not problematic for the previous
chapter’s country-year analyses.
In addition to separating countries by region, displacement data were used to generate
monthly country-averages of displacement event incidence and per capita displacement. Countryaverages were used to facilitate regional comparison, otherwise the data are misleading because of
the southern region’s relatively few countries. In keeping with the robustness check from the last
chapter, data from the IDMC and EM-DAT are analyzed simultaneously. Both datasets produced
monthly country-averaged displacement event incidence that was visually consistent with seasonal
expectations. Figures 4.2-3 show that the average number of displacement events are most frequent
in northern hemispheric countries during June through September, which is when southern
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countries experience their lowest displacement incidence, and the distribution reverses during
October through February. Seasonality is less apparent when displacement is measured as the
monthly average of country-level per capita displacement, Figures 4.4-5. IDMC measures – both
event incidence and per capita – are consistently higher than those presented by the EM-DAT. One
explanation is that the discrepancy could result from the IDMC’s truncation to years 2013-2016,
when climate extreme events are worsening over time, whereas the EM-DAT’s averages might be
lowered by including years 2008-2012. This explanation was however ruled out when EM-DAT
data was temporally truncated but yielded similar values in comparison to the full dataset. Now
that displacement seasonality by region has been established, I can test my temporally-oriented
hypotheses.

Estimation Methods
This chapter applies statistical tests using country-month as the unit of analysis. In contrast to the
preceding chapter, formatting the data at the country-month rather than year is a better research
design feature for testing hypotheses about climate-conflict variations that are expected to occur
as early as 30-days following a disaster-induced displacement event. Temporal disaggregation
alternative to the country-year has precedent in environmental conflict research (Hsiang et al.
2017; Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015), and the country-month in particular has been used to
assess the relationships of atmospheric temperature and civil war onset (Landis 2014), as well as
riots (T. G. Smith 2014) and violent conflict events (Jones, Mattiacci, and Braumoeller 2017)
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following food price-shocks.33 Moreover, I adopt the technique of taking country-year data for
control variables, such as Polity and GDP, and disaggregating them to country-month. Whereas
country-year research designs use a single per annum value for these variables despite the likely
actuality that they vary during a year’s time, I reverse this analytical compromise by using the
single value for the Polity, GDP, population growth, and youth bulge variables, and extrapolating
them for a year’s 12 months.
The dependent variables are the same conflict and unrest variables that were used in the
preceding chapter. An important difference is that temporal leads are applied to the dependent
variables. For example, a one-month lead means a displacement measure and the control variables
that occurred in January 2013 (Xt) will be regressed on the count of conflict incidence for February
2013 (Xt + 1) (Stata 2017, 661). A five-month lead applied to the same displacement event will
regress the predictor variables on the count of conflict events for June 2013 (Xt + 5). See Figure
5.6 for an illustration.
Leading dependent variables has precedent as a methodological technique that allows for
the passage of time from a climate change event, during which social-political processes can occur
that produce variation in the outcome of interest (Nel and Righarts 2008). Lagging predictor
variables is the convention for modeling temporal data in political science, which is why I used
lags rather than leads in the last chapter’s country-year analyses. I followed research design
conventions–lagged predictors and country-year units of analysis–to generate baseline results.

33

Although unrelated to climate change, Butcher (2017) buttresses the precedent by using country-month
units of analysis to assess how spatial distances of contentious political acts to country capitals relates to
regime transition.
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Figure 5.6 One-month moving leads for the dependent variable. In this example, the lead is for a
displacement event that occurred during January.

Two reasons underlie the decision to lead the dependent variable in this chapter. First, a
dependent variable with a lead (Xt + x) is analyzed with the entire combination of predictor
variables that occurred at an earlier point in time (t) (Stata 2017, 661). Doing so is more consistent
with actuality than introducing temporal disjunction by lagging one or more predictor variables
while leaving the controls and dependent variable temporally unaltered (t). Admittedly, some
variables vary little over time, as in the case of regime type. A second reason for choosing leads is
that when exploring results from different models with seemingly minor variations, the same
variables in one instance with a lagged displacement predictor, and another with a led dependent
variable, generated unreliable results with critical discrepancies. The discrepancy typically was
inconsistent values for regression coefficients. Less frequent but more concerning were instances
when the displacement’s statistical significance changed.
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Because of these two reasons, to assess monthly variation for conflict and unrest, I model
the predictor variables in the same month (t) and then repeatedly remodel the variables, in each
subsequent instance applying an additional one-month lead to the dependent variable (Xt + 1). This
procedure continues through an eleven-month lead, such that displacement and control measures
in January 2013 (t) are ultimately regressed on the conflict measure for December 2013 (Xt + 11).
Limiting the analysis to an eleven-month lead provides temporal variation for analysis and does
not go further (e.g. leads of 12 months or more) because there are no clear theoretical grounds for
doing so.
The variables included in the forthcoming analyses differ from those in the last chapter.
Analysis will be limited to ICEWS-sourced data for conflict and unrest because of its global
coverage that will better measure seasonality, in comparison to the SCAD that is limited to African,
Caribbean and Latin American countries. International aid is omitted from this chapter’s analyses
because of its temporal truncation. The most recent aid data was for the year 2013; including it in
models reduced the number of observations and efficiency, and often resulted in models that did
not converge (i.e. Stata’s statistical software was unable to generate results). Months were included
as dummy variables to assess H3’s expectation about seasonality in non-equatorial countries.
Lastly, the analyses were limited to countries in the northern hemisphere. Doing so enables testing
of H3’s expectation that conflict will seasonally vary for non-equatorial countries. Northern
countries offered ample cases and variation, whereas subsetting to the southern region would
involve only seven countries. Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables.
The data were again modeled using negative binomial regression with fixed effects for the
reasons detailed in the last chapter, namely the dependent variable is overdispersed count data
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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics for northern countries only.
Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

14.64

22.71

0

284

0.40

2.86

0

91

0.40

1.39

0

29

Repression

13.83

21.84

0

284

Protest

13.84

38.62

0

924

Unrest

0.32

1.16

0

26

0.01

0.02

0

0.29

3,024

0.14

0.38

0

2.35

3,072

0.01

0.04

0

0.69

Variables
Aggregate*

Conflict

ICEWS

IDMC
Displacement

EM-DAT

Controls

Antigovernment
Nongovernmental

IDP per
capita1/3
IDP event
count1/3
Total
affected per
capita1/3
Total
affected
event count1/3
(ln) GDP pc

N†

Years

6,912

2008-2016

2013-2016

6,912 2008-2016
0.09

0.30

0

1.91

9.07

1.32

6.10

11.42

6,348

Polity2

5.08

6.28

-10

10

6,348

Polity22

298.08

159.37

1

441

6,348 2008-2016

0.94

1.32

-3.11

7.06

6,792

30.71

8.34

0

48.34

6,804

Population
Growth
Youth Bulge

* Aggregate combines anti-governmental, non-governmental, and repression.
† N = number of observations. Number of countries: 64
X1/3 indicates transformation using cube root. ln indicates transformation using natural log.
Unit of analysis is country-month.
Descriptive statistics for global coverage are in the appendix, Table A.4.
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(Hilbe 2011, 2014; Hoffmann 2016). The data being formatted at the country-month increased the
percentage of zero values presented by the dependent variables. Setting aside the absence of
theoretical reasoning for true zeroes, as discussed in the previous chapter, I again applied
diagnostics to rule out the possibility that a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression
model might be better preferable. Cube-root transformations were again applied to both
displacement measures, per capita and event incidence, to mitigate skewness from outliers while
also managing zero values (Cox 2011).

Results and Analysis

Figures 5.7-12 graphically present the displacement-conflict regression coefficients.34 Each
vertical bar represents a confidence interval at a particular month contemporaneous with (Xt) or
subsequent to (Xt + (1 through 11)) displacement activity. Statistical significance is indicated when
the confidence interval does not overlap the horizontal line that is denoted zero. The white circle
within each interval reports the coefficient’s value; a coefficient greater than zero denotes
increased conflict whereas a coefficient less than zero indicates a decrease. Production of these
graphs required, in contrast to the last chapter, that the coefficients to be unexponentiated (i.e. they
are not Incidence Rate Ratios). Each page presents results for a single conflict type or unrest, from
both displacement data sources (IDMC and EM-DAT) and measures (per capita and event count).
The expectation of H1 that unrest will occur earlier than conflict was not supported. For
both measures of EM-DAT data, unrest presented a slight U-shaped distribution across the leads

34

Tables A.5.2-25 detail the regression results and are available in the appendix.
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Figure 5.7 Regressing internal displacement on conflict aggregate in northern countries.
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Figure 5.8 Regressing internal displacement on anti-government conflict in northern countries.
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Figure 5.9 Regressing internal displacement on non-governmental conflict in northern countries.
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Figure 5.10 Regressing internal displacement on repression in northern countries.

Event count displacement

4

2

0

-2

.25

.2

.15

.1

.05

0

1.5
1
.5
0
.25
.2
.15
.1
.05

132

11

11

Per capita displacement

0

1

2

3

4

5

A

6

7

8

Displacement data source: IDMC
Years: 2013-2016

9

10

11

0

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

90% Confidence

11

0

0

1

1

3

3

4

4

5

D

5

6

6

95% Confidence

2

2

B

7

7

8

8

9

9

10

10

Displacement data source: EM-DAT
Years: 2008-2016

Y-axes are unexponentiated regression coefficients.
X-axes are monthly leads of the dependent variable.

Coefficient

4

C

Figure 5.11 Regressing internal displacement on protest in northern countries.
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Figure 5.12 Regressing internal displacement on unrest in northern countries.
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11

11

– increasing significantly through 0-3 month leads, decreasing, but then significantly increasing
again with the 7-month lead, Figure 5.12.B and D. A similar pattern appears for unrest with the
IDMC data but only the 8-11 month leads are significant, Figure 5.12.A and C. The immediate
increase of unrest following displacement events is consistent with H1, however, multiple conflict
types show similar results. For instance, repression (Figure 5.10.A and C) and protest (Figure
5.11.A-D) showed immediate increases. Especially similar to unrest, anti-government conflict
showed an initial increase though the 0-2 month leads, a decrease, followed by a second increase
around the eighth and ninth month-leads, Figure 5.8.A-D. These results indicate that the
spontaneous and uncoordinated acts of unrest do not precede multiple forms of conflict, and thus
refute H1.
The results do not clearly support H2’s expectation that increased conflict incidence will
persist for longer duration in comparison to unrest. The difficulty with assessing this hypothesis
relates to unrest presenting U-shaped results. Had the unrest results not shown the second increase,
I could conclude that increased unrest lasts approximately four months, during the period 0-3
months subsequent to a natural disaster. IDMC-sourced data showed that unrest progressively
increased beginning at seven months (Figure 5.12.A and C), and the duration of this increase is
unclear because of the 11-month lead maximum, which precludes observation of the relationship
twelve months and thereafter. Unrest was inconsistent with EM-DAT data, per capita measure
showed that the second increase began decreasing at the eight-month lead (Figure 5.12.B),
whereas, similar to the results from the IDMC data, the duration of the event count’s second
increase is unclear because of the 11-month lead maximum (Figure 5.12.D). These results do not
provide a single, consistent increase, the duration of which could be measured and compared with
the durations for conflict types.
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Setting aside H2 because of the inability to empirically assess it, the results inductively
raise the question, how long do variations in conflict incidence last following disaster-induced
displacement? The results present two tendencies: increases of either five-month duration or an
increase that is seen throughout the leads. Anti-government conflict (Figure 8.A-D) and protest
(Figure 11.A, C, and D) best exemplify the five-month increases. Conflict aggregate (Figure 7.BD) and repression (Figure 10.B-D) exemplify an overall increase of conflict incidence.
I next evaluate H4’s expectation that conflict will peak during the period 2-3 months
following a disaster-induced displacement event, because doing so will facilitate assessment of
H3. The results provide qualified support for H4 and is best supported by results for antigovernment conflict. The incidence of anti-government conflict showed monthly increases
following displacement events that crest during the second or third months following displacement
events, Figures 5.8.A-D. Unexpectedly however, anti-government conflict showed a second
increase during the ninth and tenth months following displacement. These increases are
statistically significant and robust – they appear regardless of data source (IDMC or EM-DAT) or
measurement (per capita or event count).
Protest also showed significant increases during the 0-4 month-lead periods, Figures
5.11.A-D. The immediate increase of protest is surprising based on Nardulli et al.'s (2015)
empirical findings, and the theoretical expectation that time would be required for grievances to
develop following displacement activity. Also notable is that when EM-DAT data is used, protest
incidence significantly increased throughout nearly all of the time-periods analyzed, Figures
5.11.B and D. Furthermore, protest presented a U-shaped distribution in three of the analyses. This
is surprising because an inverted-U distribution is more intuitive, wherein protest would gradually
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increase and eventually crest following a displacement event, and then decrease back to its
baseline.
The other conflict measures (aggregate, non-governmental, repression) did not accord with
H4’s temporal expectation. Coefficients for conflict aggregate (Figures 5.7.A-D) and repression
(Figures 5.10.A-D) were consistently positive and statistically significant in most instances,
robustly supporting conflict theory, but in a manner that is inconsistent with H4’s anticipated peak
at 2-3 months. The results for non-governmental conflict weakly support conflict theory (Figures
5.9.A-D). IDMC-sourced measures show increased coefficients of non-governmental conflict at
5-7 months following disaster-induced displacement, with similar results for EM-DAT-sourced
event counts, but none of the results are statistically significant.
Turning to H3, its expectation that conflict incidence in non-equatorial countries will
increase after their hemispheric region’s seasonal increase of disaster-induced displacement was
supported by results for anti-government conflict and protest. Initial descriptive statistics affirm
H3 for repression and protest, Figure 5.13. Both measures show minimum incidence during
August, when northern countries are at their peak season of climate-related natural disasters. The
nadir for repression and protest accords with theory that conflict will abate during and immediately
subsequent to disaster-induced displacement. Unrest shows a similar low-point during August with
a peak during May. Like unrest, non-governmental shows a distinct increase during May, and antigovernment conflict shows a similar increase in April. However, both anti-government and nongovernmental conflict show high incidence during August, thus contradicting theoretical
expectation.
A problem with using descriptive statistics in this manner to assess temporality of the
displacement-conflict relationship is that one is unable to determine how the value of natural
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Figure 5.13 Conflict and unrest incidence, averaged by country-month for northern hemispheric
countries. Data source: ICEWS, years 2008-2016.

disaster measurements are influencing conflict and unrest. For instance, how is the peak disaster
incidence during August 2017 (Xt) influencing the incidence of unrest during May 2018 (Xt + 10)?
Evaluating H3 more thoroughly necessitates revisiting results from regression analyses.
Furthermore, analysis is limited to anti-government conflict and protest because of their relatively
distinct increases at the 2-3 and 9-10 month leads.
Using regression analyses to assess H3 found that anti-government conflict increased as
expected following disaster events. The process of evaluation entails the following steps. H4’s
finding that anti-government conflict peaked at the 2-3 and 9-10 month leads, means that antigovernment conflict should crest in the northern hemisphere during November and June, 2-3 and
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9-10 months after August, respectively. Assessing H3 entails referencing models with the
particular lead of dependent variable (i.e. two or ten months) and the dummy variables for months.
When assessing the two-month lead and anti-government conflict, while the results are
insignificant, coefficients for the monthly dummy variables increase after August and crest in
November as anticipated by H3. Moreover, this finding is consistent for three of the four
measurements of disaster-induced displacement, Figure 5.14.A, Figure 5.15.A, and Figure 5.16.A.
The same procedure was used to assess anti-government conflict’s second peak 10 months after
natural disasters. Modeling the ten month-lead finds that June is the peak month of antigovernment conflict, 5.14.B, Figure 5.15.B, and Figure 5.16.B. Applying this method of analysis
to protest finds comparable results with a two-month (Figure 5.17.A, Figure 5.18.A, and Figure
5.19.A) and ten-month lead (Figure 5.17.B, Figure 5.18.B, and Figure 5.19.B). These findings for
anti-government conflict and protest support H3’s temporal climate-related natural disasters, with
the additional and unanticipated finding of a second increase at the 9-10 post-disaster time period.

Conclusion
This chapter engaged temporally oriented questions about the relationship between climate
change-related human displacement and conflict. Theoretical and empirical work from the last
chapter suggested that the country-year unit of analysis is too imprecise to assess variations of
conflict and unrest incidence following disaster-induced displacement. As an alternative, this
chapter applied descriptive statistics and regression analyses to country-month units of analysis to
better evaluate the temporally-oriented hypotheses. Doing so revealed when conflict and unrest
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Figure 5.14.B Regressing internal displacement with ten-month
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Figure 5.15.B Regressing total affected from climate-related
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natural disasters with two-month lead applied to antigovernment conflict in northern countries. Displacement
data source: EM-DAT, years 2008-2016, event count
with cube-root transformation.

Feb
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Figure 5.16.B Regressing total affected from climate-related
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natural disasters with two-month lead applied to antigovernment conflict in northern countries. Displacement
data source: EM-DAT, years 2008-2016, per capita
with cube-root transformation.
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Figure 5.17.B Regressing internal displacement with ten-month
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lead applied to protest in northern countries. Displacement data
source: IDMC, years 2013-2016, event count with cube-root
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Figure 5.17.A Regressing internal displacement with two-month
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Figure 5.18.B Regressing total affected from climate-related
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incidence escalates following disaster-induced displacement – a finding that would have been
impossible with the standard country-year analysis.
Findings from this chapter further support the expectation that disaster-induced
displacement will influence increased conflict and unrest incidence. The results showed that during
the month of a disaster-induced displacement event through the eleven months thereafter, the
incidence of unrest, anti-governmental conflict, repression, and protest showed significant and
patterned increases. Unrest presented immediate increases as hypothesized but contrary to
expectation, multiple conflict types – anti-governmental conflict, repression, and conflict –
likewise showed immediate increases, which was surprising because organizational requirements
were anticipated to produce delayed conflict escalations.
Anti-government conflict most closely accorded with the hypothesis that conflict will peak
during the period 2-3 months following displacement activity. This is consistent with findings
from disaster scholarship that cooperation tends to characterize communities immediately
following natural disasters, and contentious political theory, that time will be required for political
actors to respond. Unexpectedly, anti-government conflict showed a second increase during the
ninth and tenth months following displacement. Similarly, protest showed significant increases
during the 0-4 month-lead periods, which is surprising because of the expectation that time would
be required for grievances to develop following disaster-induced displacement. The final
hypothesis, that conflict incidence in non-equatorial countries will increase after their hemispheric
region’s seasonal increase of disaster-induced displacement, was affirmed and further supported
findings regarding anti-government conflict and protest.35

35

It is important to reiterate that operationalization of ICEWS data to generate conflict variables is
conservative. Observations that were missing any information regarding the country in which an event
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The next and final empirical chapter explores spatially oriented considerations regarding
climate change-related displacement and conflict. Through this project’s country-year and
country-month analyses, evidence has been found to support theoretical expectations that conflict
increases subsequent to disaster-induced displacement. Next, I will examine if disaster-induced
displacement presents significant spatial patterning, the presence of which would lend heightened
importance to spatially-oriented theories and methods.

occurred, source-sector, and target-sector were omitted, which eliminated 22.3% of available observations
but left only those in which the highest degree of confidence could be placed in their validity.
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Chapter Six
Spatially Informed Hypotheses and Analyses

The “where” is useful only insofar as it elucidates the complexity of “why.”
Clionadh Raleigh, surveying the application of spatial analytic methods to conflict
studies (2012, 441).

The spatial relationship between climate change-related human displacement and conflict is
examined in this chapter. Disaster-induced displacement is distributed neither randomly nor
uniformly, it concentrates where physical hazards (e.g. heavy rain, high winds, storm surges)
combine with high vulnerability, meaning the political, economic, and social conditions that leave
a population ill prepared to mitigate harm from climate change-related natural disasters. This raises
potential problems for the conventional country-level statistical analyses that predominate climateconflict scholarship. Foremost, spatial effects such as dependence and/or heterogeneity are likely
present, which undermine the independence assumption of non-spatial statistical methods, thereby
leading to inefficient estimates and increased risk of Type I error.
To remedy the problems that can result from erroneous application of conventional
statistical methods, I assess the relationship between disaster-induced displacement and conflict
while accounting for the phenomena’s spatiality. As this project’s final empirical chapter, I first
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derive three hypotheses from previous conflict studies that used spatially informed theories and
methods. Doing so continues this project’s progression of increasingly detailed units of analysis,
from the conventional country-year that was used in chapter 4 to establish a baseline that is
consonant with the typical research design of climate-conflict scholarship, to the country-month
unit of analysis of chapter 5 that revealed insights about temporality – insights that were obscured
by the country-year. I continue this effort with an aim of revealing spatial insights in this chapter.
The absence of human displacement data that is geocoded, and therefore amenable to
spatial methods, required a case study approach so that the workload of manual geocoding was
feasible. Based on the absence of robust results within climate-conflict scholarship, case selection
was guided by most-likely case criteria. Bangladesh was selected because it fit the conditions for
a case that is most-likely to support conflict theories related to climate change. Applying spatial
methods to Bangladesh’s 64 subnational administrative districts confirmed that disaster incidence
exhibits significant country-wide and local spatial dependence.
Three primary findings are accomplished. First, measures of disaster-induced displacement
and conflict both present significant spatial dependence. Second, the results suggest that high rates
of displacement do not correspond with significantly high conflict incidence when assessed subnationally, suggesting out-migration away from disaster epicenters. Third, and most important, is
the implication for subsequent statistical analyses of the displacement-conflict relationship – the
country-year level of analysis is shown to be problematic. As data and computer capability become
increasingly amenable to spatial analysis, my findings demonstrate that researchers must account
for spatiality in their modeling.
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The Spatial Turn and Climate-Conflict Research
Social science experienced a “spatial turn” during the 1990s that gave greater attention to the
geographic locations and relationships of studied phenomena (Anselin 2010; Iqbal and Starr 2015;
Raleigh 2012, 440). This development is based on the premise that outcomes of interest, and the
influences thereof, are neither uniformly nor randomly distributed throughout spatially delimited
areas such as cities, countries, or regions. Aided by advances in Geographic Information System
(GIS) computer capability for generation, storage, mapping, and analysis of highly disaggregated
geocoded data, researchers now have unprecedented ability to explore how phenomena are
spatially distributed and related.
Early conflict studies that applied spatial analytic methods emphasized geometric
properties (Stephenne, Burnley, and Ehrlich 2009). Contiguity of international borders was a staple
variable as higher numbers of neighboring countries was shown to elevate the risk of conflict
(Buhaug and Gates 2002; Iqbal and Starr 2015; Starr and Thomas 2005; Tir and Diehl 2002),
especially when neighboring countries were considered in terms of regime type (Gibler and
Braithwaite 2013), and whether or not they were experiencing intra-state conflict (Omelicheva
2011). Capital cities and urban areas also figure prominently in spatial analyses of conflict. The
concentration of government bodies and resources are material and symbolic incentive for
insurgents, thereby significantly increasing a locale’s probability for civil war onset (Theisen,
Holtermann, and Buhaug 2011) and violent event incidence (Witmer et al. 2017). However,
distance diminishes a state’s ability to project power, leading to concentrations of rebel activity in
remote and distant locations (Tollefsen and Buhaug 2015). Furthermore, rough terrain (e.g.
mountains, forests, sparse roadways) has been shown to increase conflict by hindering a state’s
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ability to control territory and providing rebels with refuge (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tollefsen and
Buhaug 2015).
Spatial analyses are progressing beyond the relatively simple analysis of geometric
measures. One source of progress with bearing on climate-conflict research is that the social,
political, and economic conditions that mediate climate extremes have been increasingly integrated
into analyses. Figures 2.2-3 from chapter 2 map Africa and visually confirm the spatial overlap
and concentration of conditions that have been shown to elevate the probability of conflict, such
as low levels of economic development and community resilience, poor governance, and historic
violence (Busby et al. 2013; Busby, Smith, and Krishnan 2014). In addition, the maps are
consistent with theoretical suggestions of threat multiplication or catastrophic convergence, which
portend that the concentrated spatial pattern of climate change hazards and social-political risk
factors will “not merely mean that several disasters happen simultaneously, one problem atop
another. Rather…that problems compound and amplify each other, one expressing itself through
another” (Parenti 2011, 7; U.S. Department of Defense 2014). Before further reviewing heretofore
applications of spatial analysis to climate-conflict research and opportunities for advancement,
brief elaboration of spatial analytic methods is provided.

Spatial Analysis: A Brief Primer
Spatial analytic methods share commonality with conventional non-spatial methods and statistics.
Both start from basic description.36 In the context of conventional statistics, this entails graphing

36

I acknowledge the prerequisites of conceptualization, operationalization, measurement and data
collection, but am setting them aside for analytical concision.
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so that distributions can be visualized, and generating summary measures such as percentages, the
mean, and standard deviation. Descriptive methods provide basic information about empirical
phenomena: e.g. the number of cases, the breadth of values or sub-types for theoretically relevant
variables, and the distribution of a variable’s values. From this, theoretical relationships can be
inductively suggested, or, hypotheses from elaborated theories can undergo preliminary testing.
Spatial methods correspond to conventional statistics with the important addition that each
datum is geocoded, meaning that it has information connecting it to a specific location on the
Earth’s surface through a geographic coordinate system. A two-dimensional spatial feature can be
represented by one of three options: a point, a line, or a polygon (an area enclosed by one or more
lines). For example, in a relatively small-scale map, a capital city in a country-level study area is
typically represented as a point with road networks and waterways represented as lines, whereas
larger scale subnational analyses often depict the same capital city as a polygon that encloses its
territory. These elementary features can be combined with colors and other visual symbols to map
and describe data: the number of features, where each is located, where they are located in relation
to other features, and a feature’s density or clustering. Again referencing Figures 2.2-3 from
chapter 2, and similar work by Busby, Smith, and Krishnan (2014), the maps visually confirm that
in the context of Africa, values of theoretically pertinent conditions overlap and concentrate as
anticipated.
Notwithstanding the contribution of Busby et al., is the concentration of risk factors, the
apparent catastrophic convergence, actually extraordinary? Using descriptive methods to discern
significant patterns from those that are merely apparent and random, can be difficult and pose
unacceptable risk of error, Type I and II. Minor and innocent selections of a map’s symbology,
such as color choice or the size of points, can produce drastically different suggestions. Another
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Figure 6.1 Modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) and its two sources: scaling and zoning.
Source: Loidl et al. (2016, 3).

important consideration is the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) (Darmofal 2015, 26–27;
Rogerson 2006, 16). MAUP has two sources: the scaling effect derives from the number of features
or sub-units disaggregated from a larger space; and second, once scale is established, problems
can result from zoning effect, or how boundaries are drawn. Figure 6.1 illustrates how altering
scale and zoning can dramatically change the number of units, in this case polygons, and the value
(i.e. points) for each polygon - “it is not only the level of aggregation that matters, but also how
‘elemental units’ are combined spatially” (Anselin 2002, 262). A cynical anecdote about these
considerations refers to a GIS practitioner who is tasked with generating a heat map to show
concentrations of a particular phenomenon. The dutiful technician responds, “Sure, where do you
want the hot spots to be?” The primary technique for mitigating MAUP (and ethical research) is
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to format the data in units of analysis that conform to the phenomenon of interest as much as
possible.
Inferential statistics are available to both conventional and spatial methods to distinguish
significant patterns from randomness. The application of negative binomial regression in chapters
4 and 5 of this project exemplified inferential statistical analysis of the question, do measures of
disaster-induced displacement influence conflict incidence? The relationship was shown to be
significant for anti-government conflict and protest, especially 2-3 and 9-10 months following
disaster-inducted displacement, in that the results were unlikely to have occurred because of
random chance. However, the analyses of chapters 4 and 5 were conducted at the country-level, a
level of aggregation that, based on theoretical reasoning and heretofore mapping, fails to convey
the subnational spatial variation in which climate hazards and socio-political vulnerabilities locate.
Dissonant levels of aggregation are not merely theoretical, they have important implications for
empirical analysis.
Geocoded data enables assessment of spatial effects, and if needed, their management in
relation to inferential statistics. Spatial effects are organized by two major types—heterogeneity
and dependence—that have differing influences on results and require particular methods for
optimal modeling. Spatial heterogeneity is known as a first-order effect that refers to clustering or
inconsistency of phenomena in a study area, manifest through variant parameters or
heteroskedasticity (Anselin 1988, 13, 119–20, 2010, 5; Fotheringham 2009, 243; Getis 1994, 62,
2010). It can result from the MAUP or model misspecification. Spatial dependence (or
autocorrelation), is a second-order effect that underlies the so-called first law of geography that
“everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things”
(Tobler 1970, 236). More precisely, spatial dependence refers to data having non-random
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characteristics that are inversely related with distance: it’s “a functional relationship between what
happens at one point in space and what happens elsewhere” (Anselin 1988, 11; Getis 2010). Spatial
dependence can be data-driven, a mismatch between the actual spatial occurrence of a
phenomenon and the available data’s administrative level (Anselin and Rey 1991, 113). It can also
result from an interactive, “diffusion” process, or because of attributes held by the units of analysis
(Darmofal 2015, 3–4, 30–31). An interactive process, for instance, could be insurgents in one area
sharing tactical advice with insurgents in nearby areas. Alternatively, hurricane-induced internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in the United States are concentrated in Gulf and southeastern seaboard
states because they possess the attribute of being coastal in a region that regularly finds itself in
the path of hurricanes.
Spatial effects are pertinent to inferential statistics. Unmanaged spatial heterogeneity can
bias parameter estimates and generate erroneous significance levels (Anselin 1988, 120).
Unmanaged spatial dependence undermines the independence assumption of non-spatial statistical
models, whereby each observation is supposed to be uninfluenced by other observations. The risk
of problematic inference consequently increases (Cressie 1993; D. W. S. Wong and Lee 2005).
Specifically, unaddressed spatial dependence in non-spatial statistical models “can produce
inefficient parameter estimates, standard error estimates that are biased downward, and type I
errors” (Anselin and Rey 1991; Darmofal 2015, 5). Fortunately, methods are available for
diagnosing spatial effects, visually representing them, and managing their influence upon
inferential statistical analysis.
Moran’s I is a commonly used method for statistically assessing spatial dependence
(Anselin 1988; Darmofal 2015; Rogerson 2006). Its global variant assesses all instances of a spatial
feature within a study area and compares it with the expected value of the null hypothesis, which
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is that the feature presents complete spatial randomness.37 Requiring a minimum of 30 units for an
analysis, Moran’s I generates measures of statistical significance (e.g. Z-values and p-values);
directionality, a positive value indicating that neighbors clusters with similar neighbors, and the
rare case of a negative value, wherein units have dissimilar values with neighbors; and, finally,
strength of the dependence. Its range and interpretation are similar to Pearson’s R correlation
coefficient but differ in two respects: the absence of spatial dependence is not zero, it is close to
zero but negative; and secondly, the range is not bounded by ± 1, but is commonly within ± 1
(Darmofal 2015, 49; Rogerson 2006, 233).
Global Moran’s I is a useful aggregate statistic with two important qualifications. First, a
result of no dependence at the global level does not mean that dependence is absent at the local
level. Second, results from the global Moran’s I provide no information regarding individual
spatial features. Fortunately, local indicators of spatial association (LISA) are available that
generate measures like the global Moran’s I but for each individual spatial feature, by comparing
each feature to its neighbors.38 Anselin’s Local Moran’s I is a LISA that can identify spatially
dependent units that cluster with similar high or low values (Anselin 1995; Darmofal 2015, Ch. 4;
Scott and Janikas 2010).39 A spatial unit with a significantly high value that neighbors other units
with high values relative to neighboring units, is denoted as High-High (HH). Conversely, a unit
with a significantly low value that neighbors other low value units is denoted as Low-Low (LL).

37

Figure A.1 in the appendix details the formula for global Moran’s I.
Neighbors are based on theoretical guidance, and can be variously defined and operationalized (Darmofal
2015, Ch. 2). Contiguity, or adjacency, is probably the most intuitive neighboring structure. Neighbors can
also be formatted using distance bands that treat all units within a specified range as equal, or with a
distance-decay band that weights closer units more heavily. Alternatively, non-spatial weights can be
applied for network analyses.
39
Figure A.2 in the appendix details the formula for the Anselin Local Moran’s I analysis.
38
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Anselin Local Moran’s I is not limited to clusters, it can also detect outliers. A lone unit with a
significantly high value that is surrounded by low value neighbors is identified as a High-Low case
(HL), whereas a unit with a significantly low value that is surrounded by high value neighbors is
denoted as Low-High (LH). Combining global and local diagnostics allows one to determine if
spatial dependence is present, and if so, how it is distributed across the units of analysis.
These tests of spatial dependence have notable limitations. Foremost, they are univariate
statistics and therefore do not control for other variables. These measures also provide no
estimation regarding theorized causal relationships, i.e. the expected value of a variable dependent
on a combination of predictors. A variety of methods are available that can both manage spatial
effects and statistically evaluate theorized relationships. Briefly, a regression model can be
modified with a spatially lagged dependent variable to account for dependence that results from
diffusional and interactive processes, whereas a spatial error model can be applied to mitigate
dependence from data-driven errors, and finally, a host of methods are available to address spatial
heterogeneity (Anselin 1988, 2002, 2017a; Anselin and Rey 1991; Darmofal 2015; Fotheringham
2009). One final limitation of the spatial effects tests that have been discussed is that they are
“unfocussed” diagnostic measures, meaning that they neither offer insight regarding the etiology
for a spatial effect nor about which of the available regression models is appropriate. Focused
diagnostics are available to indicate optimally specified spatial regression models (Anselin 1988;
Darmofal 2015, Ch. 5).

Inferential Spatial Analyses and Climate-Conflict Research
Application of inferential spatial analytic methods has enabled progress in conflict studies. One
category of advancement is evinced by studies that combine data that is spatially disaggregated to
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a relatively high degree with non-spatial methods. Ash and Obrodovich (2017) use third-level
subnational districts in Syria as units of analysis to examine the relationship between droughtinduced IDPs and protest. Applying non-spatial inferential statistics, their findings show twofold
aspects of subnational variation: first, drought conditions led to intra-state out-migration, IDPs
relocated from drought afflicted districts to other parts of Syria, and second, the displacement was
followed by elevated protest incidence in areas of in-migration that received IDPs. A similar
research design was used by Zahran et al. (2009), who used county-level data in Florida to study
post-disaster social effects. In contrast to Ash and Obrodovich, Zahran et al.’s findings accorded
more with cooperation theory: greater natural disaster incidence significantly decreased rates of
property and violent crimes, but significantly elevated number of reported domestic violence. Both
studies exploit the attribute of more finely disaggregated data to attain findings that address
climate-conflict questions: Do climate extreme events alter the incidence of conflict? When
increased conflict occurs, is it associated with IDPs? Despite the contributions from both studies,
it is important to note that they do not explicitly address the potentiality that spatial effects may be
present and adversely affecting their results.
A second group of conflict studies combine disaggregated data with inferential spatial
methods. Building upon earlier spatial studies that emphasized geometric properties, Tollefsen and
Buhaug (2015) found that politically marginalized groups add to earlier findings that impediments
to state projection of power, namely distance and rough terrain, significantly increase the
frequency of violent conflict events. Rather than relying on subnational administrative units, they
follow the method used by Busby et al. (2013, 2014) of analyzing all African countries as grid
cells of 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degrees, which generate cells with side-lengths of approximately 50
kilometers. Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug (2011) applied a similar research design to Africa
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and found that drought-induced water scarcity did not significantly relate to increased civil war
onset, but their measures of social-political marginalization showed a significant positive
relationship. In addition to using highly disaggregated data, both studies raise concern for the likely
presence of spatial dependence, and respond with a spatially lagged dependent variable. The results
of both studies might therefore be especially compelling because they combine highly
disaggregated data with an inferential method that has the potential for optimally modeling
relationships when spatial dependence is present. However, both studies provide no indication that
focused diagnostics were undertaken to confirm that spatial dependence was significantly present,
and if so, that a spatially lagged dependent variable, rather than error term, was the appropriate
response.40
A final category of research has the threefold combination of disaggregated data,
diagnostics of spatial dependence, and spatial regression. Khatiwada (2014) used Moran’s I to
conduct global and local analyses of Nepal’s 75 district-level administrative units and found spatial
dependence in hot spots, nine districts clustered together in the country’s north had significantly
high rates of violent conflict deaths, and conversely, ten cold spots were identified, a strip of
districts in the country’s south with relatively low rates of conflict-deaths. Although Khatiwada
did not report following-up by applying focused diagnostics to the spatial dependence, he applied
a spatially lagged regression that confirmed his theoretical expectation “that the spatial patterning

40

To be fair, Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug (2011, Footnote 68, Pg. 96) assert that their sampling of
grid cells mitigates spatial dependence. While this tact is not commonly covered by methodological texts
(Anselin 1988, 2002; Anselin and Rey 1991; Darmofal 2015), it has precedent (Fortin and Dale 2009). An
additional critique of note is that Tollefsen and Buhaug (2015, 14) log transform their dependent variable
to lessen the “highly skewed cell-specific count distribution” that naturally results from it being a count,
and analyze it with an OLS model. While intuitively sensible, the recommended approach is to leave the
count dependent variable untransformed and apply a suitable model, e.g. Poisson or negative binomial
(O’Hara and Kotze 2010).
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of conflict is highly associated with the spatial patterning of various factors related to education,
infrastructure, gender development, communication, and resource availability in the districts”
(Khatiwada 2014, 211). These findings are admittedly unsurprising but they are nonetheless a
contribution. In contrast to Basedau and Pierskalla (2014), for example, who visually diagnose
spatial dependence among natural resources, ethnic group power differentials, and violent conflict
in Africa, Khatiwada builds upon Busby et al.'s maps (2013, 2014) by using statistical inference
to confirm what may appear visually obvious, but can often be misleading.
These studies indicate that I must at minimum account for spatial effects, and will probably
need to manage them, when statistically analyzing disaster-induced human displacement. While
large-scale natural disasters can in some instances affect more than ten-percent of a country’s
population, most natural disasters (59%) affect less than one-percent of a country’s population
(Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015, 329). Further suggesting spatial dependence in to relation
disaster-induced displacement is the fact that in the United States, ten ZIP codes in Louisiana
during 2012-2017 accounted for 11% of the country’s property damage from natural disasters
(Chinoy 2018). Country-year data is probably inappropriate for geographically concentrated
events. Spatial effects must therefore be managed when using inferential statistics to analyze
climate-conflict hypotheses. Spatial effects must be accounted for through diagnostics and if need
be, the appropriate spatial analytic model.
I derive several hypotheses from the spatially-informed research on conflict. Climate
hazards, meaning the occurrence and exposure to the sudden onset events that are becoming more
frequent and severe because of climate change, interact with social-political conditions to make
human populations more vulnerable to climate extreme events (Adger et al. 2014; Field et al.
2014a). As a result, the following hypothesis is derived:
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H1: Disaster-induced human displacement will spatially cluster, creating significant spatial
dependence.
Spatial analyses of conflict have produced contradictory results. There are grounds for
anticipating spatial overlap of disaster-induced displacement and conflict. Human displacement
can occur without distant dislocation, IDPs are typically averse to leaving their home areas because
of social and economic ties, or are unable to do so. In addition, climate extreme events are most
harmful in areas that people are already vulnerable, and therefore less able to implement adaptive
measures to lessen the effects of natural disasters. This “catastrophic convergence” of disaster
events and social-political vulnerabilities is expected to engender conflict, such that disaster and
conflict events spatially overlap (Basedau and Pierskalla 2014; Parenti 2011, 7–9; Theisen,
Holtermann, and Buhaug 2011). Alternatively, other research has found evidence of out-migration
as IDPs relocate to other administrative units within their home country (Ash and Obrodovich
2017). The influx of IDPs may create tensions with the resident population, the idea of boundary
formation from contentious politics, or destabilize extant tensions, i.e. boundary activation (Tilly
and Tarrow 2007). Thus, conflict events will occur in locations that are asunder to natural disasters.
These divergent expectations are distilled into the following hypotheses.

H2.A: Conflict will spatially cluster in areas of high disaster incidence.
H2.B: Conflict will spatially cluster in areas of low disaster incidence.

Conflict has been found concentrated in capital cities and urban areas. From a resource
perspective, cities possess transportation and communication infrastructure, as well as weapons
and equipment caches for the military and domestic security forces materials (Theisen,
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Holtermann, and Buhaug 2011; Witmer et al. 2017). If captured, or damaged while remaining in
control of government forces, these resources improve the ability of insurgents to wage a
campaign. Furthermore, capitals and urban centers have symbolic value. Their capture suggests
that an insurgency has effective leadership, support, and momentum. Demographic factors also
contribute to the expectation that urban areas will be sites with high conflict rates. The percentage
of the world’s population is steadily growing, and often the increased demand on infrastructure
and services is worsening the size and conditions of the urban poor (Field et al. 2014a, Ch. 8;
Raleigh 2015). These conditions can lower opportunity costs for joining an insurgency. Such
conditions elevate the risk of all conflict types, from organized insurgencies to spontaneous
protests and instances of unrest by individual persons. Conversely, other studies have found that
conflict occurs in areas that are more distant from state strongholds, where insurgents can operate
with less interference (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tollefsen and Buhaug 2015). Two hypotheses are
suggested by these findings.

H3.A: Conflict will spatially cluster in capital cities and urban areas.
H3.B: Conflict will spatially cluster in remote areas that are distant from capital cities and
urban areas.

Methods
Geocoded data for disaster-induced human displacement is not readily available. Unfortunately
for this project the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s (IDMC) data on disaster-induced
IDPs is not yet geocoded. The IDMC intends to eventually geocode its data to facilitate spatial
analysis (IDMC and Griggs 2017). Furthermore, despite the IDMC’s generous sharing of its event162

Table 6.1 Hypotheses regarding the spatiality of disaster-induced displacement and
conflict.
H1

Disaster-induced human displacement will spatially cluster, creating significant
spatial dependence.

Overlap / Asunder
H2.A Conflict will spatially cluster in areas of high disaster incidence.
H2.B Conflict will spatially cluster in areas of low disaster incidence.
Urban / Rural
H3.A Conflict will spatially cluster in capital cities and urban areas.
H3.B Conflict will spatially cluster in remote areas that are distant from capital cities
and urban areas.

based data, the coding of events’ subnational location(s) is currently insufficient to enable manual
geocoding. The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), which produces
the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), has been progressing in its geocoding effort (CRED
2014; Vanderveken and Guha-Sapir 2016). The EM-DAT also generously shared its data
formatted at the event-level for natural disasters. While the EM-DAT is not currently coded with
geographic coordinates, manual geocoding is feasible because each event has information
regarding its subnational location(s). The EM-DAT is admittedly not human displacement data
per se, but it is a reasonable proxy that has been used in climate-conflict research (Bergholt and
Lujala 2012; Landis 2012; Nel and Righarts 2008; Omelicheva 2011; Wood and Wright 2015).
A case study will be necessary because manual geocoding of climate-related natural
disasters renders global or regional analysis impractical for this project. Based on the absence of
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robust results within climate-conflict scholarship, case selection calls for, and will be guided by, a
most-likely case research design (A. Bennett and George 2001; Lijphart 1971). Case selection
based on the most-likely case criterion is suited for a line of research that has made theoretical
headway but has yet to generate empirical findings from multiple tests of hypotheses that
consistently favor a theoretical orientation. A case will be selected because it possesses the
characteristics that make it likely to present a particular theorized relationship. In this context, I
will select a case that most-likely accords with conflict theory.
A country will be the case and the lowest subnational administrative unit for which data
are available will be the unit of analysis. Conceptualizing a case as a country helps control for
conditions that influence conflict but are not captured by available data. Based on the literature
and findings from the previous two chapters, a country that is most-likely to adhere to conflict
theory will have high experience with climate-related natural disasters and have an anocratic
political regime. Furthermore, being mindful that multivariate regression is the methodological
objective, variation in the value of the main predictor variable will be necessary. To accomplish
this, a country with physical geography of both coastal and inland regions will be optimal. Floods
and storms are the disaster type with the greatest frequency, property damage, and loss of life.
Thus, a country with a coastal region will likely have areas that experience greater effects from
natural disasters relative to its inland area.
Bangladesh well fits the criteria for a case that is most-likely to support conflict theories
related to climate change. During 2008-2014, Bangladesh was ranked sixth for the absolute
number of disaster-induced IDPs (25 million) (Bilak et al. 2016, 16; IDMC 2018). Similarly,
during 2008-2016, data from the EM-DAT indicates that Bangladesh was 11th for the number of
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Figure 6.2 Bangladesh-centered map of the globe and south Asia. Map source: Ihuang.Me (2018).

disaster events (50) and 27th in average annual per capita total affected persons by climate-related
natural disasters (1.78%). Bangladesh’s high rate of disaster-induced displacement results in part
from its exposure to climate hazards (Bilak et al. 2016, 16; IDMC 2018). It’s a low-lying country
with approximately 22% of its population (35 million) living along its southern border that abuts
the Indian Ocean, Figure 6.2. Bangladesh’s dense coastal population are exposed to the high winds
and flooding from heavy rain and storm surges during cyclones. In addition, those who live in the
Ganges-Brahmaputra river delta region or along the rivers’ banks are increasingly exposed to
flooding during the country’s monsoon season.
Also important to Bangladesh’s status as a most-likely case for climate-conflict are the
social conditions that heighten its vulnerability to physical hazards. Its political regime was
classified as anocratic by the Polity indicator for seven of the eight years for which IDMC disasterinduced data was available (the exception being autocratic during 2008). Bangladesh also has a
history of armed conflict; it experienced three military coup d'états between 1975-1982, two
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Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics

Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Climate-related natural disasters*

6.42

3.34

1

14

Anti-Government conflict, per
capita (pc)

0.0003

0.0013

0

0.0097

Non-Governmental conflict pc

0.0006

0.0013

0

0.0067

Repression pc

0.0542

0.0571

0.0032

0.255

Protest pc

0.0093

0.0145

0

0.0958

Unrest pc

0.0008

0.0015

0

0.0062

* Extreme temperature, floods, landslides, and storms.
Unit of analysis is Bangladesh’s 64 districts (zilas) during the years 2008-2016.

successful and one failed, and has ongoing inter-communal land disputes (BBC 2018; CIA 2018;
IDMC 2018).41 Developmentally, Bangladesh is lauded for progressing towards its Millennium
Development Goals through consistent economic growth and improved social indicators but a
considerable percentage of its population remains below the poverty line (CIA 2018; IMF 2018;
World Bank 2018).
Geodcoding of Bangladesh’s 50 disaster events proceeded as follows. So that results can
be compared with findings from this project’s earlier chapters, analysis was limited to the years
2008-2016 and to disaster types that are related to climate change: extreme temperature, floods,
landslides, and storms. The first subnational administrative level in Bangladesh consists of eight
administrative divisions that are subdivided into 64 districts or zilas. Each natural disaster reported

41

Similar to global figures, Bangladesh’s annual number of disaster-induced IDPs is considerably larger
than its conflict-induced IDPs (IDMC 2018).
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by the EM-DAT indicates which division(s) and district(s) was affected. Districts will constitute
the unit of analysis because they are the lowest subnational administrative unit for which data are
available. Each district was coded with a sum of its climate-related disaster events. Ideally, like
the preceding chapters’ analyses, the per capita number of persons affected within each district
would also be analyzed. However, EM-DAT’s event-based data report a single value for total
affected persons, and all but two disasters affected more than one district. Including a per capita
measure is precluded because there is no way of determining how the number of persons affected
by a disaster event was distributed among the affected districts.

Assessing Climate-Related Natural Disasters for Spatial Dependence
Basic mapping of disaster incidence across Bangladesh’s districts shows the expected distribution,
Figure 6.3. The country’s southern coastal districts, that are densely populated and exposed to
cyclones from the Indian Ocean, show high disaster incidence. In addition, a band of high
incidence districts follows the Brahmaputra river as it flows southward from Bhutan and joins the
Padma river in Bangladesh’s interior (Hofer and Messerli 2006). The apparent clustering of
districts with high disaster incidence suggests spatial dependence, which is confirmed by applying
global Moran’s I, Table 6.3. The result (0.277) significantly exceeds the expected value for the
null hypothesis of complete spatial randomness. Moreover, the result’s positive value and z-score
corroborate Figure 6.2’s visual suggestion that disaster incidence clusters: districts with high
disaster incidence tend to be neighbors with other high incidence districts, and conversely, districts
with low disaster incidence tend to be neighbors with other low incidence districts.
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Figure 6.3 Climate-related natural disaster incidence in Bangladesh, 2008-2016.
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Table 6.3 Assessing spatial dependence of climate-related disaster in Bangladesh using global Moran’s I.

Variable
Climate-related natural disasters*

Moran’s Index

Expected Index

z-score

p-value

0.277

-0.015

3.763

0.000

* Extreme temperature, floods, landslides, and storms.
Unit of analysis is Bangladesh’s 64 districts (zilas) during years 2008-2016.

Results from the global Moran’s I affirm H1’s expectation that climate-related natural
disasters entail spatial effects. An important implication is that spatial dependence must be
managed when regression models are applied to the EM-DAT’s disaster incidence data. A
limitation of these results is that they are a summary measure for the entire study area; no
assessment can be made regarding any individual district. To confirm the clustering that is visually
suggested in Figure 6.3, the Anselin Local Moran’s I method for assessing local spatial dependence
and identifying significant clusters and outliers was applied. Contiguity was selected for this
statistical analysis’ requirement that a spatial relationship be specified for what constitutes
neighboring districts. For each district, all districts that either shared a border or corner were
considered neighboring districts. Contiguity is more appropriate than alternatives such as distance
bands because of variation in storm size and inland distance of districts.
Figure 6.4 shows the results from the cluster-outlier analysis of Bangladesh’s climaterelated natural disaster incidence.42 As suggested by the descriptive mapping of Figure 6.3, three

42

In addition to spatial dependence, LISA analyses are vulnerable to problems from multiple comparisons.
Local analyses of spatial effects run multiple hypothesis tests, one for each unit of analysis, which uses data
repeatedly because units are neighboring or overlap. These multiple comparisons inflate Type I errors,
especially with “large datasets” (Anselin 2017b). Of the available responses, the False Discovery Rate
(FDR) drops results that are likely false positives without being “overly conservative” and unduly risking
Type II errors (Brunsdon and Charlton 2011; Caldas de Castro and Singer 2006, 182). While FDR is well
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Figure 6.4 Application of Anselin Local Moran’s I for identifying significant clusters and outliers of Bangladesh’s
climate-related natural disasters, 2008-2016.

established in spatial analytic research that have thousands of units of analysis, this analysis of Bangladesh’s
64 districts does not warrant using FDR (Harling and Castro 2014; Law, Quick, and Chan 2015; Liévanos
2015; Tian et al. 2010).
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districts along the Brahmaputra river and one district on the coast are found to be High-High
clusters because with 95% confidence (a = 0.05), they have significantly high levels of disaster
incidence, and, are neighbored by other high, but not statistically significant, districts. Conversely,
five districts in central Bangladesh are found to be Low-Low, districts with significantly low
disaster incidence that are neighbored by other low districts. This Low-Low cluster may be related
to Dhaka, the district that contains the country capital (also named Dhaka), which, although
insignificant, is implicitly a low incidence district because of its contiguity with three of the LowLow districts’ western borders. The city of Dhaka originated during the 7th century CE and
although located amid tributaries for three major rivers, much of the city is located on the
Madhupur Tract, elevated “islands” of land that, along with natural waterways and drainage,
helped Dhaka to coexist and benefit from seasonal monsoon flooding (Hough 2004, 57).43 Lastly,
the local Moran’s I shows one High-Low outlier on Dhaka’s western border, a district with
significantly high disaster incidence in a low incidence neighborhood, and two Low-High outliers
near the country’s northern High-High cluster. The cluster of high-disaster districts in the north
and the High-High district on the coast confirm H1’s expectation that climate-related disasters
spatially concentrate.

43

I credit Evan Perkoski, who suggested that historical settlement conditions might help account for
Bangladesh’s Low-Low disaster cluster.
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Assessing the Spatiality of Conflict in Bangladesh

This section applies the Anselin Local Moran’s I to this project’s four conflict types and unrest.
The data’s formatting is briefly explained before proceeding.44 Conflict incidence is, in part, a
function of population size. Controlling for a district’s population size is therefore necessary to
evaluation of conflict-related hypotheses. Data for population density was acquired from the
Center for International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University (CIESIN
2017). The data is from the year 2010 and is formatted as gridded cells with side-lengths of 30 arcseconds that are approximately one kilometer for Bangladesh’s longitudinal location (ESRI
2018c).45 Each cell was transformed into a point, then, all points within each of Bangladesh’s 64
districts were aggregated to calculate average population density for each district during 2010.
Conflict incidence for each of districts during the years 2008-2016 was divided by the population
density mean to generate per capita variables for each of the conflict types and unrest, Table 6.2.
The results show that districts with significantly high per capita conflict do not overlap
with high-disaster districts. Of the four conflict types and unrest, non-governmental conflict
(Figure 6.6) was the only type with a high conflict district (Jamalpur) that overlapped with a highdisaster district. This finding favors H2.B’s expectation that conflict incidence would not overlap
with high-disaster districts. Additional results support H2.B and provide evidence consistent with

44

The global Moran’s I was applied to each of the four conflict types and unrest, and found that only antigovernment conflict showed significant spatial dependence at the country-level. Results are provided in
Table A.5 in the appendix.
45
CIESIN (2017) generates its population density data by using national censuses and population registers
to estimate human population density (number of persons per square kilometer). An algorithm combines
the population data with approximately 13.5 million national and subnational administrative units, dividing
the population count raster (i.e. grid cells) for a given year by the land area raster.
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Figure 6.6

Application of Anselin Local Moran’s I for identifying significant clusters and outliers of Bangladesh’s anti-government (Figure 6.5) and non-governmental
(Figure 6.6) per capita conflict incidence, 2008-2016.

Figure 6.5
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Figure 6.8

Application of Anselin Local Moran’s I for identifying significant clusters and outliers of Bangladesh’s repression (Figure 6.7) and protest (Figure 6.8) per
capita incidence, 2008-2016.

Figure 6.7

Figure 6.9 Application of Anselin Local Moran’s I for identifying significant clusters and outliers of Bangladesh’s
unrest per capita incidence, 2008-2016.

out-migration. The district of Barisal is notable because it was High-Low for non-governmental
conflict, repression (Figure 6.8), and protest (Figure 6.9). (Only Sylhet, a northeastern district,
matched Barisal by also having three significantly high results: anti-government conflict, protest,
and unrest.) Moreover, Barisal is north of and adjacent to Patuakhali, the single High-High disaster
district on Bangladesh’s southern coastline. These results suggest that out-migration may be
occurring, with IDPs vacating the neighborhood of coastal, high-disaster districts, and relocating
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to Barisal. A similar finding occurred with anti-government conflict; the district of Bogra was
shown to be High-Low, and, adjacent to Jamalpur, which is the southernmost district that is part
of Bangladesh’s High-High disaster cluster in the north.
The results are more definitive for H3’s expectation related to cities. For all four conflict
types, a majority of their significantly high districts included a major city. Of the six districts
showing high non-governmental conflict, for instance, one was High-High and three were HighLow districts, and all four of these high-conflict districts included a major city. Of the two districts
showing High-Low protest, both included a major city. Anti-government conflict also had four
high-conflict districts, two included major cities, one of which was Dhaka. These results support
the expectation of H3.A that conflict will concentrate in cities rather than urban areas. Unrest is
the exception. Of the five districts showing high per capita unrest, only one included a major city.
The results are more nuanced for the expectation of hypothesis 3 that conflict will
concentrate in capital cities. Anti-government conflict produced a High-Low result for the Dhaka
district that includes Bangladesh’s capital city. This accords with theory that capital cities will
attract the efforts of insurgents, as well as previous empirical findings that capital cities experience
significantly higher conflict incidence. A curious finding is that no other conflict type showed high
incidence in the Dhaka district. This is especially puzzling for repression and protest. The
significantly high incidence of anti-government conflict in Dhaka would be expected to have
concomitant high repression incidence, as the state’s forces countered insurgents. Likewise, a
capital city being the focal point of a regime’s power and representatives, would expectedly attract
protestors, regardless of a displacement-conflict relationship. Thus, for anti-government conflict,
the expectation of H3.A, that conflict will significantly cluster in the capital city is affirmed.
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Conclusion
This chapter applied spatially oriented theories and methods to disaster-induced displacement and
conflict. Bangladesh was examined as a most-likely case to experience a climate-conflict
relationship. Spatial dependence was found to be present among the EM-DAT’s natural disaster
data that served as a proxy for human displacement. The most important implication from these
findings is that statistical analysis of the displacement-conflict relationship, at the country-year
level of analysis, is shown to be problematic. Unmanaged spatial effects can produce inefficient
estimators and elevated risk of Type I error. These findings are only definitive for Bangladesh, but
they are another instance of systematically derived empirical support for including spatial analysis
in climate-conflict research. Future climate-conflict studies that use large-n research design should
take two insights from my work. First, statistical analyses of the climate-conflict relationship, in
which disaster data is the primary predictor of interest, need to use data that is disaggregated from
the country-year unit of analysis; and second, methods that can accommodate spatial effects should
be applied.
Local spatial analyses were also applied to the displacement measure as well as to this
project’s four conflict types and unrest. Doing so allowed for preliminary evaluation of divergent
hypothetical expectations as to whether or not disaster-induced displacement and conflict will
spatially overlap. Natural disasters presented significant local spatial dependence, with highdisaster districts located in the north along the Brahmaputra river, and on the country’s southern
coast with the Indian Ocean. Non-governmental conflict was the only conflict type with a highincidence district that overlapped with a high-disaster district. Finding that most conflict types did
not spatially overlap with high-disaster districts favors the theory of domestic out-migration of
displaced persons. For theoretically divergent expectations regarding where conflict will occur in
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relation to capital cities and urban areas, resource-based theories were supported by finding that
per capita measures for all four conflict types, a majority of their significantly high districts
included a major city. The results were more nuanced for Bangladesh’s country capital, Dhaka.
Unsurprisingly, anti-government conflict showed significantly high incidence in the Dhaka
district. However, no other conflict type showed high incidence in the district, which is especially
curious for repression and protest, which would expectedly show concomitant high incidence as
the state’s forces would presumably counter insurgents and protestors.
A next step for this project is application of focused diagnostics to further assess the type
of spatial effects and which modeling technique – a lagged or error model – is called for. Doing
so will enable multivariate analysis that controls for other influences, and assessment of
directionality, meaning how much conflict and unrest varies dependent on the values of the
predictor variables influence. In addition, integrating the temporal findings from chapter five,
raises questions for the data will be modeled to account for variation that occurs within temporal
durations shorter than a year.
These findings are correlational. Like the climate-conflict line of research, results will
likely vary dependent on how concepts are measured. These findings will benefit from subsequent
research that use case study methods to help verify the validity of findings from statistical methods,
thereby triangulating towards a more accurate, but forever imperfect and distorted, assessment of
empirical relationships. Finally, out of concern for fetishism of methods and diminution of
substantive concerns, it’s imperative to remain mindful that these units of analysis and their
variables, however imperfect, impart information on the lives and welfare of human beings, and
wildlife within their ecosystems. Robustly demonstrating displacement conflict relationship, or the
tendency for domestic out-migration rather than displacement-conflict spatial overlap, will help
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policymakers, emergency responders, and civil society direct their preparedness and post-disaster
resources.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion

The physical impacts of climate change include rising atmospheric temperatures with longer and
more frequent heat spells, more frequent and intense heavy rainfall events, higher wind speeds
during hurricanes (i.e. typhoons or cyclones), and rising sea-level. Some of the social
consequences from these impacts are manifesting as economic hardships, acute disruption of
communities that rely on subsistence agriculture, worsening heat-related illnesses, and the need to
relocate coastal communities. The IPCC has concluded that these events will continue (Field et al.
2014a; IPCC 2018). Pertinent questions now ask – how severe will the impacts be? To what degree
can they be mitigated? And how can societies adapt?
Environmental conflict scholarship, the field of research that is dedicated to studying how
the natural environment, politics, and conflict interact, has increasingly cast its attention towards
climate change. Aside from poor and marginalized communities experiencing the brunt of related
hardships because of low resilience and capability for adaptation, findings from climate-conflict
research are neither generalizable nor robust. This highlights the contingency of climate-conflict
relationships, dependent on the type of climate change impact and conflict, and how intervening
social-political conditions link the impacts to conflict.
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Three basic questions motivated this dissertation. The first asked, is there a relationship
between climate change-related human displacement and conflict? The importance deriving from
the anticipated increase in severity and duration of heat spells, floods, and high-wind storms. When
these physical hazards meet vulnerable populations, human displacement from natural disasters
results. And internal human displacement especially, rather than international migration, is an
understudied intervening condition that links the natural environment and conflict.
Second, if evidence is found to support such a relationship, what are the association’s
characteristics? Specifically, will disaster-induced displacement entail more or less conflict? Once
a disaster-induced displacement event occurs, how much time thereafter will lapse until the
incidence of conflict and unrest varies? And spatially, where will conflict occur in relation to
disaster-induced displacement events? Will they overlap in the same area, or will IDPs migrate
domestically thereby altering conflict incidence in asunder locales?
My response to these questions applied innovative research designs to the understudied
condition of disaster-induced human displacement. In contrast with earlier environmental studies
that examine civil war, I took advantage of event-based datasets that enable analysis of multiple
conflict types, some of which constitute civil war when aggregated. Doing so allowed for finer
analysis with greater variation on the outcome variable. Similarly, displacement data from the
IDMC, which to my knowledge has yet to appear in published research, was used because of its
superior validity in comparison to the disaster-focused EM-DAT. Finally, I analyzed units of
analysis alternative to the country-year so that the results offer the precision necessary to answering
my temporally and spatially-oriented questions.
These features of research design and the results that they generate lead to this
dissertation’s third guiding question - what policy implications derive from the findings in
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response to the first two questions? Continuing to use these three questions as guides, this chapter
reviews the major findings from each of this project’s empirical chapters, discusses the findings’
policy implications, and concludes with suggestions for further research.

Findings
Chapter 4 assessed the relationship between disaster-induced displacement and conflict using
conventional statistical analyses. Country-year was used as the unit of analysis because it is a
convention of climate-conflict studies that use statistical methods. Following this approach and
using data with global coverage provided an initial analysis of the project’s first question that
would share an important commonality with similar studies. Cooperation theory was initially
favored by the preponderance of results that included international aid in the modeling. However,
when international aid was omitted to increase the number of more recent observations, the results
supported conflict theory. Anti-government conflict, in particular, showed robustness as it was
significant and positive through varied specifications, both in this analysis and earlier modeling
that included international aid. Another notable finding is that regime type performed as expected,
presenting the curvilinear inverted-U distribution. Anocratic countries, those with regimes that
present democratic and autocratic features, experienced the most conflict incidence. This accords
with theoretical expectation that mixed regimes, in comparison to autocracies, may not possess the
ability or resolve to suppress conflict directed towards government entities or among nongovernmental actors. Alternatively, in comparison to democracies, autocracies may foster conflict
through less effective governance, in terms of preparation and response to natural disasters, as well
as peaceful conflict resolution. Also related to regime type, the results favored the expectation of
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that democracies, because of their tolerance for public demonstrations, experience increased
protest incidence following climate change-related disaster-induced displacement.
Chapter 5 addressed temporally oriented questions about the relationship between climate
change-related human displacement and conflict. Specifically, when will significant variation of
conflict and unrest incidence occur following disaster-induced displacement events? Using the
country-month as the unit of analysis, in combination with descriptive statistics and regression
analyses, enabled evaluation of temporally-oriented hypotheses with much greater detail. Antigovernment conflict and protest accorded with the expectation that conflict will increase during
the period 2-3 months following displacement activity. This is consistent with findings from both
sociological disaster scholarship and contentious political theory; the former finding that
cooperation characterizes communities immediately following natural disasters, and the latter’s
expectation that time will be required for political actors to take advantage of post-disaster
conditions. An unanticipated finding was that anti-government conflict showed a second increase
during the ninth and tenth months following displacement. Similarly, protest showed significant
increases during the 0-4 month-lead periods, which is surprising because of the expectation that
time would be required for grievances to develop following disaster-induced displacement. To
further check the validity and robustness of these findings, dummy variables for calendar months
confirmed that northern hemispheric countries experienced increased anti-government conflict and
protest subsequent to the region’s seasonal crest of disaster-related displacement during August.
Chapter 6 engaged spatially oriented questions about the relationship between climate
change-related human displacement and conflict. Neither displacement nor conflict occur
uniformly within countries. Consequently, using conventional country-year analyses obscure
country-level variation and risk biased estimates from inferential statistics. A case study was
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necessary to implementing spatial analyses because the natural disaster data required manual
geocoding. Bangladesh was selected because it is a most-likely case to exhibit a climate-conflict
relationship: it has high exposure to disaster hazards, and its social, political, and economic
conditions lend to its vulnerability.
The paramount finding of chapter 6 was that natural disasters presented significant spatial
autocorrelation. It’s unsurprising that disasters are spatially clustered among Bangladesh’s
northern districts along the Brahmaputra river, as well as its southern coast that is exposed to
cyclones from the Indian Ocean. The importance of finding significant spatial dependence is that
it calls for models that can accommodate the spatiality of natural disasters that violate the
independence assumption of conventional statistics. Preliminary analysis of spatially oriented
hypotheses were administered through LISA statistics that indicate significant local spatial
dependence. Non-governmental conflict was the only conflict type with a high-incidence district
that overlapped with a high-disaster district. This result favors domestic out-migration, whereby
disaster-induced IDPs relocate across sub-national districts. Resource-based theories were also
supported by finding that a majority of sub-national districts with significantly high conflict
incidence included a major city. Interestingly though, the results were more nuanced for
Bangladesh’s country capital, Dhaka. Consistent with expectation anti-government conflict
showed significantly high incidence in the Dhaka district, but no other conflict type showed high
incidence in the district, which is especially curious for repression and protest, which would
expectedly show similarly high incidence as the state’s forces would presumably counter
insurgents and protestors.
So how does all of this relate back to the dissertation’s three fundamental questions? The
findings provide a clear response to the first question – yes, internal human displacement because
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of climate change-related natural disasters influence conflict and unrest. Assertions regarding this
relationship require qualification. Foremost, what exactly is meant by conflict? This project
examined up to six different conflict variables and found that anti-government conflict and protest
are the types that are most likely to result from climate change.46 Qualification is not limited to the
dependent variable, one needs to also specify the manifestation of climate change. Yet, even when
the conceptualization of climate change has been defined, disaster-induced human displacement
in this case, seemingly minor differences in conceptual focus, such as the EM-DAT’s focus on
natural disasters per se and the IDMC’s emphasis on IDPs, can lead to inconsistent results.
Disaggregation of concepts and alternative research design features were vital to
addressing the dissertation’s second question about the displacement-conflict relationships
temporal and spatial characteristics. The conflict aggregate variable of chapters four and five –
that combined anti-government conflict, non-governmental conflict, and repression – was intended
to follow a common method of formatting dependent variables by combining different conflict
types into a single aggregate. Results from this project’s conflict aggregate variable show that such
formatting obscured the significant relationship that was found when disaggregated to antigovernment conflict. Interestingly, disaggregation from country-year to country-month generated
similar findings, disaster-induced displacement corresponded with significant increases of antigovernment conflict and protest. Furthermore, disaggregation achieved the objective of specifying
the variation’s temporality, finding that anti-government conflict increased 2-3 months after

46

It is important to recall that the operationalization of ICEWS data to generate conflict variables is
conservative. Observations that were missing any information regarding the country in which an event
occurred, source-sector, and target-sector were omitted. Doing so eliminated 22.3% of available
observations, leaving only those in which the highest degree of confidence could be placed in their validity.
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climate change-related natural disasters, whereas protest saw immediate increases. Spatial
disaggregation was useful by confirming the significant sub-national variation.

Policy Implications
Findings from this dissertation lead to four policy implications. Foremost, the results support the
suggestion that climate change will entail increased anti-government conflict and protest. A
fundamental implication is that the displacement-conflict suggestion merits ongoing research,
consideration, and integration into planning by politicians and leaders of government
bureaucracies (diplomatic and martial), as well as non-governmental organizations, especially
those dedicated to disaster relief, development, and climate change mitigation and adaptation. To
reduce the possibility of armed opposition and protest, policymakers have an incentive to support
domestic and international efforts to mitigate the extremities of climate change and adapt to the
those that are intractable47 because of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
Second, chapter five’s temporally-focused results indicate that there may be two periods
of opportunity subsequent to disaster-induced displacement events. Disaster preparation and
prompt relief efforts might be able to alleviate the conditions that contribute to the increased
incidence of anti-government conflict and protest that were detected 2-4 and 9-10 months after
displacement events.
The third policy implication derives from chapter six’s spatially-focused results that
suggest disaster-induced displacement and conflict do not spatially overlap. The findings indicate
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I again acknowledge geoengineering technologies for capturing and sequestering greenhouse gases but
the extent to which they will be able to mitigate climate change is unclear (IPCC 2018, 2; Stocker et al.
2013b).
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that IDPs relocate away from the epicenter of disasters. This suggestion, when combined with
other empirical work that has found that IDPs tend to avoid long distant migrations, means that
disaster responses might benefit from expanding their scope. Spatially, disaster responses need to
include nearby sub-national administrative units that are likely to receive IDPs. Substantively,
further research is needed to confirm that incoming IDPs are contributing to the significantly
higher incidence of conflict, and if so, what the causal mechanisms are.
Fourth, the opacity of causal mechanisms confounds these policy implications and possible
interventions. The elevated incidence of anti-government conflict and protest could result from
popular discontent, boundary activation by political actors, perception that state capacity is
diminished creating political opportunity, a response to elite panic, or a combination thereof; this
project’s research design does not specify the causal mechanism(s) that links disaster-induced
displacement to conflict. Intervention and provision of aid is appropriate when doing so will likely
reduce deaths and ameliorate suffering of persons who are displaced by a natural disaster(s). Yet,
the fact that the displacement-conflict relationship is curvilinear, with anti-government conflict
and protest showing significant increases in anocratic regimes means that intervention could be
normatively problematic for an orientation that advocates self-determination, democratization, and
human rights.
For example, cyclone Bhola devastated Pakistan’s province of East Pakistan during
November 1970; inflicting an estimated 300,000-400,000 deaths. The storm’s impact and
perceived inadequate response by the national government stoked the ongoing civil strife between
the country’s Muslim population in the west and the Bengali population in the east. Resentment
for the post-disaster management strengthened the Bengali separatist movement and contributed
to Pakistan’s 1971 bifurcation that created Bangladesh from East Pakistan (Drury and Olson 1998).
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The case of Bangladesh’s independence, like initial protests of the Assad regime in Syria that have
been partially attributed to drought-related IDPs, give pause to acting on the findings from this
project. Assuming that my major findings are actual and generalizable, taking advantage of the
temporal windows of opportunity and expanding the spatial scope of relief efforts beyond a
disaster’s epicenter could, dependent on a country’s particular circumstances, reinforce stability
and human rights when implemented in a democracy, or preserve autocracy and undermine
democratization.

Further Research
There is much opportunity and need for further studying the relationship between disaster-induced
human displacement and conflict. Applying spatial regression models to displacement and conflict
data is the immediate next step. Doing so with panel data will help assess the robustness of results
from chapters four and five that showed anti-government conflict and protest as the two conflict
types that are likely to significantly increase after disaster-induced displacement. Furthermore,
such findings will hopefully provide guidance for where case study work should be focused with
the aim of triangulating this project’s findings that were derived entirely from quantitative methods
(Tarrow 1995). Doing so could help trace the causal process, permitting theoretical evaluation with
greater detail. The anticipated geocoding of the IDMC’s displacement data would be a beneficial
development to this line of research by enhancing the data’s validity and precluding the need to
use EM-DAT’s natural disaster data as a proxy. However, application of spatial regression models
to count data raises a host of notable trade-offs, such as “unrealistic restrictions…[and] a spatial
autocorrelation parameter which is not intuitively interpretable” (Glaser 2017, 20). Spatial
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methods might therefore be limited to visual assessment of cluster-outlier results, as was done in
chapter six.
Ample opportunity exists for checking the robustness of this project’s findings. One
approach is the inclusion of additional explanatory variables with theoretical relevance. The
geocoded Ethnic Power Relations dataset would be an excellent addition to future analyses that
would enable testing of hypotheses that are informed by contentious politics and spatiality.
Similarly, I hope to find international aid data with improved temporal coverage. Referring back
to chapter four’s discrepant findings that were associated with whether or not relief aid was
modeled, including aid in the analyses is critical for evaluating divergent theoretical expectations.
Another need for further research pertains to alternative conceptualizations of unrest and further
testing of the heat hypothesis that portends increased acts of aggression as heat and humidity
increase. While unrest yielded insignificant results in this study, follow-up is needed to assess how
vulnerable populations — women, children, disabled — fair because of previous findings related
to the heat hypothesis and elevated rates of domestic violence following natural disasters
(Anderson and DeLisi 2011; Zahran et al. 2009).
Evaluation of possible interaction effects is another avenue of research. For example,
assessing the relationship of disaster aid and regime type is an intriguing prospect. Prior research
indicates that aid can elevate the prospect of conflict when allocated to favor political allies at the
expense of genuinely affected IDPs. Along these lines, demographic variables might only become
potent and consistent with theory when especially particular values occur. For instance, youth
bulge and its consistent negative coefficients contradicted the expectation that countries with a
large proportion of its population aged 15-24 would be at greater risk of conflict. Interaction with
regime type may be critical. Democracies might be more adept at mollifying potential discontent
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from adolescents and young adults, whereas the presence of a youth bulge in autocracies and/or
anocracies has the making for a more volatile outcome.48 The point being that my relatively
parsimonious models have room for exploring theoretically informed interaction effects.
Notwithstanding these opportunities for further research, this dissertation provides multiple
findings that substantiate internal human displacement, because of climate change-related natural
disasters, influences conflict and unrest. The findings indicate a positive relationship, one that is
more in line with conflict theories – more disaster-induced displacement means more conflict,
especially anti-governmental conflict and protest. The relationship however, is neither
deterministic nor linear. The inverted-U result, whereby conflict incidence is greatest for mixed
regimes countries in comparison to anocracies and democracies, is one of the most robust findings
that reaffirms the importance of political institutions. Moreover, finding that conflict incidence
peaks around the third and tenth month following disaster-induced displacement events, and that
displacement and conflict may not spatially overlap, portend opportunity for actionable policy and
interventions.

48

Another possibility is that youth bulge acts similar to regime type – presenting a curvilinear inverted-U
shaped relationship. This would accord with the theoretical mollification of democracies, the ability and
willingness of autocracies to repress, and the unclear causal mechanisms of anocracy, possibly lack of
resolve or capability for repression, that leads to higher conflict incidence.
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191

Weather &
Climate

Wind

Precipitation

Temperature

Low confidence in projections of extreme winds (with the
exception of increased wind-speed of tropical cyclones).

Very likely increase in length, frequency, and/or intensity
of warm spells or heat waves over most land areas.

Medium confidence in increase in length or
number of warm spells or heat waves in many
(but not all) regions.

Low confidence in trends due to insufficient
evidence.

Virtually certain increase in frequency and magnitude of
unusually warm days and nights at the global scale.

Very likely increase in number of unusually warm
days and nights at the global scale.

Likely increase in frequency of heavy precipitation events
or increase in proportion of total rainfall from heavy falls
over many areas of the globe, in particular in the high
latitudes and tropical regions, and in winter in the northern
mid-latitudes.

Virtually certain decrease in frequency and magnitude of
unusually cold days and nights at the global scale.

Very likely decrease in number of unusually cold
days and nights at the global scale.

Likely statistically significant increases in the
number of heavy precipitation events (e.g., 95th
percentile) in more regions than those with
statistically significant decreases, but strong
regional and sub-regional variations.

Projected changes to 2100.

Observed changes since 1950.

Table A.1 IPCC Assessments & Projections of Climate Change Extremes. Adapted from (Field et al. 2012, 119–20).
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Seasonal
Phenomena
&
Compound
Events

Sea Level

Drought

Likely that sea level rise has led to a change in
extreme coastal high water levels.

In other regions, droughts have become less
frequent, less intense, or shorter, for example,
central North America and northwestern
Australia.

Medium confidence that 1950s some regions of
the world have experienced more intense and
longer droughts, especially in southern Europe
and West Africa.

Low confidence and agreement about changes.

Low confidence in trends because of insufficient
evidence.

Monsoons

Flood

Low confidence that any observed long-term (i.e.,
40 years or more) increases in tropical cyclone
activity are robust.

Tropical
Cyclones

Very likely that mean sea level, rather than storm surges,
rise will contribute to upward trends in the future.

Medium confidence of increased duration and intensity in
some regions, including southern Europe and the
Mediterranean region, central Europe, central North
America, Central America and Mexico, northeast Brazil,
and southern Africa.

Medium confidence that projected increases in heavy
rainfall will contribute to increases in rain-generated local
flooding, in some catchments or regions.

Low confidence in projected changes in monsoons,
because of insufficient agreement between climate
models.

Likely increase in heavy rainfall associated with tropical
cyclones.

Likely increase in mean maximum wind speed, but
possibly not in all basins.

Likely decrease or no change in frequency of tropical
cyclones.
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Mass
Movement

High confidence that changes in heat waves,
glacial retreat, and/or permafrost degradation will
influence high mountain phenomena such as slope
instabilities, mass movements, and glacial lake
outburst floods, and medium confidence that
temperature-related changes will influence
bedrock stability.
Low confidence regarding future locations and timing of
large rock avalanches.

High confidence that changes in heavy precipitation will
increase landslides in some regions.
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Assassinate
Impose blockade, restrict
movement
Occupy territory

Attempt to assassinate

Kill by physical assault

Destroy property
Use unconventional
violence, not specified
below
Abduct, hijack, take
hostage
Physically assault, not
specified below
Sexually assault

Seize or damage
property, not specified
below
Confiscate property

ICEWS Sub-type

Use force to take control of somebody else’s
property, confiscate, expropriate.
Use force to destroy, demolish property.
Use of unconventional forms of violence which do
not require high levels of organization or
conventional weaponry, not otherwise specified.
Kidnap, take hostage, hijack, or forcibly seize
control of an aircraft, car, bus, ship, etc.
Attack physical well-being of individuals without
the use of weaponry, not otherwise specified.
Sexually abuse, assault sexual integrity of
individuals.
Kill individuals by physically assaulting them
without the use of weaponry, through beating,
torture, lynching, etc.
Attempt but fail to kill politically significant and
influential persons.
Kill politically significant and influential persons.
Prevent entry into and/or exit from a territory using
armed forces.
Occupy, seize control of a territory using armed
forces.

Use of force against property or violation of
property rights not otherwise specified.

Description
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191

186

185

1823

1821

182

181

180

1712

1711

171

CAMEO code

Anti-Government Conflict

Table A.2 Adaptation of ICEWS data to generate conflict and unrest variables.

Business, Civilian,
Criminals,
Dissident,
Extremist, Gangs,
General population,
Insurgents, Labor,
Mob, NonGovernmental
organizations,
Popular opposition,
Protestors, Radical,
Rebel, Separatists,
Social

Source Sectors

Executive,
Government,
Military, Parties,
Police

Target Sectors
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Destroy property
Use unconventional
violence, not specified
below
Abduct, hijack, take
hostage
Torture
Kill by physical assault

ICEWS Sub-type
Coerce, not specified
below.
Seize or damage
property, not specified
below
Confiscate property

Engage in ethnic
cleansing

Engage in mass killings

Use massive
unconventional force,
not specified below
Engage in mass
expulsion

203

202

201

200

Use force to take control of somebody else’s
property, confiscate, expropriate.
Use force to destroy, demolish property.
Use of unconventional forms of violence which do
not require high levels of organization or
conventional weaponry, not otherwise specified.
Kidnap, take hostage, hijack, or forcibly seize
control of an aircraft, car, bus, ship, etc.
Torture, inflict extreme pain on individuals.
Kill individuals by physically assaulting them
without the use of weaponry, through beating,
torture, lynching, etc.

Use of force against property or violation of
property rights not otherwise specified.

Description
Repression, violence against civilians, or their rights
or properties not otherwise specified.

1823

1822

181

180

1712

1711

171

170

CAMEO code

Non-Governmental Conflict

All uses of unconventional force that are meant to
cause mass destruction, casualties, and suffering not
otherwise specified.
Force large groups of people or populations out of
some territory. This event form is different from
expulsions of diplomats and international or nongovernmental groups (166), and legal deportations
(174).
Kill a substantial number of people, typically with
the intention of ridding a territory of a particular
group of people.
Use mass expulsions and/or mass killings targeting
a specific ethnic group.

Business, Civilian,
Criminals,
Dissident,
Extremist, Gangs,
General population,
Labor, Mob, Nongovernmental
organizations,
Popular opposition,
Radical, Rebel,
Social

Source Sectors

Business, Civilian,
Criminals,
Dissident,
Extremist, Gangs,
General population,
Labor, Mob, Nongovernmental
organizations,
Popular opposition,
Radical, Rebel,
Social

Target Sectors
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Ban political parties or
politicians

Coerce, not specified
below.
Seize or damage
property, not specified
below
Impose restrictions on
political freedoms

ICEWS Sub-type

Engage in ethnic
cleansing

Engage in mass killings

Assassinate
Use massive
unconventional force,
not specified below
Engage in mass
expulsion

Conduct suicide, car, or
other non-military
bombing, not specified
below
Attempt to assassinate

Violate or impose limitations on fundamental
political rights such as freedoms of speech,
expression, and assembly.
Prevent establishment or activities of political
parties or politicians.

Repression, violence against civilians, or their rights
or properties not otherwise specified.
Use of force against property or violation of
property rights not otherwise specified.

Description

Repression

Attempt but fail to kill politically significant and
influential persons.
Kill politically significant and influential persons.
All uses of unconventional force that are meant to
cause mass destruction, casualties, and suffering not
otherwise specified.
Force large groups of people or populations out of
some territory. this event form is different from
expulsions of diplomats and international or nongovernmental groups (166), and legal deportations
(174).
Kill a substantial number of people, typically with
the intention of ridding a territory of a particular
group of people.
Use mass expulsions and/or mass killings targeting
a specific ethnic group.

The use of explosive devices or improvised
explosives outside of military engagements.

1722

1721

171

170

CAMEO code

203

202

201

200

186

185

183

Executive,
Government,
Military, Parties,
Police

Source Sectors

Business, Civilian,
Criminals,
Dissident,
Extremist, Gangs,
General population,
Insurgents, Labor,
Mob, Nongovernmental
organizations,

Target Sectors
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ICEWS Sub-type

Engage in ethnic
cleansing

Engage in mass killings

Assassinate

Attempt to assassinate

Physically assault, not
specified below
Sexually assault

Kill by physical assault

Use unconventional
violence, not specified
below
Torture

Use repression

Impose state of
emergency or martial
law
Arrest, detain

Description

Protest

Kill individuals by physically assaulting them
without the use of weaponry, through beating,
torture, lynching, etc.
Attack physical well-being of individuals without
the use of weaponry, not otherwise specified.
Sexually abuse, assault sexual integrity of
individuals.
Attempt but fail to kill politically significant and
influential persons.
Kill politically significant and influential persons.
Kill a substantial number of people, typically with
the intention of ridding a territory of a particular
group of people.
Use mass expulsions and/or mass killings targeting
a specific ethnic group.

Legal or extrajudicial arrests, detentions, or
imprisonments.
Actively repress collective actions of dissent by
forcing subjugation through crowd control tactics,
arrests, etc.
Use of unconventional forms of violence which do
not require high levels of organization or
conventional weaponry, not otherwise specified.
Torture, inflict extreme pain on individuals.

Suspend normal constitutional rights and provisions
by installing state of emergency or military rule.

CAMEO code

203

202

186

185

1821

182

1823

1822

180

175

173

1724

Source Sectors

Target Sectors

Popular opposition,
Protestors, Radical,
Rebel, Social
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Conduct hunger strike
for rights
Conduct hunger strike
for change in
institutions, regime
Obstruct passage, block,
not specified below
specified.

Conduct hunger strike
for policy change

Conduct hunger strike,
not specified below
Conduct hunger strike
for leadership change

Demonstrate for change
in institutions, regime

1424

144

Protest by blocking entry and/or exit into building or
area, not otherwise specified.

1423

1422

1421

142

1414

1413

1412

1411

141

140

Refuse to eat until demands for major institutional,
constitutional, or regime change.

Protest by refusing to eat until certain demands are
met, not further specified.
Refuse to eat until demands for leadership change
are met. Target should be the actor who is expected
to relinquish power. Hunger strikes that demand
new elections should also be coded here.
Refuse to eat until demands for policy reform are
met. Use this code when protesters demand specific
policy changes or unspecified political reforms.
Refuse to eat until demands for political, social,
economic, or other rights are met.

Dissent collectively, publicly show negative feelings
or opinions; rally, gather to protest a policy, action,
or actor(s).
Dissent collectively, gather, or rally demanding
leadership change.
Dissent collectively, gather, or rally demanding
policy change.
Dissent collectively, gather, or rally demanding
political, social, economic, or other rights.
Dissent collectively, gather, or rally demanding
major institutional, constitutional, or regime change.

Demonstrate or rally, not
specified below

Demonstrate or rally for
leadership change
Demonstrate or rally for
policy change
Demonstrate for rights

All civilian demonstrations and other collective
actions carried out as protests against the target
actor not otherwise specified.

Engage in political
dissent, not specified
below.
Business, Civilian,
Criminals,
Dissident,
Extremist, Gangs,
General population,
Labor, Mob,
Popular opposition,
Protestors, Radical,
Rebel, Social

Unspecified, Any
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Coerce, not specified
below.
Use unconventional
violence, not specified
below
Physically assault, not
specified below

ICEWS Sub-type

Engage in violent protest
to demand change in
institutions, regime

Obstruct passage to
demand leadership
change
Obstruct passage to
demand policy change
Obstruct passage to
demand rights
Obstruct passage to
demand change in
institutions, regime
Protest violently, riot,
not specified below
Engage in violent protest
for leadership change
Engage in violent protest
to demand policy change
Engage in violent protest
to demand rights

Repression, violence against civilians, or their rights
or properties not otherwise specified.
Use of unconventional forms of violence which do
not require high levels of organization or
conventional weaponry, not otherwise specified.
Attack physical well-being of individuals without
the use of weaponry, not otherwise specified.

Description

Unrest

Protest forcefully, in a potentially destructive
manner, to demand major institutional,
constitutional, or regime change.

Protest forcefully, in a potentially destructive
manner, not further specified.
Protest forcefully, in a potentially destructive
manner, to demand leadership change.
Protest forcefully, in a potentially destructive
manner, to demand policy reform.
Protest forcefully, in a potentially destructive
manner, to demand political, social, economic, or
other rights.

Obstruct passage, block entry/exit to demand major
institutional, constitutional, or regime change.

Obstruct passage, block entry/exit to demand policy
reform.
Obstruct passage, block entry/exit to demand
political, social, economic, or other rights.

Obstruct passage, block entry/exit to demand
leadership change.

182

180

170

CAMEO code

1454

1453

1452

1451

145

1444

1443

1442

1441

Executive,
Government,
Military, Parties,
Police

Source Sectors

Unspecified, Any

Target Sectors
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Destroy property

Confiscate property

Kill by physical assault

Sexually assault

Sexually abuse, assault sexual integrity of
individuals.
Kill individuals by physically assaulting them
without the use of weaponry, through beating,
torture, lynching, etc.
Use force to take control of somebody else’s
property, confiscate, expropriate.
Use force to destroy, demolish property.
1712

1711

1823

1821

Business, Civilian,
Criminals,
Dissident,
Extremist, Gangs,
General population,
Labor, Mob,
Popular opposition,
Radical, Rebel,
Separatists, Social
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Distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action directed toward members of a distinct “other” group or
government authorities. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) can be identified.
Distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action directed toward members of a distinct “other” group or
government authorities. In this event, clear leadership or organization cannot be identified.
Distinct, continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct “other” group or government
authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property damage. In this event, clear
leadership or organization(s) can be identified.
Distinct, continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct “other” group or government
authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property damage. In this event, clear
leadership or organization(s) cannot be identified.

Organized
demonstration
Spontaneous
demonstration
Organized violent riot

Spontaneous violent
riot

Description

Protest

Description
Distinct violent event waged primarily by a non-state group targeting individual, or “collective
individual,” members of an alleged oppositional group or movement. As distinguished from riots, at least
one actor must have a semi-permanent or permanent militant wing or organization. Government
authorities are not listed as actors or targets.

Non-Governmental Conflict

Description
Distinct violent event waged primarily by a non-state group against government authorities or symbols of
government authorities (e.g., transportation or other infrastructures). As distinguished from riots, the antigovernment actor must have a semi-permanent or permanent militant wing or organization.

SCAD sub-type

SCAD sub-type
Extra-government
violence

SCAD sub-type
Anti-government
violence

Anti-Government Conflict

Table A.3 Adaptation of SCAD data to generate conflict variables.
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SCAD sub-type
Pro-government
violence (Repression)

Description
Distinct violent event waged primarily by government authorities, or by groups acting in explicit support
of government authority, targeting individual, or “collective individual,” members of an alleged opposition
group or movement. Note that this event is initiated by the government or pro-government actors. See
code for repression, below.

Repression

Table A.4 Descriptive statistics for chapter 5 country-month analyses, global coverage.

Variables

Mean
Aggregate*

Conflict

ICEWS

IDMC
Displacement

EM-DAT

Controls

16.33

Anti0.31
government
Non0.27
governmental

Std.

Min.

Max.

Dev.
90.33

0

2,964

2.10

0

91

1.18

0

29

N

Years

17,928

2008-2016

Repression

15.74

89.65

0

2,948

Protest

10.46

45.15

0

1,738

Unrest

0.30

1.78

0

80

IDP per
capita1/3
IDP event
count1/3
Total
affected per
capita1/3
Total
affected
event count1/3
(ln) GDP pc

0.01

0.03

0

0.79

0.16

0.42

0

3.04

0.01

0.04

0

1.02

0.09

0.30

0

1.91

8.31

1.43

5

11.42

16,920

Polity2

4.52

5.69

-10

10

15,024

Polity22

273.26

148.18

1

441.00

15,024 2008-2016

1.47

1.23

-3.11

7

17,748

33.68

9.83

0

48.34

17820

Population
Growth
Youth Bulge

7,872

17,928 2008-2016

* Aggregate combines anti-governmental, non-governmental, and repression.
X1/3 indicates transformation using cube root. ln indicates transformation using natural log.
Unit of analysis is country-month.
Number of countries: 166
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2013-2016

7,968

Table A.5 Assessing spatial dependence of conflict Bangladesh using global Moran’s I.

Variable

Moran’s Index

Expected Index

z-score

p-value

Anti-government conflict

0.095

-0.015

2.401

0.016

Non-governmental conflict

-0.071

-0.015

-0.764

0.444

Repression

0.062

-0.015

1.035

0.300

Protest

0.040

-0.015

0.863

0.388

Unrest

0.051

-0.015

0.894

0.371

Unit of analysis is Bangladesh’s 64 districts (zilas) during years 2008-2016.
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Figure A.1 Formula for Moran’s I to assess global spatial dependence. Source: (ESRI 2018b).
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Figure A.2 Formula for the Anselin Local Moran’s I statistic to assess local spatial dependence
and identify clusters and outliers. Source: ESRI (2018a).
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